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SUMMARY of THESIS 
This thesis as a whole seeks to rehabilitate Swift's major 
satires, especially Gulliver's Travels, as essential texts for a 
modern readership, both in the light of recent critical work and 
in the light of later twentieth-century historical experience. 
The argument throughout is fundamentally concerned with this 
task, and its importance is stressed at many points in the 
thesis. 
Chapter One is a survey of criticism of Gulliver's Travels 
fro m S wi f t ' s day too u r 0 wn , and the jus t i f i cat ion for 
undertaking what must seem to many a work of supererogation, 
given the number of such surveys over the years, is to be found 
in the fact that the task of re-instating Swift's works, though 
greatly advanced, is far from complete. Given the large number 
of widely-divergent views on the meaning of Gulliver's Travels, 
the author believes it to be both helpful and necessary to 
provide an interpretation of the history of the criticism of the 
book in order to clear the ground, and lay the foundations for a 
different hypothesis, one based, as the Chapter argues, as 
accurately as possible on the actual text itself. The problems 
of biography, though not the chief concern of the thesis, are 
touched upon where it is felt they impinge upon a clear 
interpretation of the works, for in Swift, perhaps above all 
writers, the biography has become so intimately, and shamefully, 
interwoven with the literature as to make it a primary 
requirement on the part of any critic to attempt to disentangle 
the mat s u c h poi n t s as the y pre v e n t c 1 ear and pro per 
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understanding of the books' message. 
Chapter Two seeks to provide the historical background to 
the general argument about Swift and our own age. In order to 
say what Swift is today, it seems only proper to establish what 
he was, and was not, in his own day. His roots are found to be 
in the seventeenth rather than the eighteenth century, especially 
in the political, religious and moral dilemmas posed by the 
events surrounding the Civil War. In order to substantiate this 
contention, a comparison is made between Swift and Locke and 
between Swift and Hobbes. The crucial questions of human nature 
and the role of law in society are discussed, and Swift is found 
to be nearer to Hobbes on the vital moral issues, closer to Locke 
on the political issues. The former association is argued to be 
more important, since the question of human motivation 
necessarily underlies all else. The argument that Swift is a 
Hobbesian is not pursued too far, given Swift's fierce 
independence and his loyalty to the Church of England, which is 
seen as his primary loyalty, for both political and religious 
reasons. 
Chapter Three explores the background to the utopianism of 
Gulliver's Travel, traces it to its origins, and finally 
establishes its limitations. The origins of the utopian elements 
of Houyhnhnmland are traced to Plato via Sir Thomas More, whose 
Utopia forms an important bridge between the utopias of classical 
antiquity and that of Swift. Utopia and Gulli ver' ~ Travels are 
then compared and studied at length in order to demonstrate that 
they belong to a nonliteral utopian tradition, one that does not 
believe in the possibility of the realisation of utopia, but 
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wh1ch presents it as an absolute, unattainable ideal. The 
mentality behind creating such utopias is found to be a shared 
attitude towards history, an attitude which interprets history as 
wicked, senseless, and something to be feared. The good life 
could only be achieved by escape from history, according to this 
tradition, except for the fact that history cannot be evaded. 
Consequently, such utopias are not programmes of action, 
something towards which we may work, but presentations of 
abstract ideals. The other utopian tradition - the literal is 
found to be the enemy of such a view, since it believes that 
history can be overcome and utopia established on earth. Swift's 
attitude towards this other utopian mentality is discovered in 
Gulliver'~ Travels, where its proponents are excoriated as evil, 
deluded, and mad dreamers who can only bring about chaos and 
disaster. In this attack on the Modern utopists Swift's true 
forte is discovered, for his pallid description of utopia is as 
nothing compared to the genius of his satiric onslaught on his 
opponents. The fullest expression of this attack is argued to 
be in A Tale of a Tub, a wide-ranging satire on the Modern 
~ 
mentality which begins as an expose of fraudulence and ends as an 
unremitting and disturbing exploration of the human condition 
itself. 
Chapter Four advances the argument, and also attempts to 
pull it together in a final synthesis. George Orwell is proposed 
as a kind of modern counterpart to Swift, a writer whose infamy 
Orwell also partly inherited. A study of his relationship to 
Swift via his essay on Swift cements the bond discovered between 
the two wri ters • A study of Orwell's last two novels, Animal 
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Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, follows, and a comparison between 
the pessimism found there and that found in Gulliver'~ Travels is 
drawn. The vital link between Swift and Orwell is argued to be 
their assessment of the crucial need for man to strip himself of 
his illusions about himself, as a prelude to reform. The fact 
that both appear, at times, to state more than this is also 
noted, and also the potentially nihilistic vision of their major 
satires. A brief glimpse of twentieth-century literary and 
philosophical trends substantiates the view that the optimistic 
vision of man and of his future possibilities is rapidly becoming 
discredi ted, and suggests that a maj or reassessment of who (and 
what) we truly are is now widely recognised as important, even 
mandatory. 
The thesis concludes with the contention that in exposing 
this moral Achilles heel in man, Swift (like Orwell) deserves to 
be counted among his benefactors, for its exposure, and the 
importance of facing up to the task of remedying it, are argued 
to be essential for our survival. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GULLIVER'S TRAVAILS: THE REHABILITATION 
OF A CLASSIC 
The task of rehabilitating Swift has been a major critical 
concern throughout our century, and most critics have undertaken 
some part of this work in their writings on the great Dean. The 
biographical scandals, misapplication of life to the works, 
banishment of the acceptable parts to the nursery and the 
unacceptable parts to damnation, the charges of madness, 
misanthropy and vicious spleen all these aspects of past 
cri ticism have been re-examined, and largely dispelled in our 
time. 
And yet, despite the obvious debt owed to past critics by 
critics of the second half of the twentieth century, the 
controversy over Swift's beliefs, the kind of man he was, the 
essential meaning of the great satires and the true relationship 
between life and works remains very much alive. It would appear 
that the man who wrote a treatise whose purpose was to 
"wonderfully mend the world", 1 and who read each passage to a 
servant to ensure simplicity and intelligi bili ty, 2 has left as 
a legacy to mankind one of the eternal enigmas of literature: 
what is Gulliver's Travels saying to us? 
If the work of our own age has removed certain obvious 
obstructions to arriving at conclusions about the Travels, it has 
equally left many more intact and, I will argue, added certain 
other obstructions, perhaps even more vital to remove if any 
advance in Swift-studies is to be possible. 
1 
That Swift was a madman, a misanthrope, an atheist priest, 
as the nineteenth century claimed, no one would, I believe, now 
attempt to claim. The truth of his ailments, his generosity to 
friends, his humour and his devotion to the Anglican Church are 
now more-or-less universally accepted premises upon which to base 
any judgment or evaluation of our greatest satirist. 
But what has been the cost of such advances? For that 
some cost is involved forms a central pillar in the fabric of my 
argument that somehow Swift scholarship has gone awry and 
fundamentally so. I contend that the mistakes - and such I 
believe them to be - of more recent writers on Swift constitute a 
perversion of the great satires and in particular Gulliver .... s 
Travels - which one should be anxious to correct. In this 
introductory Chapter it will be my aim to assess the major 
strains of Swift-study, discover where they are mistaken, and 
propose what I hope will be a more accurate and faithful 
hypothesis. My prime concern will be to rescue Swift from the 
charge that he is somehow a sheep in wolf .... s clothing. As Patrick 
Reilly has suggested: the task of rehabilitating Swift having 
been achieved, our purpose is now to attempt the rehabilitation 
of Lemuel Gulliver. 3 
It must be stated from the outset that the purpose of this 
introductory Chapter is not to destroy in toto the fabric of 
Swift criticism in our age. The contentions will always be 
tempered by a candid admission that most of the critics mentioned 
contribute something positive, necessary and helpful to the study 
of Swift in our time. I believe only that, in correcting the 
nineteenth-century view of Swift, they have gone too far to the 
2 
opposite extreme, and my objections are primarily concerned with 
the ultimate emasculation of Swift's great book and its message 
which their criticism produces. 
In order to undertand why it was necessary to undergo a 
process of reclamation at all, we must first appreciate the 
legacy of Swift criticism as it existed at the start of the 
twentieth century. 
On its publication Gulliver's Travels was an immediate 
popular success. The buzz and hubbub surrounding the event are 
well enough documented for there to be no doubt about this. His 
friend Gay wrote that "From the highest to the lowest it is 
universally read, from the Cabinet-council to the 4 Nur sery" , a 
fact confirmed by a letter from Arbuthnot: "Gulliver is in Every 
body's Hands". 5 As to the actual reactions to the book itself, 
one will search in vain for a recorded vilification which would 
have justified the extreme caution which Swift employed in the 
matter of the book's publication. 6 "I find no considerable man 
very angry at the book", wrote Pope, adding only that "some 
indeed think it rather too bold".7 
But by and large the reports of the time are either 
complimentary or humorous: the Dublin bishop who declared that 
the book was "full of improbable lies, and for his part, he 
hardly believed a word of it"; 8 the old gentleman who, having 
read the book, immediately consulted his map, in order to locate 
Lilliput; the sea-captain who claimed to have known Gulliver -
these are the almost-legendary, good-humoured anecdotes which 
were proper indications of the book's general reception. 9 
Even so, the root of the great debate which has since 
3 
surrounded the Travels is evident, if subdued, even this 
early.lO The origin of the book's essential epithet 
'controversial' - can be fairly ascribed to Bolingbroke's remark, 
quoted by Gay, that it was "a design of evil consequence to 
depreciate human nature."ll In this remark, not greatly 
regarded at the time, lies, of course, the origin of the ensuing 
struggle over the book. Taken side-by-side with Arbuthnot's 
famous statement that "Gulliver is a happy man that at his age 
can write such a merry work" 12 , we have in " . precl.s the two 
'angels' which have contended for domination over Swift's great 
masterwork. I mention this fact here in the hope that it will be 
remembered when I come to deal with the twentieth-century 
critics, because I believe it to be a fundamental, crucial 
dichotomy. 
The eighteenth century produced a critical balance in 
favour of Bolingbroke's view. It was, however, always accepted 
that Swift was a supreme stylist and his writing merited the 
highest praise, even from detractors. His conciseness of style, 
said Boyle, "has never been equalled by any other writer" .13 
Even Dr. Johnson, who on Boswell's testimony did not like Swift 
and used to attack him "upon all . ,,14 occaSl.ons , concluded his 
unenthusiastic appraisal of the Dean with the following tribute: 
"perhaps no writer can easily be found that has borrowed so 
Ii ttle, or that in all his excellences and his defects has so 
. d d .. 1 ,,15 well maintained his claim to be consl. ere as orl.gl.na • 
Nonetheless, the prospect of the Fourth Voyage was a 
different matter entirely, the general consensus being that the 
book was a bad idea, and an even worse execution. "In painting 
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Yahoos he becomes one himself, ,,16 said Boyle. Delaney judged 
the Travels to be ill-advised, ill-considered and badly executed 
and asserted the following: "Who would not wish rather to be 
author of one Arcadia than fifty Laputas, Lilliputs and 
Houyhnhnms?,,17 Other critics described the Travels variously 
as "this unnatural filth" , (1781)18 "very unsatisfactory 
reasoning", (1822)19 and "disease, deformity and filth", 
(1779-81)20 and the overall picture was of a man and a book 
preoccupied by, if not obsessed with, humanity and life in its 
most debased, brutal and nasty lights. This is not to say that 
Swift was without defenders of his Travels. Godwin claimed Swift 
as a friend to humanity and saw the Travels as displaying "an 
ardent love of everything that is excellent and honourable to the 
human heart",21 and even into the nineteenth century we may 
still find Hazlitt's exuberant celebration of the book's message: 
"It is an attempt to tear off the mask of imposture from the 
world; and nothing but imposture has a right to complain of 
't ,,22 1 • 
Thereafter, until the twentieth century, we find a 
critical field largely held by detractors, and a growing concern 
over the Fourth Voyage. Swift's death in unfortunate 
circumstances became the source of numerous and injurious myths, 
all of which were fostered and nurtured in this critical period. 
A painful ailment and a bitterly painful exile combined to make 
Swift's last words and actions reflect a cruel twilight before a 
longed-for night. The significance of this would not have been 
so great, had it not been for the undue, and unfounded, emphasis 
placed upon the Dean's completely misunderstood illness. For it 
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was to cast a giant shadow not only over the period of his life 
to which it pertains, but backwards over his entire life and 
career. The diagnosis of 'madness' by persons not in the least 
qualified to judge the matter was to prove disastrous. 
It must be noted in passing that what this period 
represents must be viewed from a broader perspective than simply 
that of literary criticism. The late eighteenth and, to a much 
greater extent, the nineteenth century were marked by a growing 
optimism about man, society and the future. 23 The philosophes, 
the French Revolution, the rise of humanism, industrialization, 
social and political reform: these are the indicators of the 
philosophical and political perspectives of the times. The 
proper study of philosophical concepts of man and human destiny, 
and Swift's place in that scheme of things, will be the subject 
of the succeeding Chapter to this, and detailed examination of 
such matters will be found there. For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, it must be noted simply that the period in 
the 'history of ideas' to which Swift belonged, namely the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, was the age which least 
bore the mark of optimism and was therefore unlikely to be 
favoured by the thoroughgoing, complacent positivism of the 
nineteenth century. Swift's age was regarded as an intellectual 
and moral 'dark age', satire its most odious expression, and he 
d . b . t 24 an Pope 1tS most 0 V10US proponen s. 
By the time the Victorians came to have their say, the 
Fourth Voyage had already been singled out as the thoroughly 
pernicious item in Swift's oeuvre, a tragic appendage to a book 
which was otherwise largely praiseworthy. 
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The most famous - or perhaps infamous - of the Victorian 
critics was of course Thackeray, whose essay on Swift in The 
English Humourists (the irony is inescapable) contains a torrent 
of abuse heaped upon a "madman" in what is perhaps the greatest 
age of optimism and self-satisfaction in the history of English 
letters. The attack centred upon the Fourth Voyage, and the 
Yahoo in particular. Thackeray's suggestion that those who had 
not read the last Voyage of the book should spare themselves the 
degradation of so doing, 25 amply demonstrates the effect which 
this satire, written, Swift would have us believe, to 
"wonderfully mend the world", 26 had on the sensibilities of the 
d 1 V· . d 27 aut lctorlan rea er. Finding it impossible to dissociate 
Swift from his work, and finding the work impossible to accept 
and odious to contemplate, Thackeray sought to upbraid the book's 
author on grounds not restricted to the field of literary 
criticism. Since the man believed his fellow-creatures to be 
Yahoos, he could not have been a decent human being, and 
Thackeray took up the cudgels to some extent from Johnson here in 
turning the biography against the man in order to prove the 
veracity of his claims about the Travels. 
Two important assertions made by Thackeray were: firstly, 
that the message of the book was incompatible with a Christian 
view of man, and consequently Swift could not have been a 
Christian; and secondly, that association between Swift and 
Gulliver unswervingly assumed the man who produced such a 
misanthropic, warped and bitter view of mankind could not in fact 
have been sane. In upholding the first assertion Thackeray 
scoured the life of the Dean in order to find evidence, which he 
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believed he did. Evidence of Swift's expediency in matters of 
religion was found in his advice to his friend Gay, an unlikely 
candidate indeed for the Church, to take holy 28 orders. His 
religion was "hypocrisy", a complete sham, and Thackeray 
concludes of Swift's religion that "he had bent his pride so far 
down as to put his apostasy out to hire.,,29 But even the 
demolition of Swift's beliefs was not enough. Such an outrage 
was the Travels to Thackeray that it could not be explained even 
by its author's being a time-serving, self-seeking hypocrite, or 
by the absence of religious doctrine in the book itself. Hence 
the second assertion that Swift was a madman. The intention to 
imply it seems obvious in the following diatribe against the 
'hero' of the Travels: 
a monster gibbering shrieks, and 
imprecations against mankind - tearing 
shreds of modesty, past all sense of 
and shame; filthy in w~5d, filthy in 
furious, raging, obscene. 
gnashing 
down all 
manliness 
thought, 
In any event, the connection between such misanthropy and madness 
was soon made, and, indeed, after Scott's assertion that such a 
vicious and brutally degraded vision of man consti tuted "the 
first impressions of • • • incipient mental disease", 31 Lecky and 
many others took up the idea and it became more-or-less a 
" " . .. h S . ft 32 commonplace to speak of madness In connectlon Wlt Wl • 
A hypocritical clergyman, an exposed misanthrope, and a 
fully-diagnosed madman were the three dimensions which 
constituted the Swift which critics of our century were presented 
wi th and consequently a Gulliver's Travels de based, distorted, 
8 
disdained and discarded. 
Faced with such a legacy, the twentieth century has seen 
it as its proper duty to undertake the rehabilitation of Swift 
and his great satire from the critical and biographical dungeon 
into which the nineteenth century had cast them. Patrick Reilly 
has perceived two 'schools' of criticism involved in the task, 
which he has denominated 'Christian' and 'formalist' and, since I 
believe both his perception and his classification to be correct, 
I will henceforth use his terms to denote these critics. 33 
The first 'school' - the 'Christian' critics - employs the 
same techniques as Thackeray and co. to defeat his view of 
Swift. Thackeray had used the biography to denigrate the life 
and thence the work, and so these critics re-examined the life in 
order to reinstate the man and the work. It will be observed 
that such critics show no greater tendency than the Victorians to 
separate man and work. It is purely the results achieved which 
constitute the reinstatement of Swift. Since Thackeray had 
concluded that Swift was a diseased writer who believed men 
incapable of goodness, he was not a Christian; which led the 
Victorian to scour the life of the Dean in order to find the 
instances already noted above which upheld his contention. All 
contradictory evidence, or ambivalent incidents, were not 
mentioned. The modern critics are, however, able to contradict 
such a view and easily find in the biography ample evidence that 
Swift quite definitely was a Christian, committed to his Church 
and his calling. 34 Thus the ground has been cleared for the 
building of a new structure of Swift-criticism which stands 
against the irreligious madman proposed by Thackeray. 
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It is when one considers the object of such an approach 
that one fully realises the similarity with Thackeray. In 
proving that Swift was a good Anglican, these critics suggest 
that the real meaning of the Travels will become evident. If 
Swift was a Christian, then the Travels cannot be the rantings of 
an irreligious lunatic; they cannot represent black despair. 
This is an exact reversal of the Thackeray view, and yet one 
which employs identical means to achieve opposite ends. The 
interpretation of the Travels depends as much for them as for 
their predecessor upon the crucial question of Swift's religion. 
The results may differ, but the underlying assumption is the 
same. In declaring for Swift the Christian, these critics are 
validating Thackeray's approach, and attacking only his results. 
The biography remains the key. As one critic has expressed it, 
in connection with the meaning of the Fourth Voyage: 
"We can, I believe, clarify these matters if we consider the 
relation of Swift's theological views to his satire, bringing 
together the two sides of the man which tradition has separated: 
Jonathan Swift, satirist, and Dr. Swift the Dean.,,35 
Where Thackeray had gone wrong was not in seeking an explanation 
of the Travels in Swift's life, but in seeking it in the wrong 
places in that life, and a new generation of critics has set 
about the task of correctly relating the religious life of the 
Dean to the works of the satirist. 
To begin with, one must surely question such an approach 
on the basis of its methodology. For instance, when Kathleen 
Williams - who has written the most thoroughgoing and convincing 
book from this point of view - chides past critics for their 
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failure to include Swift's other writings in their discussions on 
the Travels, and includes the sermons as an essential concomitant 
to reading the maj or satires, one wonders whether this approach 
is in fact an advance from that of Thackeray. 36 After all, as 
has been pointed out, "they would be very odd sermons indeed that 
were not compatible with Christianity", 37 and one cannot help 
asking the obvious questions which such a coupling of texts 
begs. Is it not true to say that the suggestion that Swift's 
sermons may be used as a key to the Travels is in fact to have 
already made one's mind up about the meaning of the satire? 
Might one not - equally legitimately - take Thackeray's reading 
of the Travels to the sermons and consider them symptomatic of 
religious hypocrisy? For, after all, these critics who read the 
T r a vel s a s C h r i s t ian doc t r i n ear e imp 0 sin g the i r 0 wn 
reinterpreted biography upon the work, declaring that the book is 
Christian not so much because of its contents, as because Swift 
was a Christian. The process involves importation of foreign 
material which is to be presented as domestic produce and, just 
as Thackeray's invented "madman" was used to condemn the work, so 
Tuveson's (quite correctly) reinstated sound Anglican Dean is 
used (quite incorrectly) to tame the Travels. 
We are being asked to believe that because Swift was a 
Christian, the correct interpretation must embody this fact or be 
condemned with the Victorians. Discussion of the book's meaning 
is thus severely restricted, and conj ecture or assessment must 
take place wi thin a framework of selected biography regarding 
religious orthodoxy. To understand Swift's religion is to 
decipher his satire, and literary criticism as such must take 
11 
second place to biography. However well such an approach may 
work wi th other authors, I do not believe it can be allowed to 
apply to Swift. It may be that to know that Sartre is an 
existentialist is the vital key to understanding his Roads to 
Freedom trilogy, since it is clearly the literary embodiment of a 
philosophy of life expressed elsewhere by the author. But does 
it prove as useful with such a complex, varied and multi-faceted 
writer as Swift? However much the reinstatement of Swift as a 
clergyman by these critics is to be admired, it still remains to 
say that this is not by any means the final word on the satires. 
To demand that one should read the satires through a pair of 
Anglican-tinted spectacles is not really legi timate. We should 
rather simply bear in mind that the hypocrite preacher is no 
longer a credible portrait and then read the work for what we 
find it to say. 
The 'Christian' viewpoint is important to discuss because 
it has been asserted that it is "the now dominant interpretation 
of the Fourth Voyage,,38 and a closer look at the claims of 
these critics is therefore not only desirable but necessary. The 
most important contention of the 'Christian' critics is that 
Swift's religion is crucial to the Fourth Voyage, and that this 
book represents some kind of defence of the Christian faith, and 
in particular the Anglicanism of its creator. Kathleen Williams, 
prominent among these critics, assumes in her book a clear 
connection between the sermons and the Travels, suggesting that 
the ideas and motivation behind the major satires are identical 
to those behind the Anglican sermons. Yet, beyond the statement 
that Swift was a sincere churchman, no positive proof of such an 
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assertion is provided. But is this really as unexceptionable a 
claim as its proponents suggest? Is it so self-evident that one 
may accept it more-or-Iess as a truism that a Christian's book 
will - indeed must - be Christian? The answer must lie in a 
study of the text: this alone must be the acid test of such 
assumptions. 
It is when we do examine Gulliver's Travels that we feel 
the ground beneath these critics tremble and give way. For, 
instead of supporting religion, the book, insofar as it mentions 
the subject at all, seems to undermine the spiritual life of man 
every bit as much as the physical aspects of his nature. The 
references have been assessed as follows: 
Aside from the Third Book's transient assault on 
the 'Christianity' of the Dutch, religion only 
appears twice: in the first book as a 
preposterous source of schism among the 
Lilliputians • • • and, in the Fourth Book as a 
cause of modern warfare. In both instances Swift 
points out the trivial grounds and j9vil 
consequences of religious controversy itself. 
There seems little evidence of even a concealed attempt to uphold 
Christian values in these passages, and when the doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body appears to be mentioned in Book One, we 
find Gulliver stating that "the Learned among them confess the 
Absurdity of this Doctrine; but the Practice still continues, in 
Compl iance to the Vulgar. ,,40 One begins to wonder whether 
Tuveson's description of the Travels as one of "the defenses of 
" db" f' d 41 religion of that ay can e Just1 1e • 
Despite the fact that Gulliver refers to religious 
doctrine as , , f f ". h F th V 42 .. things indi erent 1n t e our oyage, 1t 1S 
13 
argued that this book is a defence of Christianity against modern 
humanism and other fashionable theories of human nature. 
Williams states that Swift places humanity not only above the 
Yahoos by virtue of possessing a rational intellect, but even 
above the Houyhnhnms by virtue of being granted the possibility 
of Christian salvation. 43 But even if it is true that Swift 
believed this himself, it must be substantiated from the book 
itself if we are to accept it. The notion that man is superior 
to beasts because of his reason is the primary satirical object 
of the whole book. The Houyhnhnm master declares that 
when a Creature pretending to Reason, could be 
capable of such Enormities [Gulliver has been 
describing modern warfare] he dreaded lest the 
Corruption of that Faculty might be worse than 
Brutality itself. He seemed therefore confident, 
that instead of Reason, we were only possessed of 
some Quality fitted to increase our natural 
Vices; as the Reflection from a troubled Stream 
returns the Image of an il\4shapen Body, not only 
larger, but more distorted. 
This tallies with his final judgment on man when he supposes 
"what Qualities a Yahoo of their Country, with a Small Proportion 
of Reason, might be capable of exerting: And concluded, with too 
much Probability, how vile as well as miserable such a Creature 
must be".45 
These passages seem to me to undermine the notion that the 
Yahoos are not intended as a satire on man, or that we are 
superior to them because of our ratiocinative capacity. It is 
surely part of the whole attack on human pride to suggest that 
the attribute which we most value - and of which we are most 
proud - is neither a benefit to us nor indicative of superiority 
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over any beast. As one critic has expressed it: 
The notion that men use their reason to make 
themsel ves worse rather than better was not 
invented by Swift, but it disturbingly weakens 
the contrary assurance that it is after all by 
virtue et our reason that we are better than the 
Yahoos. 
And yet the 'Christian' critics suggest not only that man is 
superior to the Yahoos, but that he is superior to the Houyhnhnms 
themselves, because he is capable of Christian redemption. Is it 
not the case that whose who suggest such a reading of the Travels 
"are simply leaping into a void, supplying the links between 
horses and the Kingdom of Heaven out of such airy materials as 
they discover in their own predispositions.,,?47 
Having offered a definition of Swift, they proceed to extend this 
def ini tion to the Travels wi thout evidence or indeed any 
substantial indicative material drawn from within the book 
itself. This amounts to a literary equivalent of the magician's 
sleight of hand: the implications which they put into the Travels 
are presented as inferences drawn from the book. 
From their point of view, the statement that man is 
superior to the horses is backed up by the supposed presentation 
of "deism" in the Houyhnhnm ethics. 48 This .... fact.... discredits 
Gulliver in his admiration for the horses and distances Swift 
both from his hero and the Houyhnhnms. As an Anglican who 
steadfastly opposes deism in his pamphlets and tracts, he quite 
clearly cannot present as unambiguous Utopia a country dominated 
by deist principles. It is undeniable that Swift would never 
have credited a system governed by deists; but are the horses of 
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that persuasion? The vote is very far from unanimous on the 
issue, and such an eminent scholar as Herbert Davis has dismissed 
the notion,49 while others have called it an "impossible 
notion" among other things. 50 It is surely, then, a matter 
which requires verification of some sort; yet none is offered. 
The statement that "Swift has not failed in his task of making 
his meaning clear to the candid reader,,51 would be a dangerous 
one in almost any context of discussion of the great Dean; but in 
the present case seems presumptuous to the point of arrogance. 
The idea that in the Fourth Voyage Swift is satirising deism at 
all belongs with the great inventions of the present century: it 
had occurred to no critic (to my knowledge) of any previous age. 
Again one looks at the secondary literature on Swift to 
find no lack of voices prepared to back one's instinctive 
opposition to such a proposition. It has been said that the 
notion is not "one that most common readers, past or present, 
have 1 . d t ,,52 spontaneous y arrlve a, and this can easily be 
verified by a study of the history of Swift criticism. 
Furthermore, since the true lesson of the book was evidently so 
subtly and imperceptibly presented, we may feel it legitimate to 
say that: 
there needs to be very good reasons for supposing 
that he concealed his satirical point not only 
from the Vulgar bu: a~o from the Learned for 
more than two centurles. 
As Anglican apologetics opposing deist principles the book has 
markedly failed to advertise itself. Unless we are to infer that 
virtually everyone who has read the book, apart from Professor 
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Williams and friends, is a good deal less "candid" than 
proponents of this view, one is led to the conclusion that the 
failure on the part of critics to interpret the book as a defence 
of Swift's religion and an attack on that of the deists for 
almost two hundred years is a twenty-four carat conundrum. That 
our age alone should have discovered such an intention in the 
Travels is remarkable; but that Swift should have chosen to 
conceal such an intention is extraordinary. 
However, one of the proponents of this reading perhaps 
gives himself away in the following blunt assertion: 
That Swift fought deism as a subversive force is 
well known. What is not so well known, however, 
is that he carried on the same struggle against 
such religious heresy through S£he symbolic 
Houyhnhnms in his most famous work. 
Indeed, one feels, it is not well known! If one compares 
understanding of the main allegory of the Tale with that of 
Gulliver's Travels at the time of publication and beyond, one 
finds that the modern reading of the Tale as a satire on abuses 
of three branches of religion the Catholic, Anglican, and 
Presbyterian Churches - is the same as has been professed by men 
of all ages. But when one regards the new vision of 
Houyhnhnmland as a land of deists, one looks in vain for a critic 
prophetic or even perceptive enough to have discovered it before 
our time. The question, then, still remains to be answered: why 
should Swift have shrouded his 'true' meaning? One critic has 
assessed the case thus: 
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Only two reasons can be conj ec tured: either he 
was insufficiently skilled as a writer to make 
his real purpose clear or he had motives for 
keeping it dark. The first possibility can be 
dismissed at once; and as for the second, it is 
hard to see what reason for concealment he could 
have had. 55 
When all is said and done, the reason which strikes the reader 
wi th most conviction is that the attack on the deists is 
invisible to most readers because it is not there. In concluding 
that Swift had no such intention in the Travels, one states only 
what one finds in the text, and must settle for such a conclusion 
as being consistent with the text, even if it explodes a pet 
thesis about the book's provenance. 
The discussion at present is really about methodology, 
about ways in which one ought to approach a subject in order to 
achieve the best, and therefore most honest, conclusions. Karl 
Popper, eminent philosopher and scientist, has asserted that 
"every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or 
to refute it", and points out that one does not formulate a 
theory and seek confirmatory evidence; but rather one tries every 
method possible to disprove it. If at the end of exhaustive 
experiment one's theory proves to be the least disprovable, then 
the theory can fairly claim to hold the field until a superior 
hypothesis appears on the scene. 56 Popper adds the important 
comment that "it is easy to obtain confirmations, or 
verifications, for nearly every theory if we look for 
f 0 0 ,,57 h 0 h Ok con 1rmat10ns, w 1C str1 es one as a just assessment of the 
matter. R. S. Crane, in an excellent refutation of the 
'Christian' approach, says the same: we can regard a theory as 
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f ac t "only when, havi ng impartially considered all the 
counter-possibilities we can think of, we find disbelief in it 
more difficult to maintain than belief.,,58 Crane attacks 
Williams's reference to the "age of compromise" in which Swift 
supposedly wrote, and under whose influence he gave a particular 
meaning to the Travels. The message is really that we should use 
more of our reason and less of our brute instincts to achieve a 
via media of Anglican Christianity. 
But Crane objects to the whole process, which Patrick 
Reilly has 
categories", 
described 
of giving 
as "hypos ta tiza tion of methodological 
59 concrete life to abstract concepts. 
To carry forward such an approach, to regard a period in the 
his tory of ideas "as the age of something or other, where the 
something or other is designated by an abstract term like 
, compromise''', is to give ideas a kind of historical substance 
which abstract terminology should not be able - or allowed - to 
possess. 60 It is not by any means enough, Crane concludes, for 
a critic to assert "that the work makes sense when it is 'read' 
as the hypothesis dictates", for a multiplicity of 'readings' can 
be argued which do not emanate from the text. 61 When one 
'Christian' critic says that "Swift the clergyman repeats himself 
in Gulliver's Travels," he is guilty of the sin we have been 
discussing: assuming the truth of a hypothesis and applying it 
uncritically to a work of literature. 62 In the hypothesis he 
proposes, Swift the Dean and Swift the satirist are one man, and 
when he turns to the text it is no surprise that he finds the 
evidence which is implicit in the original assumption. In saying 
how he will read the text, he is in fact predisposing himself to 
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find what he is looking for. In reference to two 'Christian' 
works by Kallich and Winton which adopt a similar stance, Crane 
observes a similar effect: "The ground is thus laid, in both 
essays, for a confirmatory argument in which the use of textual 
evidence is wholly dominated by the exigencies of the thesis to 
be proved.,,63 
It is not the 'history of ideas' approach per se which one 
opposes, but its misuse to prove a hypothesis. Crane himself 
uses the approach to suggest an interpretation of the Fourth 
Voyage based upon the philosophical background of Swift's 
learning. The idea that the horse is the exemplary beast above 
whom man towers by virtue of his reason is reversed to disprove 
the thesis - which Swift opposed in a letter to Pope - that man 
is animal rationale. Swift's modification to "only rationis 
capax" suggests that the reversal in Book IV of the Travels is 
meant to be clear to his fellows. 64 The reversal and the book 
are a challenge to man's self-perception, a challenge which would 
be null were the Houyhnhnms to be objects of satire. It seems 
clear that Swift would not have given man such an easy loophole 
through which to escape from his invective, if it was to be at 
all effective. His declared intention in his writing - that he 
wrote "to vex the world rather than divert it,,65 would be 
inappropriate to the Travels unless the horses were an ideal of 
something which man pretends to possess himself. As another 
critic has put it: 
We may replace the equine symbol by what ideal we 
please: Swift's reproach is not alone that our 
conduct falls short of the mark within our reach, 
but as well that we regard the ultimate mark as 
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attainable. We fail 
Brobdingna~ians, and we 
Houyhnhnms. 6 
to approach the 
suppose we can be 
This strikes one, I believe, with the force of truth. 
Swift's work is an assault upon human pride, which fact has 
struck most readers on first reading the Travels. The force of 
the invective has always been acknowledged; the energy, the 
single-mindedness and the inclusiveness of the attack readily 
accepted by most readers. The challenge to man, not merely to 
prove himself rational, but to say how he is better than the 
beasts, has been recognised even by later poets. Goldsmith 
copies Swift in a poem of similar intention: "Reason, they say, 
belongs to man,/ But let them prove it if they can.,,67 The 
Swift ian impulse behind this poem parallels the charge behind the 
Travels: prove that you are what you say you are. The 
implication behind the statement "brute beasts are far before 
, em" is also the same as the Fourth Voyage. 68 The whole satire 
is self-evidently both an attack on pride and a challenge to 
prove a long-held self-perception, and when the 'Christian' 
critics attempt to divert the implicit attack in the book from 
themselves and their fellow-men and to infer that Swift's message 
for man is, in fact, a palliatory one, they are conspicuously 
guilty of the kind of reaction which Swift knew satire always 
arouses: self-defence. In the Tale he acknowledges the 
hopelessness of trying to amend men through the medium of satire: 
"Tis but a Ball bandied to and fro, and every Man carries a 
Racket about Him to strike it from himself among the rest of the 
,69 Company. ' 
The 'Christian' critics, then, fail in a similar way to 
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the Victorians. They protected themselves by creating a monster 
whose challenging words were therefore allowed to be disregarded; 
while the new critics who create a message of Anglican 
'compromise' in the book reduce the monster to such a size that 
his words can easily be swallowed without pain, and he may be 
safely restored to the nursery from which Thackeray excluded 
him. But if the present writer declares that he cannot accept 
the 'Christian' view, where Gulliver is deluded, the Yahoos 
unreal, the Houyhnhnms satirised Shaftesburians, and Swift there 
beside us with a pocketful of cosy platitudes, he does so because 
he does not see such components within the book itself. To save 
Swift from Thackeray's denomination of "shrieking madman" at the 
expense of turning him into a quiet church-mouse is, surely, too 
exorbitant a price to pay. 
The second strain of modern critics who have attempted the 
rescue of Swift from the excesses of previous ages are the 
'formalist' critics, who have taken as their primary concern the 
valuable study of the techniques used by Swift to achieve his 
satirical purposes. Maynard Mack has argued that "in the case of 
satire, at any rate, what is desperately needed today is inquiry 
that deals neither with origins nor effects, but with artifice", 
and upbraids the kind of criticism which, when faced with satire, 
cannot separate the man from the work, and reads the contents of 
each satire as the personal opinion and spleen of the author, 70 
a fact also noted by Louis A. Landa, who emphasises the 
unwillingness of critics h 'f f h' " 71 to detac SW1 t rom 1S wr1t1ngs. 
The 'formalists' are one with the 'Christians' at this point, 
asserting that the origins of the misunderstanding of Swift's 
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great satires are to be found in this failure to read the text 
correctly. Emphasis on method leads to a proper evaluation of 
the rhetoric of satire, exposing simple author-character 
equations as absurd and inappropriate. As one critic has 
expres sed it: "We find it hardest of all to admit of any 
distinction between a satirist and his satiric composition - and 
this despite the fact that satire is much more obviously a form 
of rhetoric than is lyric poetry.1I72 
This crucial distinction provides the springboard for a 
critique of Swift's work which will not fall into the trap which 
Thackeray and friends failed to avoid - the failure to appreciate 
satire as an art-form. They had regarded satire as a brutal form 
of literature, the expression of savage instincts and feelings. 
But the 'formalists' argue that satire had always been an 
exuberant, spontaneous explosion of strong emotions which must, 
necessarily, deal in extremes according to its nature. In 
looking at the author as a satiric poet, we must go against the 
Victorian discussion of the man; but this is all to the good. 
It is all to the good primarily because such an approach 
provides an escape-tunnel through which Swift the 1I0grell may be 
helped to escape. 
The chief advantage of such an approach lies in the fact 
that it enables these critics to rehabilitate Swift, both as 
artist and man, the former being implied by the latter. These 
critics, then, correct the Victorians' foolish Gulliver-Swift 
equation by showing that lithe incidents of the book show the 
d1 d . h· h 1111 73 author to be studie y un ercutt1.ng 1.S ero-gu • Thus the 
problem of explaining the undoubted misanthropy of the Travels is 
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solved in a different way from the 'Christians'. They argued 
that the book was in reality expressive of a Christian solution 
to man's dilemma. The 'formalists', however, claim that the book 
was misanthropic, but that the guilt for such misanthropy has 
been attached to the innocent party, and that Swift, far from 
identifying with Gulliver's views, regarded them as absurd, and 
in fact proved this by undercutting the credibility of his 'hero' 
at crucial moments throughout the book. 
The similarity with Thackeray still exists, though the 
"mons ter gibbering shrieks" is now Gulliver, a fact clearly 
proved by Swift in the book. Swift, instead of being at one with 
Gulliver at the crucial moments - such as in the Houyhnhnms - is 
in truth "above him in the realm of comic satire, still indignant 
at the Yahoo in man, but at the same time smiling at the 
absurdity of the view that can see only the Yahoo in man". 74 
The mistake in Thackeray's interpretation, caused by his failure 
to appreciate satire as literary form, is thus rectified, and the 
Travels reinterpreted in such a way as to make Gulliver the 
object of ridicule in his own Voyages. Consequently, the charges 
brought against Swift by previous critics could be fielded easily 
by this process. The 'pride' which Thackeray was so adamant was 
Swi ft' s most dominant and damnable - characteristic, is now 
transferred to Gulliver, "the supreme instance of a creature 
smi tten wi th pride", and the genuine misanthrope of the 
Travels. 75 
Although these studies do not come to identical 
conclusions, and conclusions of course range from Gulliver as 
buffoon to Gulliver as monster, the fundamental approach remains 
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identifiably the same. This approach has been described as one 
in which these critics "distinguish sharply between Swift and 
Gulliver as a preliminary to showing that Gulliver's view of his 
fellow-men as Yahoos is not shared by his creator .,,76 This 
open, uncritical admiration for the rational horses is cited as 
evidence of Gulliver's insanity, since such a view is supposedly 
untenable if attributed to Swift. Under the assumption that 
Swift could not have shared the beliefs of his hippophile hero, 
the 'formalists' conclude that "the last words of Gulliver's 
memoir are part of the complex process of discrediting his vision 
of the world"; 77 and, as a result of this interpretation, the 
long passage at the end of the book in which Gulliver denounces 
the pride of his fellow-men and declares that "I here intreat 
those who have any Tincture of this absurd Vice, that they will 
not presume to appear in my Sight",78 becomes part of what 
Robert C. Elliott calls the "satirist-satirized theme".79 
Swift is giving Gulliver enough rope here to hang himself since 
pride is "a sin of which he himself is conspicuously guilty.II8D 
The obvious purpose of such studies is to suggest much the 
same as Thackeray and co.: namely, that the vision of mankind 
embodied in the Travels, and especially the Fourth Voyage, is 
incompatible with a balanced, sane view of human nature. If 
Swift was not a misanthropic madman, then Gulliver must be, 
because the book is representative of such a world-view, and 
requires a madman to whom its insanity may be properly 
a tt r ibuted. The crucial connection with Victorian diatribes 
consists in the fact that these twentieth-century men, as much as 
their nineteenth- century predecessors, are anxious to "exonerate 
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mankind from the charge of being Yahoos" , and aim to prove that 
Swift did not think so either. 81 The obvious differences from 
Victorian criticism do not conceal a genuine similarity in 
intention. 
In acknowledging the importance of their contribution to a 
fairer and more realistic appraisal of the man and his work, it 
must be said that these people too are guilty of the sin of 
over-correction. Instead of the simplified moral gargoyle 
spewing forth misanthropic bile upon the heads of his fellow-men, 
we see before us an immensely complex, even obscure, if 
consummate, stylist, whose achievements and presentiment of 
ambiguous character foreshadow the work of twentieth-century 
writers, and in particular, it has been suggested, the Henry 
James of The Turn of the 82 Screw. But again the question 
already applied to the 'Christian' argument seems relevant. Why 
should Swift, who on his own admission wrote "To the Vulgar more 
than to the Learned", 83 have failed in his intention in what 
is, despite recent claims for the Tale, generally regarded as his 
magnum opus? Why, in other words, should the meaning of the 
Travels be so obscure that it has required the intricate, 
sophisticated methods of such critics to uncover it? 
Indeed it seems that the subject of the discussion must be 
some other Gulliver's Travels. How otherwise are we to explain 
the gross disparity between Thackeray's conclusions about the 
Travels, and those of the 'formalists'? Thackeray thought the 
book "filthy in thought, filthy in word, furious, raging, 
o bs cene" , 84 and Gosse referred to "the horrible foulness of 
this satire on the Yahoos". 85 The reaction of a modern critic 
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to this same book is that the book is not representative of 
misanthropy at all. Gulliver "does not rail, as the misanthrope 
does, on the imperfections of men". 86 Another claims "Swift 
never meant the Yahoos to be identified closely with humans" and 
cites as proof the fact that "they walk on all fours and are also 
amphibious".87 The reader will easily deduce from this that, 
since neither applies to him, the Yahoo cannot be a satire on 
man. QED. Further evidence is to be found in the fact that the 
capacities of the Yahoos are limited to those appertaining to 
beasts of burden, since they are "the most unteachable of 
brutes".88 The reason for Gulliver's being duped into 
believing that they are ostensibly of human kind is explained as 
being due to Gulliver's "comic lack of understanding,,89 and his 
gullibility in the face of Houyhnhnm insistence to the contrary: 
"despi te the insistence of the Houyhnhnms, he is not at all like 
the beastly Yahoos.,,90 
The Victorian diatribes and the anxiety to exonerate man 
from the charges levelled against him at the end of the Travels 
were, after all, unnecessary. The controversy was merely a storm 
in a critical teacup, and the true nature of the book's meaning 
was now laid bare. In a classic reversal of Swift's famous 
statement, the book was indeed written to divert the world rather 
than to vex it, with the chief diversion being none other than 
Gulliver the madman. Thackeray and co. had misunders tood the 
intention of the Fourth Voyage, and in believing it to be an 
attempt to portray their own society and their fellow-Europeans 
in a bestial, depraved and anarchic condition, consequently had 
expended great amounts of energy in a futile cause. They had 
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made a fundamental error in reading the book. Harold Kelling 
reveals the following: 
Gulliver .... s account to his European master in 
chapters V and VI of a European society made up 
of wholly vicious people is clearly the result of 
his eyes being blinded and his understanding 
perverted by the perfection of the Houyhnhnms ••• 
it is clear that Swift did not present chapters V 
and VI 9fs an accurate picture of European 
society. 
But surely this is the same picture of European society which 
Gulliver witnesses in Lilliput, and the identical conclusion of 
the King of Brobdingnag: that Gulliver .... s fellows were "the most 
pernicious race of odious little vermin that Nature ever suffered 
to crawl upon the surface of the Earth. ,,92 Are we then to 
believe that the apparent truth, not only of the Fourth Voyage, 
but also of the first two, is in effect a clever trick to deceive 
us into accepting at face value what are actually comic lies? We 
will return to this issue later, since it is patently a crucial 
one to clear up. 
What we are really dealing with in such interpretations is 
an attempt - similar in intention, though different in form, to 
that of the .... Christian .... critics - to treat Gulliver as entirely 
separate from his creator. He is, in fact, according to such a 
view, the central character in a novel and, as has been suggested 
above, more precisely a Henry James novel. As Patrick Reilly has 
suggested: "It would be difficult to think of another error more 
guaranteed to produce confusion in the interpretation of the 
Travels",93 and when one considers the following explication of 
the book .... s meaning, the importance of refuting such 
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interpretation becomes obvious: "the . meanlng of the book is 
wholly distorted if we identify the Gulliver of the last voyage 
with his creator and lay Gulliver's misanthropy at Swift's 
door.,,94 The reason for this suggestion is that Gulliver 
i s a full y r end ere d, 0 b j e c t i v e , dram at i c 
character, no more to be identified with Swift 
than Shylock is to be identified with 
Shakespeare. This character acts and is acted 
upon; he changes, he grows in the course of his 
adventures. Like King Lear, he begins in 
simplicity, grows into sophistication and ends in 
madne§g. Unlike King Lear, he is never 
cured. 
It seems unthinkable to believe such a claim, since 
Gulliver is quite patently not a character at all. In this 
context Kliger's perpetual and infuriating habit of referring to 
the Travels as a "novel", without explanation or definition, is 
typical of this presumption. 96 To claim so much without proper 
proof is illicit in literary criticism. The evidence against it 
is overwhelming, and the voices of opposition have not remained 
silent on the issue. As one critic has put it: "The voice 
throughout is that of Swift. He employs Gulliver and the other 
persons as either straightforward or ironical mouthpieces: and 
they have neither the consistency, nor the life of characters in 
a novel. ,,97 Their only relevance consists in their relationship 
to Swift; the nature of their words and actions must be weighed 
against the voice of their creator. Each 'character' is in fact 
"a device in Swift's hands for achieving one single consistent 
aim - the systematic attack upon human pride.,,9B 
Yet another opponent of this view describes Gulliver's 
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Travels as "a work of fiction but not a novel", and adds that 
"Swift could never have been a novelist. Satire can only be part 
of the novelist's make-up; in Swift's it was everything.,,99 
Herbert Davis defines such creations as "puppets" rather than 
dramatic characters, and argues that Swift "could never have 
trusted anyone to speak for him" .100 He remains constantly in 
control of all situations in his fiction. A roving-licence given 
to any of his creations, the ability of any of them to develop or 
move in directions of their own, is clearly antithetical to the 
satiric intention. 
The ultimate blind-alley up which these critics lead 
themselves can be demonstrated easily enough. Patrick Reilly has 
convincingly refuted Robert C. Elliott's attempt at the 
'Jamesian' approach, "Gulliver as Literary Artist" .101 In this 
article, Elliott argues that Gulliver is "an accomplished artist, 
capable of self-insight, objectivity and perhaps even 
irony.,,102 In order to make such a reading tenable, the author 
distinguishes between Gulliver-author and Gulliver-character, the 
former able to recreate the latter with 0 bj ectivity, humour and 
accuracy. His ability is permeated by a remarkable restraint, 
since the misanthrope can write of the ingE:fnu without, 
apparently, displaying a single trace of the contempt which he 
must feel towards his former self. But, of course, such a 
rendering of Gulliver as a complete, fully-rounded character, 
leads Elliott into troubled waters. Why, to quote one example, 
should Gulliver be a magnanimous giant in the First Voyage and a 
contemptible midget in the Second? Why should the 
" 1· GIl· f B k I" suddenly become "the liberty- oVlng u lver 0 00 
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Machiavellian schemer of Book II"? 103 Again, why should the 
Gulliver who stops his nose with rue to keep away the smell of 
his Yahoo-kin, and who would "never suffer them to eat in the 
same room,,104 (h· h t b w 0 1S, we ave 0 remem er, the Gulliver who 
eventually writes his memoirs), say at the outset of the Fourth 
Voyage, the voyage which leads him to his present condition of 
self-knowledge and misanthropy: "I continued at home with my wife 
and children about five months in a very happy condition, if I 
could have learned the lesson of knowing when I was well." 105 
Why, in other words, does a book written by a convinced 
misanthrope conceal its message of misanthropy for the final few 
pages? 
The answer, of course, lies in Gulliver's artistic 
accomplishment and literary restraint. The accepted fact of the 
Travels being the work of a masterly English fiction-writer is 
given a sudden twist. In rejecting Thackeray's total integration 
of man and work, Elliott goes to the other extreme. Swift has 
been rescued from the charges levelled against him by jettisoning 
work from author. Quite apart from inconsistencies in the text 
which Elliott is unsatisfactory in explaining, the crucial issue 
ought to be development of character. As his voyage to the 
Houyhnhnmns progresses, Gulliver-character ought to be merging 
into Gulliver-author. Yet, in the midst of his vi tal 
renaissance, we find Gulliver describing the following scene to 
his Houyhnhnm master: 
And, to set forth the Valour of my own dear 
Countrymen, I assured him that I had seen them 
blow up a Hundred Enemies at once in a Siege, and 
as many in a Ship; and beheld the dead Bodies 
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drop down in Pieces from the Cl~~~s, to the great 
Diversion of all the Spectators. 
In its context this passage proves a stumbling-block to the 
Jamesian approach, since Gulliver-character should (being now 
almost wholly Gulliver-author), as Elliott himself admits, "be 
incapable of such moral obtuseness. ,,107 The futility of irony 
towards the horses is obvious: as it is a form of lying, they 
could not understand it. In any case, the underlined clause 
seems meaningless in any ironic context conceivable within this 
approach. 
Another critic opposing the Jamesian approach remarks that 
we are not, I think, very actively horrified at 
Gulliver's feelings, as we should have been if 
they had been Winston Smith's. In a novel, or in 
life, we should be revolted by his callousness. 
But we cannot, here or elsewhere, respond to him 
as a 'characteS'. He is too absurd and two-dimensional. 10 
Elliott implicity accepts this, though regretfully. He 
tentatively suggests that "a case might be made out for the view 
that in this section of the work Gulliver is in the last throes 
of his struggle to cling to what has been for him the real 
world" ,109 but immediately admits that he is treading thin 
ice. Reluctantly he accepts that "we must conclude that Gulliver 
is here not a consistent character".110 But, incredibly, 
Elliott turns this admission of failure on the part of his own 
critique against Swift, whose book is therefore an "artistic 
failure", and Gulliver's attack on pride itself an epitome of 
that "1 h t"t III partlcu ar uman ral. Gulliver is absurd, not least 
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in his admiration for the Houyhnhnms, who are obj ects of satire 
themselves, and the ultimate effect on the Travels is the 
creation of a stage of characters whom we are not to accept, 
narrated by a fool whom we are not to trust, and whose essential 
message amounts to milk-and-water Christian platitudes about 
'compromise' • 
The purpose of such suggestions about the nature of the 
Travels is obvious. An attempt is being made to discredit what 
the Victorians believed to be the message of the book by means of 
distancing Gulliver from his creator, and subsequently 
attributing the misanthropy of the book to him alone. We will 
notice that the technique and the motivation behind it are the 
same as used by Professor Williams and co. The assumption that 
misanthropy is the keynote of the Fourth Voyage is not disputed, 
but the guilt is removed from Swift, and placed firmly on the 
shoulders of Lemuel Gulliver, literary artist supreme. The 
reason given for such a shift is that the 'new' Swift the 
reinstated sound Anglican divine - could not have shared such a 
view of man; Swift "could not accept the total Yahoodom of 
man".112 Supposed justification for this lies in the following 
statement, made again without evidence being cited: "Swift the 
divine and Swift the artist are one and the same as to 
.. ,,113 
op1n10ns. The result of such bold assertions is to 
discredit Gulliver and to cast a pervasive shadow over what he 
tells us. This can be achieved by the creation of two personae: 
Gulliver the ogre, and Gulliver the buffoon. 
We owe a debt to those critics who have rehabilitated the 
Travels as a great comic work, and who have sought to 
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re-emphasize the wit and humour which have for so long been 
suppressed by writers anxious to discredit Swift both as man and 
writer. But if the humour is to be accentuated to the exclusion, 
or worse, the distortion of the satiric message, then, we might 
legitimately ask, what has become of the book which has proved to 
be so controversial for three centuries? Is it not true that in, 
justifiably, correcting the excesses of the Victorians, these 
critics have gone to the opposite pole of response? If the 
melodramatic, hellish monstrosity of Thackeray does not strike 
the modern reader as a true representation of the meaning of the 
Travels, does it not at least - when opposed to the watered-down, 
tepid and innocuous knockabout version of the 'formalists' 
suggest that in this book there is an implicit gauntlet thrown 
down before man. If Thackeray's failure to credit Swift's 
message for man seems serious, then the failure of these critics 
seems calamitous. On their advice we are led to read Swift's 
daun ting and challenging images of man as "only the clever 
hyperboles of a rhetorician who wishes, really, to recommend 
perfectly orthodox pieties" .114 It is, surely, at this 
juncture that the reader who has brought no a priori assumptions 
to the book, who has no fixed notions or theories about Swift and 
who is prepared to state what he finds in the text itself, 
revolts and cries: "Enough!" \fuat metamorphosis has taken place 
in the meaning of the book described by T.S. Eliot as "one of the 
h · d,,?llS greatest triumphs that the human soul has ever ac leve . 
But if we are to reject both schools of criticism, both on 
the basis of dubious methodology and damaging results, and 
denounce with Norman Brown "the poverty of criticism designed to 
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domesticate and housebreak this tiger of English 
literature"; 116 if we are to agree with John Traugott that "the 
common reader ••• in his simple moments has always sensed, with 
Thackeray, Yeats and Orwell, Swift's outlawry", 117 and have no 
wish to impose a pattern upon a difficult and challenging work, 
or to restrict to the orthodoxy or mundanity of Anglican 
apologe tics the great genius of Swift: what then should we 
believe of the Fourth Voyage, remembering that we have rej ected 
the two most popular approaches to the work in our time? 
Several recent books and articles have articulated other 
possible interpretations of the Travels, and a fair number of 
review articles and synopses of criticism have appeared, some of 
which uphold the basic premises of the two schools of criticism 
we have noted, some of which do not. James L. Clifford brings 
the debate one step forward when he splits Swift criticism into 
two different schools, "hard" and "soft".118 Both the 
'Christian' and 'formalist' approaches fall within the "soft" 
school, whilst the argument offered in the present work is 
defined as "hard". To use Clifford's own descriptions: "By 
'hard' I mean an interpretation which stresses the shock and 
difficulty of the work, with almost tragic overtones, while by 
"'soft' I mean the tendency to find comic passages and compromise 
solutions.,,119 The maj or figures in the "hard" school are seen 
to be R. S. Crane, Edward Rosenheim Jr., Charles Peake, Louis A. 
120 
Landa, Conrad Suits, and Donald Greene • To this number one 
might fairly add Claude Rawson, David Ward, Peter Steele, and 
Patrick Reilly, 121 all of whom have, in various ways and to 
varying degrees, asserted the essential seriousness of the 
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message of Swift's great satire. Pat Rogers has described the 
latter group as the "Anglo-Australian" school,122 more a 
geographical than a critical distinction. Such terminology, it 
need hardly be said, does not denote a school in any strict 
definition of the term, but it does usefully pool together a 
number of figures whose reading of Swift is, in many essentials, 
consistent, particularly with regard to their reaction to the two 
approaches comprising the "soft" school we have already 
encountered, and provides the foundation for the following 
interpretation of the Fourth Voyage. 
Our final option is to offer a different hypothesis, one 
which cheats neither Swift nor Gulliver, and is consistent with 
the book as it stands. Gulliver's dilemma is that he has seen in 
the Houyhnhnms the embodiment of all that he has been led to 
believe is desirable in a reasonable being. The idea that he has 
been brainwashed into believing this is no doubt substantiated 
when one considers the ease with which Gulliver has adopted the 
manners, customs, and behaviour of the inhabitants of his 
previously visi ted "remote nations": a fact comically underlined 
h · f h· f· 123 on 1S return rom 1S 1rst two voyages. But that what he 
has been led to believe in Houyhnhnmland is not altogether 
foreign is of course vital. That the Houyhnhnms should embody 
the ideals of humanity is central to Swift's purpose. Gulliver 
is to see in the horses all that he has been taught to believe is 
the final ideal of mankind. 124 That the name given to the 
horses translates as "the perfection of Nature" 125 is meant to 
be a bitter blow to the pride of humanity. How dare Swift give 
the reason to brute beasts! That Thackeray and co. should have 
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reacted as they did to the Yahoos is central to the purpose of 
the book too. The juxtaposition is, however, much more than 
comic. The comedy, even when directed against the 
needle-threading horses, does not at all weaken the impact of the 
satire. 
For the satire does not concern the Houyhnhnms at 
all. 126 The Houyhnhnms, as so often has been pointed out, are 
"dreary beasts,,·127 , "we would not wish to emulate them if we 
could",128 and so forth. That they "are no more than mental 
abstractions" 129 is not to the point. Swift knew only too well 
th t there . h th' t' 1 h 130 a 1.S no sue 1.ng as a ra 1.ona orse. It seems 
an obvious point, and yet is so little emphasized as to lead one 
to the conclusion that it rarely has been appreciated. The key 
to this may be seen in Leavis'" s quote: "The Houyhnhnms may have 
all the reason, but the Yahoos have all the life.,,131 
Exactly! The crux of the reader's dilemma is that all the 
reali ty belongs to the Yahoos, and none at all to the horses. 
The reader thinks he must choose between an impossible ideal and 
an only-too-real reality. Gulliver's perplexity lies in the fact 
that he cannot be a horse, and he has recognised that he is a 
Yahoo. When the Yahoo-girl attempts to mate with Gulliver, he 
recognises the vicious truth at the heart of his travels - he is 
of their kind. 
In this cataclysmic, catastrophic recognition of kinship 
with the Yahoo, Gulliver has achieved what he never had before: 
self-knowledge. The suggestion that Gulliver is ridiculous in 
his eventual choice is arguable, but the idea that this solution 
to the dilemma destroys the essential credibility of that dilemma 
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is, I think, not. 132 Traugott describes this as "the ironic 
disjunction between the impossible truth, Utopia, which cannot be 
ignored, and the shadowy actuality, England, which cannot be got 
rid of",133 and th1"s, b I elieve, is just. 
Gulliver is an alienated figure at the end of the Travels, 
but his alienation from mankind cannot be presumed to prove 
alienation from his author. Gulliver is alienated for precisely 
the reason that he is at last a "true seer". 134 He is lost to 
mankind at precisely the moment when we can be sure, if ever, 
that he is voicing the opinions of his puppet-master: 
Pride. 
I am not in the least provoked at the sight of a 
Lawyer, a Pick-Pocket, a Colonel, a Fool, a Lord, 
a Gamester, a Poli tician, a Whoremonger, a 
Physician, an Evidence, a Suborner, an Attorney, 
a Tray tor, or the Like: This is all according to 
the due course of things: But, when I behold a 
Lump of Deformity, and Diseases both in Body and 
Mind, smitten with Pride, it immediately breaks 
all the measures of my Patience: neither shall I 
be ever able to comprehend how s~~~ an Animal and 
such a Vice could tally together. 
Human pride is the object of the whole satire. How can 
we suggest that Gulliver is a "lunatic", or that he is completely 
isolated from Swift, when it is perfectly obvious that he has had 
his eyes opened to "what Swift's rhetoric during the first three 
voyages has presented as the truth about society,,?136 We 
cannot dissociate Gulliver from Swift at this point because he is 
enunciating the lesson of the book as a whole. At no point in 
Gulliver's Travels is the hero more allied to his author than 
here: only at this point does Gulliver join the Giant King, the 
Houyhnhnm Master, and the God of "The Day of Judgement" among the 
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gallery of Olympians who express SWift's crucial message for 
man: see the ridiculousness and injustice of your pride in human 
nature. l37 That Gulliver's solution is ridiculous may be 
debatable, but that the motive behind his action is wholly 
justified is not. Gulliver has made the mistake of believing he 
can really imitate a rational horse, however honest his 
intention, but he has made no mistake whatsoever in believing in 
his kinship with the Yahoo. The fact that the Yahoos in his 
country wear clothes and speak "a kind of jabber"l38 called 
language is neither here nor there, and Gulliver knows it. 
As in the Tale, the choice is between being a Fool or a 
Knave, because, textually, that is all there is on offer. But 
secretly Gulliver knows that the choice is no choice at all: 
there is only the vicious reality of the Yahoos. His only 
option, then, is misanthropy: if he cannot achieve the good, he 
must turn his back on the evil. This is not the pride of 
Gulliver, but his ul timate humility in the face of appalling 
revelation. 
It is fundamental to my case that the renunciation of the 
'Christian' critics is far more important for us than dismissal 
of Thackeray and his ilk, and for the the following reason. 
Swift's conclusion to the Travels is open-ended; it quite 
deliberately avoids catharsis. Fuller evidence of Swift's views 
on such a subject in his other writings will follow in succeeding 
Chapters, but for the moment we must at least point out that it 
is incomplete for a vital reason. The reason is this: that the 
lesson of Gulliver's Travels is the Yahoo and the Yahoo alone. 
We are to read the Travels, I would contend, in order that we 
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should achieve the kind of self-knowledge to which Gulliver is so 
shockingly exposed. Like Brecht, Swift refuses us an answer in 
his text: the answer is to be sought in life itself. 139 
Furthermore, I would add, we must realise that Swift never 
contended that truth should, or would, be a comfort - for this 
presupposes the kind of truth which we shall find .140 If we 
find the Yahoo intolerable, and shrink from him in disgust, then 
this is our problem, not Swift's.141 That we consider the 
explosive charge in the Yahoo a dud is our own folly, nay, our 
own pride. The case remains unaltered. Upon this hypothesis, 
which, I believe, is faithful to the text, I shall base my 
further evaluations of the Travels. The rehabilitation of Lemuel 
Gulliver is the starting-point for a study of Jonathan Swift 
which will attempt to prove that in his most radical scepticism, 
he is the writer most relevant to our age. 
In dealing with such concerns, we immediately think of the 
devastating world-view - or 'man-view' - of such as T. S. Eliot, 
Aldous Huxley, Samuel Beckett, Joseph Conrad, William Golding, 
and the late George Orwell. 142 The considerations of these 
authors' works produce far-reaching effects in terms of our own 
self-perception. To whatever extent they or we believe their 
truth as perceived is problematical. What is sure, however, is 
that their works present us with a buck of veritably explosive 
power, which we, as readers, must deal with as we see fit. I 
propose to suggest that in his evaluation of human nature, Swift 
asks the questions which most perplex our own age; that in his 
vision of history and politics he suggests enquiries and remedies 
which we cannot afford to ignore; and that in his great satires 
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he displays himself as a writer who, as much as Shakespeare, 
deserves to be read and re-read by a twentieth-century audience. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LIBERTY vs. LICENCE 
To take Swift at his word is one of the two most hazardous 
responses to his writings. The other is, of course, not to take 
him at his word. Nowehere can this be more clearly illustrated 
than in the attempts of critics over the years to place Swift's 
politics firmly in one camp. The results of such enterprises, 
confidently embarked upon, illustrate the point perfectly. He 
has been aligned with liberals,1 absolutists 2 and 
. 3 h commun1sts; as been praised for his services to liberty,4 
denounced for his worship of authoritarianism,S and described 
as both a proponent and an opponent of freedom. 6 The society 
of his most famous creations the Houyhnhnms has been seen as an 
example of both h . 7 anarc 1sm and t 1 · . . 8 ota 1tar1an1sm, and his 
political affinity has been shown to belong to both Hobbes 9 and 
Locke,IO and practically every standpoint in between. The real 
difficulty, then, lies not merely in knowing that one must take 
him at his word at some point, but in knowing when, and which 
word. 
The issue is a crucial one, for progress towards any 
understanding of the major satires depends upon reaching an 
acceptable starting-point from which to begin a coherent 
exegesis. But this in itself becomes a difficult operation, 
given Swift's habit of treating the reader as anything but an 
ally.11 Thus the oldest game amongst Swift critics begins. 
Since we cannot interpret the works without knowing what kind of 
man wrote them, we turn to the biography as a crutch.
12 
The 
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question then ceases to be "What is Gulliver's Travels saying to 
us?", and becomes "Who is Swift?" But since the bewildering 
variety of answers to the latter question has already been 
illustrated, and since this adds little of ultimate help in 
answering the first question, we are forced to concede defeat, 
and offer approximations instead of definitions. With this 
caveat sounding in our ears, we must tentatively pick our way 
through the evidence of Swift's writings, accepting that the most 
we can do is try to unravel a few of the threads of the author's 
designs .13 
By far the most popular description of Swift's politics is 
that of a moderate man, a compromiser between extremes which he 
hopes to balance by means of a strong, secure centre. 14 The 
evidence for such an interpretation is scattered throughout his 
writings, and finds its fullest expression in the Contests and 
Dissentions and the main narrative of the Tale. In both these 
works the appeal is to common sense and reasonable mediation 
between extremes. Martin, in the Tale, eschews both the 
authoritarian demagogue Peter, with his idolatry and worldliness, 
and the violent and fanatical Jack, with his excessive zeal. We 
are clearly meant to approve his sensible compromise and see his 
dislike both of tyranny and fanaticism as the positive message of 
the book. Similarly, the Contests and Dissentions sets before us 
the evils of extremes, as they found political expression in 
classical antiquity, and the author advocates mixed or "Gothick" 
government as the best model for any society to follow. The 
recurring theme is that of balance, of choosing a middle way, of 
resisting the seductive pull of the absolute. 
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Thus far, one can see little at first glance which could 
be called contentious in Swift's politics or religion, and if 
this were all the evidence, one could be forgiven for thinking 
the controversy over his allegiance wholly illusory. But this is 
nowhere near to being the whole of the matter and, as with so 
much else in Swift, one need only scratch the surface lightly to 
see the underlying contradictions show up. The man who wrote 
"How inconsistent is man with himself!,,15 seems to be 
determined to prove the point in his own writings. 
That Swift was a man immersed in the waters of 
seventeenth-century politics has been convincingly shown many 
times. "His belief in mixed government, his opposing of the old, 
well-born, country families to the nouveau-riche moneylenders and 
tradesmen, his resentment of the rabble, and his loathing for 
oppression were all typical of the late seventeenth 
century. ,,16 His ever-present obsession was the Civil War, and 
the realities and possibilities thrown up by that conflict;17 
and, for all that the Contests and Dissentions opposes both 
tyrant and fanatic, and the Tale ridicules both Roman prelate and 
dissenter, it is clear that Swift really fears Crazy Jack and the 
Rabble: 18 and it was in the Civil War that they finally 
achieved their majority: 
The Pope would of our faith bereave us, 
But, still our monarchy would leave us, 
Not so, the vile fanatic crew, 19 
That ruined church and monarch too. 
Peter is presented only as a clever rogue, a schemer, a 
smooth-operator with an eye on supreme power. But the 
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obviousness of the challenge from Rome, and the fact that it had 
been effectively defeated in the securing of the Protestant 
succession, caused Swift to be less anxious about its likely 
success. The same was far from true of Jack and his "1"'&, who had 
already brought down Church and King and who - in Swift's view -
still threatened to destroy every belief and institution that was 
dear to him. Such was his hatred of these men that he was 
prepared to deliver a sermon on the martyrdom of Charles I - at a 
time when such a sermon was bound to be seen in certain 
influential quarters as alarmingly Jacobite - in order to attack 
them. 20 To d h· . d d f f enounce suc reglcl e an yet pro ess support or 
the Revolution of 1688 was to sail dangerously close to the 
wind. 2l It remains significant that Swift thought it worth the 
attempt. Even the attack on the hapless Partridge was, suggests 
one critic, an act of revenge for the events of the Civil War: a 
retaliatory kick long after the final whistle had been blown on 
the game. 22 
Behind, between and all around the events of the 
seventeenth century stalked the spirit of liberty, and in 
particular religious toleration. The entire structure of modern 
society took its first significant shape in that period which 
held Swift's abiding interest, which makes it essential that we 
scrutinize the precise relation between Swift and its chief 
proponents and opponents. We shall want to find out precisely 
where he stood on all the vital issues. If we take as examples 
the two most famous seventeenth-century writers on this crucial 
question of liberty Hobbes and Locke - we should be able to get 
a clearer picture of Swift's place on the political map. Since 
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these two stood at opposite poles of response to the dilemma of 
freedom and toleration, Hobbes advocating absolute government and 
a strong state-Church axis, where Locke sets forth the virtue of 
political democracy separated from a tolerant Church, their 
respective coordinates in relation to Swift ought to prove, if 
not conclusive, then at least useful. 
To link Swift with Hobbes might quite properly be 
considered an unlikely interpretation of his works, since his 
comments on Hobbes and his general attitude towards the Hobbesian 
monolith are consistently ones of scorn. 23 He derides the very 
idea of arbitrary power which "notwithstanding all that Hobbes, 
Filmer and others have said to its Advantage, I look upon as a 
greater Evil than Anarchy itself; as much as a Savage is in a 
happier State of Life, than a Slave at the Oar".24 To Swift, 
the idea that a sane man would voluntarily surrender his liberty 
to live under the metaphorical guillotine of an absolute 
monarch's whim seemed laughably naive. Far from preserving man 
from the chaos of nature, it subverts his autonomy and places him 
at the whim of one evil authority over whose power there is no 
control. This is why Swift draws a sharp distinction between the 
executive and the legislative power, proposing obedience only to 
the latter. He says this confusion of powers is a common error 
and one "which deceived Hobbes himself so far, as to be the 
foundation of all the political Mistakes in his Book".25 
To make the legislative power supreme guaranteed, 
according to Swift, that the governed could only be ruled with 
their own consent, unlike those under Leviathan who give up all 
pretensions to a say in the running of things in return for the 
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security offered by the monolithic power. Swift thought this a 
nonsense, and vigorously denies the necessity or desirability of 
so extreme a surrender. An all-powerful legislature would 
guarantee security, and a say in the election of the 
administration would guarantee freedom. This power, this 
Leviathan, is precisely the monster whose coming to power Swift 
was attempting to pre-empt in the argument contained in the 
Contests and Dissentions, where Swift seeks a balance among King, 
Nobles and Commons which will forestall any attempt by one of 
these to obtain overall supremacy. 
But when one looks at Gulliver in Lilliput and 
Houyhnhnmland, and compares his flight from the former with his 
reluctant expulsion from the latter, the dissimilarities between 
Swift and Hobbes seem less clear-cut than before. Gulliver 
subjects himself willingly to the local power, whether it be 
midget, giant or horse and his comic obeisance to the six inch 
King makes the point perfectly. Gulliver gives up all his claims 
to liberty in order to move from being outsider to member of 
society: a good Hobbesian bargain. Even his flight is a 
Hobbesian choice. His flight is occasioned by his perception 
that the king to whom he has surrendered his liberty has begun to 
act in a manner incompatible with Gulliver's own well-being. He 
therefore takes the appropriate action, refusing to stand trial, 
because "having perused many State-Tryals, which I ever observed 
to terminate as the Judges thought fit to direct; I durst not 
rely on so dangerous a Decision, in so critical a Juncture, and 
against such powerful Enemies".26 Since the initial bond was 
voluntary, its dissolution is perfectly explicable and 
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justifiable within the terms of the original bargain: an escape 
clause implicit in the contract between the free man and 
Leviathan. Hobbes's premise is, after all, that man is primarily 
selfish rather than foolish, savant rather than naif. 
And if we object that Swift's overtly political writings 
are antagonistic to such a contract, we will find it hard to deny 
that his religious writings tend rather to give it substance. 
Religious worship for Swift is not to be made a matter for the 
individual conscience, for his diagnosis of the human condition 
is sufficiently close to Hobbes's for him to understand perfectly 
what such a tolerance would mean for the Church. Could Swift 
have been an optimist, he might have regarded such a choice as 
desirable, since under a theory of the natural goodness of man -
given belief in the truth of one's Church - there could be 
nothing to fear. But Swift was never close to being an optimist, 
and his reasons for rejecting religious toleration betray his 
analysis of his fellow-men. Men must be made to be good, because 
they naturally tend the other way; and, if they cannot be made to 
be good, they must at least be obliged to seem so. Swift is 
quite prepared to accept the hypocrite, and stands in stark 
contrast to Milton in his moderate demands of the faithful. They 
are to be obliged to wear the correct mask, whatever the true 
face beneath. Assuming the selfish nature of man, and his 
similarity to beasts, he says "human nature is so constituted, 
that we can never pursue anything heartily but upon hopes of 
reward" , 2 7 and pursues this theme repeatedly in his religious 
.. 28 
wrl.tl.ngs. If the promise of heaven was not enough - and 
Swift was well aware of the value of rewards beside punishments 
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in both ecclesiastical and civil affairs - there is the threat of 
hell. 29 The significant thing here is that Swift shares with 
Hobbes a fundamental premise regarding human nature. Almost all 
men are motivated by fear or greed only.30 Despite the fact 
that the advocacy of rewards in civil matters is often regarded 
as progressive and positive, it cannot cloud the central issue: 
Swift was Augustinian in his view of human nature. If he has 
little else in common with Hobbes, we shall still feel that this 
is a fundamental link between the two. 
Accepting the definition of man as selfish, the only 
problem is how to oblige him to deny his nature in his 
behaviour. It is useless to believe that, left to its own 
devices, a man's virtue will blossom forth, and that in any event 
it is not permissible to introduce a code which will enforce an 
approved course of behaviour. For pragmatists like Swift the 
problem is in reality that of devising "a new force-field 
compelling changes of direction".31 One must attempt to make 
certain undesirable areas of the field of human experience out of 
bounds, and not simply trust the judgment of the individual to 
persuade him not to walk there. For Swift, the 'good man' thesis 
of Aristotle (and now of Locke, Tindal and co.) is a fallacious 
doctrine, the myth of those who will not see man as he truly is. 
Swift has written of such a view with contempt, claiming that 
pagan philosophers failed because they did not appeal to the 
selfishness in 32 man. Self-interest is the key to Swift's 
analysis. The 'virtuous' man will endeavour to be so just so 
long as it is in his interests; but let it be in his interests to 
go against virtue, and see then how the secular virtue stands. 
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For Swift argues that, although it is, in the eyes of the 
world, injurious to one's prospects to appear outwardly 
dishonest, this will check a man only so long as he can be seen. 
Let him believe that he can get away with it, and his 
self-interest will carry his conscience in its pocket: 
For, if he hath nothing to govern himself by, but 
the Opinion of the World, as long as he can 
conceal hi~ Injustice from the World, he thinks 
he is safe. 3 
Swift sets up the thesis of his Project directly against the 
Pelagian heresy as it found expression in his own time. 34 He 
sneers at the - , na1vete of the view which was to result in 
Fielding's characters, naive men led astray by events, but never 
losing their essential innocence. In Swift, there is no choice 
involved in human behaviour, no intellectual or moral 
self-debate, but only the presence or absence of opportunity, the 
possession of, or lack of, power to act. Given power to act, the 
results will always be the same, for human behaviour is as 
predictable as the motion of planets and stars, and all that can 
prevent the pursuit of vice is when "the Temptation was not 
properly offered, or the Profit was too small, or the Danger too 
great".35 This is the very raison d'~tre of his Project, which 
aims to reform men's manners by direct appeal to their 
self-interest. Just as in Lilliput the King is astonished that 
Europeans believe only in punishing the wrong, and neglect to 
reward the right,36 so in the Project Swift seeks to establish 
a parallel to heaven, here on earth, for those who will not be 
motivated by the greater prospect of eternal bliss; and also a 
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civic hell, 
thought-of. 37 
to appeal to men's fear of not being well 
Hell is important for Swift, when he talks of those who do 
believe. It is the cork on the poison bottle which is held in 
place by belief. So long as the people believe in eternal 
punishment, they cannot loose the murky liquids of free-thinking, 
sacrilege or dissent. They will not believe it to be in their 
long-term interests. Only let the Church falter on this matter, 
and the result will be disaster for the social and political 
order, and, of course, the Church. Swift, here, anticipates 
Orwell, seeing the dissenter or 'freedom fighter' - as a 
power-worshipper who can only exist by manifesting opposition to 
the existing order. 38 Such a view of dissenters will readily 
accede to the proposition that, since these men's power exists in 
direct proportion to their attack on the Church, it is conversely 
in the Church's interests to keep hold on its power by weakening 
that of the dissenters, operating on the same principle. Thus 
Swift threatens the 
them "The Kingdom of 
with "double stripes", and promises masses 
Heaven",39 aware that the Church must 
offer them a protection from the evils of life, but aware also 
that they must believe in those evils. The protective umbrella 
offered by the Church is valid only for so long as the people 
believe that it is raining. 
Thus far, we have observed a similarity between Swift and 
Hobbes on the vital question of human motivation, because, while 
all the evidence shows Swift to be against the Hobbesian 
monolith, there is evidence aplenty that he accepts the reason 
for Leviathan's being brought into existence. But where should 
Sl 
we look for the oft-stated similarity between Swift and Locke, 
the other protagonist in the great seventeenth-century debate on 
liberty?40 Since Swift seems to have little politically in 
common with Hobbes, perhaps we should try to see whether his 
affinities are more in the camp of the liberals. 41 
Swift's liberal credentials are most clearly represented 
in his loathing of tyranny and his advocacy of mixed government. 
His support for the idea of annual parliaments and his preference 
for the "landed" interest before the "monied", which he suggests 
will be better for the community since the Members will then have 
strong local ties and an obvious interest in the welfare of the 
locality, also link him strongly with the camp of Locke. 42 In 
addition, he also suggests that, in the interests of liberty, it 
is better that "ten guilty men should escape, than one innocent 
suffer", which places him at some distance from the Hobbesian 
summum bonum of the stable society bought at any cost, an end 
towards which any means are acceptable. 43 Moreover, and more 
important, there is the legendary fact of his constant defence 
of Irish liberty, a cause which he supported throughout his 
bitter exile in that unhappy kingdom, and which still justifies 
his inclusion among h I 0 hOt 44 t e great r~s patr~o s. His persistent 
fight for the underdog, and his heroic stand against English 
misrule and arrogant colonialism, taken alongside the above 
factors, have ensured that very few people have attempted to 
contradict Swift's own famous claim in his epitaph - in the 
l Ob ,,4S poetic tribute by Yeats - that "he served human ~ erty • 
Is Swift, then, really a liberal? If so, what does he 
mean by liberal, and what kind of liberal is he? These are the 
S2 
questions which most perplex the critic of Swift, for no sooner 
has one pointed out what seem to be the distinctive 
characteristics of his politics and religion, than 
contradictions, irritating and often peripheral though they seem 
at first, begin to appear; no sooner do they begin to appear, 
than they multiply, until one is obliged to return to one's 
original assumptions and modify them. Trying to place the island 
of Swift's true political leanings firmly on the map, one 
discovers that the longitude and latitude contained in his works 
are unreliable. Apparently determined to prevent the critic from 
locating, docketing and dismissing his intentions, he gleefully -
or so it often appears - issues a stream of false coordinates 
until the reader is so disoriented that he faces a terrible 
dilemma. He must either become like a Laputan, attempting to 
extract sunbeams from cucumbers, or, like Pope Peter, pass off 
bread as mutton, and present his projecting as truth; or, faced 
with the knowledge that the first critic is simply plumping for 
one set of coordinates no more reliable than another, he must 
admit to bafflement, and settle for recording as many coordinates 
as he finds. Agonising as this is for critics, it is the only 
responsible course of action. "Who is Swift?" has become "How 
S 1· fts are there?", many w and, short of nudging the evidence in 
favoured directions or ignoring it where it seems to lead into 
unwanted terrain in order to answer the first question, we have 
no choice but to accept the second question as the more 
realistic, and settle for an inconclusive and open-ended 
discussion of tendencies within the works. 46 
Patrick Reilly suggests that often especially where 
S3 
questions of religion are concerned Swift's "latent 
authoritarianism ignites", going on to say that this is not 
"hypocrisy or dissimulation" but "a species of unawareness, 
which, pushed to an extreme, becomes doublethink".47 When one 
reads the chapters on politics and religion in the Fourth 
Voyage,48 or observes the, largely unspoken, critical 
commentary running parallel to the Lilliputian Court, one 
presumes that Swift is expressing a heartfelt contempt not for 
individuals or parties, but for the whole degrading, disgusting 
charade; a midnight world of gangster ethics and roulette-wheel 
justice. One could not honestly say that one feels a moral 
superiority evident between high-heels or low-heels, big-endians 
or little-endians. They are all contemptible and tiny, and one 
feels, moreover, that they are tiny because contemptible and not 
vice-versa. 
But one has to face up to the fact that Swift was easily 
the best, undoubtedly the most influential and - for a time at 
least 
49 day. 
indubitably the most sought-after propagandist of his 
So that when one looks at the religious-political 
controversy in Lilliput, it seems incredible that the author of 
such passages actually belonged to one of the 
derisorily-presented factions, or at least to its counterpart in 
England. The chief effect of such writings, especially when 
taken in tandem with the Tale, is to discredit the activity 
concerned, not merely the participants, and the natural reaction 
of the reader is to regard politics and religion per se as 
ObI 50 contempt1 e. This is one of the most notable aspects of 
Swiftian satire: the satire, while setting out to mock what is 
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foppish, hypocritical or morally debased in belief, ends up by 
mocking belief itself. 51 The Tale, so Swift claims, is a 
defence of Anglicanism, and yet, though Martin comes out rather 
better than others, he is subjected to some scathing satire 
nonetheless. 52 Swift's honesty, it seems, obliges him to paint 
portraits warts and all: but, as a defensive measure, the claim 
that Martin has fewer warts than Jack or Peter is ineffective. 
It is not hard to see why Queen Anne was appalled by the book. 
There is a danger, of which Swift seemed unaware, of going too 
far, of defending the Church to death. 
However, in closer perspective we find at least some of 
the contradictory evidence making sense. We discover that, for 
Swift, party meant the Whigs, because the Tories represented the 
nation whereas the Whigs stood for new money and rising 
b . 53 USlness. The birth of moneyed power is epitomised for Swift 
by the birth of the National Debt and the collapse of the South 
Sea Company. He is of the view that speculation and the pursuit 
of such ethereals as profit-margins inevitably leads to 
disaster; they have root in nothing concrete, and can therefore 
only threaten, not establish, peace and . 54 prosperlty. This 
leads to his familiar political credo: "Law in a free country 
is, or ought to be the Determination of the Majority of those who 
have Property in Land", 55 a point which he makes repeatedly in 
his works. 56 This is why, when he uses words such as "party" 
and "faction", he is referring only to the Whigs and their 
attempts to seize power. Since the Tories are the natural 
defenders of the (unwritten) Constitution, this attitude seemed, 
to Swift, accurate and completely unhypocritical, and explains 
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his ambivalence towards censorship. The Whigs are simply 
squatters who occasionally seize control of the house, and it is 
perfectly permissible to silence their voices because of this. 
The Tories are the legal tenants, and it is, therefore, 
scandalous that any attempt should be made to keep them from 
protecting their rights. The plethora of statements on the need 
to suppress the squatters , "bbl" 57 perhaps scrl lngs - culminating 
in the question "Why not restrain the Press to those who would 
confound Religion, as in Civil Matters?,,58 - sits ill with the 
Letter to Pope, where censorship is designated as a dangerous 
tool of tyrants. 59 But in the above context, it may be seen as 
an attempt to differentiate between tenant and squatter, and 
hence as a legitimate distinction. As Ehrenpreis says: "In his 
own light Swift was not inconsistent - the others were".60 
Herein lies the key to Swift's apparent paranoia. If we 
are to find constants, we must look beneath the surface, for 
Swift is a master of masks, a supreme artist whose greatest skill 
is to evade detection behind innumerable disguises and trick the 
reader into thinking each persona is the author. 61 But - as we 
shall discover in the next Chapter - though this game took its 
most disconcerting forms in the satiric works, it is used in some 
of the 'straighter' tracts, where its rules are clearer and its 
object more intelligible. Behind the political and religious 
writings one can detect what can only be called a 
siege-mentality. Swift himself puts it thus: "I look upon myself 
in the capacity of a clergyman, to be one appointed by providence 
for defending a post assigned me, and for gaining over as many 
enemies as I can.,,62 
56 
Taken by itself, this may seem straightforward, even innocuous, 
but, taken alongside the politico-religious writings, it provides 
a vital backdrop to a scene which we would otherwise 
misunderstand. It explains the oft-lamented unintellectual 
nature of much of his writing,63 and the urgency and 
fire-in-the-belly ferocity of so much elsewhere in his oeuvre. 
This urgency arises from a belief that the barbarians are at the 
gate, and that he occupies "a threatened city fearfully awaiting 
assault".64 Hobbes lived through the only Civil War that this 
country has ever witnessed, and constructed his theory of 
absolutism according to his perception of events he saw happening 
around him. Swift, immersed in the same waters as Hobbes, 
mentally if not historically, sets out to build his protective 
politics from the same assumptions. He sees the overthrow of his 
citadel as imminent, and uses his pen as a means both of defence 
and attack in order to preserve his precious capital. But in 
order to appreciate fully why Swift was gripped by such fear, 
fear which seems a world away from the quiet moderation so many 
have seen as the characteristic trademark of his politics and 
religion, we must look more closely at the two central issues at 
the heart of the debate on liberty: the state of nature and the 
role of law. 
When Locke asserts, in the Second Treatise on Government, 
that "In the beginning all the World was America",65 he 
describes a situation with which Hobbes would have had no 
quarrel, and posits a condition of being, prior to organised 
society, one which describes man as he truly is, stripped of the 
accretions of civilisation. This, however, is the beginning and 
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end of any agreement between Locke and Hobbes on the subject of 
the state of nature. 
Natural law, for Hobbes, is what equates man with the 
rest of the animal kingdom, whilst for Locke it is what raises 
him above it. Hobbes means by it lawlessness, Locke lawfulness, 
and thus the two interpretations of 'America' are clear. For 
Hobbes, the state of nature equates men with predator and prey. 
The predator may do all that he cannot be prevented from doing, 
so that the potential prey must be faster or more cunning to 
escape, for there is no other option in nature. Right belongs to 
the predator if he catches his prey, freedom to his prey if he 
escapes. Morality can exist only if the predator decides, 
because all choice belongs to the strong. Even worse is the fact 
that men are hunters of their own kind, and often for reasons 
which have little to do with necessity, and much to do with 
cruelty. The condition of living in Hobbes's state of nature, 
therefore, is one of "continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and 
short.,,66 The only escape for Hobbesian man is into a society 
which will protect him from the brutality of life in nature, a 
society which must be ruled absolutely in order to provide 
maximum security. The weak have only one defence against the 
strong and that is to create their own powerful sovereign who 
will protect them from their competitors, and to whom they will 
resign all independence in return for this protection. Locke, 
however, interprets the state of nature in a radically different 
fashion: "Men living together according to reason without a 
common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, 
58 
is properly the state of nature.,,67 Locke is for a pluralistic 
society, and diversity, not authoritarian unity, is to be the 
safeguard against evils in society. Thus, the Hobbesian dilemma 
chaos or tyranny is rejected by Locke, who interprets the 
state of nature as not at all one representing war. He will not 
be railroaded into acceptance of Hobbes's definition of political 
necessity, because he views the matter from a completely 
different angle. 
Consequent upon one's definition of the nature of man 
comes one's assessment of the proper duties of law and 
government. One can see that the respective views of these two 
writers on what is to be required of government will contain 
little in the way of common ground. The law of natural reason is 
the keynote of Locke's America, the rule of self-interest and 
fear that of Hobbes's. Both states are anarchic, but where Locke 
takes this at its simple literal level - a society without laws 
as such, but capable of a large degree of self-regulation 
Hobbes takes it at its most suggestive and fearsome level: a 
no-holds-barred free-for-all without security for any but the 
strongest and most vicious. The choice is between a free 
association of essentially decent, rational men attempting to 
come together and improve a tolerable enough lot by mutual 
cooperation; and a desperate escape from a brutal nightmare. The 
origins of human society must stem either from a spirit of 
cooperation, or a fear of competition and a longing for security 
at any price. 
Swift, although he ostensibly rejects Hobbes, accepts his 
descriptions ,definitions and choices, and thus reveals the true 
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nature of his allegiance. 68 He uses the language of Locke, but 
he feels Hobbes in his bones. His pessimistic view of history, 
and his acceptance of the Augustinian stance on original sin - he 
asks at one point "For , why do men love Darkness rather than 
Light?,,69 in an assumption of natural depravity are 
connected. European society is organised, according to the 
Houyhnhnms, by creatures worse than their Yahoos: there is no 
room for optimism in such a house of sin. 70 He condemns 
arbitrary power,71 but describes humanity as a republic of 
dogs, where peace occurs only after a good meal, and disruption 
when one or a few only have been satisfied, while every other dog 
fights to snatch a scrap of the 
this, he accepts Hobbes's premise 
being. And even if the contextual 
not disguise a vision of man as 
competitive, in a direct rebuttal of 
tendency in the state of nature 
. 72 prlze. If Swift accepts 
for bringing Leviathan into 
metaphor is amusing, it does 
ruthless, egocentric and 
Locke's contention that the 
is towards co-operation, not 
competition. Swift's persistent assumption of the correctness of 
the state-of-war view undercuts any attempt to place him firmly 
in the liberal camp. He notes at one point the similarity 
between games and f · h' 73 19 tlng, and specifies elsewhere: 
"Quadrille in particular, bears some Resemblance to a State of 
Nature, which we are told, is a State of War, wherein every Woman 
is against every Woman.,,74 He seems unaware that a rival 
interpretation even exists. He rebukes Tindal for using the term 
"state of nature" wrongly, apparently oblivious to the fact that 
Tindal, as a disciple of Locke, is referring to the increasingly 
accepted definition by Locke. 75 As has been stated, this 
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surely is a "measure of his immersion in Hobbesian ideology",76 
and it is of profound importance that Swift should agree with 
Hobbes, not Locke, on such a vital question. 
Swift offers a legislature with the power of Leviathan, 
while rejecting Hobbes's model of absolutism. Despite the seeming 
liberalism of his advocacy of mixed government between the Three 
Estates, he soon makes it plain that, once elected, the 
government is beyond reproach: "The supreme power in the state 
can do no wrong; because, whatever that doth, is the Action of 
all.,,77 He goes further, intimating that this body is above 
impeachment and cannot break the law, because the law is what the 
government says it is. The liberal Swift is a dot in the 
distance, when the authoritarian Swift declares: "In short, they 
may do any Thing within the Compass of human power.,,78 He is 
up there with Hobbes on the question of sovereignty, even if he 
d · . h h . .. f h . 79 lsagrees Wlt t e preClse constltutl0n 0 t e soverelgn. If 
he opposes one form of absolutism, while advocating one with a 
different face but identical power, how then can we call him 
Lockean? Hobbes's model of monarchy was for the times: an 
absolute legislature will do equally well, so long as its powers 
are the same. Leviathan is about a degree of power, not a 
particular kind, and the adjective 'absolute' can be applied to 
whichever noun you please, for it is the thing and not the title 
he is concerned about. It is the absolute obedience owed to this 
power by all people which truly matters. And if this is the 
criterion for the definition of authoritarian - and what better? 
then Swift is authoritarian, in opposition to Locke's 
liberalism. Freedom here is the freedom to obey the law, or else 
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one makes oneself a rebel. 80 
This is the crux of the matter. Just because Swift used 
the word 'liberal' freely does not prove that he invested it with 
the same meaning that Locke undoubtedly did, but shows that he 
recognises the new age of advocacy of the open society. He 
realises the emotional force of the words used by his opponents, 
and employs them to gain the same effect for his own 
propositions. He taunts the Whigs with 'freedom of the press', 
parries the tolerationists with 'liberty of conscience' and so 
on, while all the time he is - or ought to be - aware that he 
means something not only different from, but opposite to, what 
the liberal spokesmen intend the words to convey. His concept of 
freedom is in no wise consistent with the Lockean one, and his 
idea of what toleration ought to consist of would have been 
anathema to the liberal philosopher. 
Freedom is itself a notoriously indefinable term, as Owen 
Chadwick has pointed out. In its simplest form, it simply means 
without restraint, and this is the definition used by Hobbes, who 
specifies it as the condition of being unhindered by external 
. d' 81 ~mpe ~ments. But its later meaning is one suggestive of 
undesirable tendencies (for authoritarians): "licentious, or 
anarchic; tending, anyway, towards licence and anarchy".82 The 
problem for Swift (and Hobbes) is to limit the application of the 
word to the first meaning, and prevent the second from becoming 
reality. He is like a zoo-keeper who wants his animals to 
recognize freedom as freedom from physical chains, whilst 
persuading them to accept the walls of the zoo as sensible 
restrictions. The difficulty, of course, is one of definition, 
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and the difference between wall and chain essentially one of 
degree or kind. Swift argues the case for kind, the 
tolerationists for degree; the former arguing for preservation of 
restrictions on human behaviour, the latter for their removal. 
Swift is the zoo-keeper where Locke is the animal liberationist, 
and the chief divergence of opinion concerns the assumed 
behaviour of the animals when freed. 
And, despite his denunciations of tyranny, it is the 
Rabble he fears. 83 In the Contests and Dissentions, it is the 
rule of the Many which represents the greatest threat, and to 
oppose this threat he accepts a theory of sovereignty which 
excludes almost no human activity from the magistrate's 
jurisdiction. He puts forward the argument that within all 
actions capable of execution by force the legislature is 
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supreme. Thus, thought is the only activity excluded; but, 
given what government can do, why bother about the trifling, if 
ranklesome, island within its domain but beyond its authority? 
And given also the view of human nature held by Swift, the 
toleration of this impregnable domain is ten times better than a 
complete break-out: a return to the state of natural war. 
But Locke counters all this by reference to a law of 
nature, an unwritten code which exists outside that of society, 
and is in fact superior to it, an idea which can be traced from 
Cicero via Aquinas to Hooker and 85 Locke. Natural law, for 
Locke, prevents tyranny, for rulers' laws must be judged by this 
pre e l."stent law and thel."r actions can be seen to be J"ust or - x , 
unjust under its spotlight. This sense of justice is permanent 
and unchangeable, all the more binding for not having been passed 
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by any legislature. It is to this sense of law that men must 
look before deciding on the morality of human institutional 
laws. This alone provides a bulwark against tyrannical 
government, a court of appeal within the reach of every man, and 
superior in authority to any court of law. Natural law is what 
the Nuremburg judges invoked against the Third Reich. A law 
providing for the extermination of European Jewry is an 
abomination against natural justice, and is therefore illegal, 
and ought to have been disobeyed. Evil human laws, whether 
enforced by bayonet, bomb or Mme. la Guillotine, have no 
authority in this court. 
legislation, is illegitimate. 
Brute force, even when backed by 
Swift thinks this a nonsense. His vision of natural 
lawlessness precludes any possible agreement with Locke on what 
is required of law. The implicit appeal in Locke's argument is 
to a sense of justice within men which will direct them to behave 
in accordance with its edicts. But Swift sees no such sense in 
men. On the contrary, he says, men are driven by the irrational 
passions, and it is these passions which must be checked by law. 
Law is for binding men to obedience, and is not to be assessed by 
those who are subject to its authority: "we are commanded to obey 
our Governors, because Disobedience would breed seditions in the 
State.,,86 The common man is not animal rationale and his 
political actions must be watched by the government as closely as 
a deadly virus. 87 
Both Hobbes and Swift argue that natural justice is a 
logical absurdity, since laws exist to regulate the fierce 
competitive nature of man. Laws which exist only in men's minds 
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have no validity in reality against those inscribed in the 
statute-book. The absolute sovereign institutes law to impose 
order on the chaos of nature, for, if natural law existed, why 
would we need such a sovereign? Prior to his existence there is 
no justice, and words like 'right' and 'wrong' are meaningless. 
Justice is not something by which one assesses the sovereign's 
doings; it is what the sovereign says it is, no more and no 
less. Discrimination between subjects is the sovereign's 
prerogative, not his responsibility, for right is what he decrees 
it to be and nothing more. 
Thus, both Swift and Hobbes put the sovereign above 
reproach of any kind: his power is his legitimacy. Rousseau, for 
instance, complains that power is not a moral force, nor capable 
of producing morality by its actions: 
If force compels 
invoke a duty to 
compel obedience, 
obligation. Thus 
to what is 
meaningless. 88 
obedience, there is no need to 
and if force ceases to 
is no longer any 
'right' adds nothing 
'force'; it is 
obey, 
there 
the word 
said by 
Force, he says, is not the same as right, and he uses the example 
of a robber who steals his purse. But this is itself meaningless 
to those who advocate absolutism. They are not concerned about 
the meaning, or even the existence, of a concept of right. It is 
to escape the robbers that Leviathan was brought into being, and 
to complain thereafter that Leviathan is no better is futile. The 
sovereign protects you from the robbers, but your rights against 
another man are not the same as your obligations to the 
sovereign. For Rousseau as for Locke, society is something added 
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to an already existent morality, and property-rights are to be 
guaranteed by society: why else would men organise themselves 
thus? For Hobbes, there is no morality without society, and 
property-rights must be given to the sovereign along with the 
rest. Swift, agreeing with Hobbes, would simply say that 
Rousseau was confusing the issue, misunderstanding the point of 
legitimacy. Rousseau is, of course, referring to the sense of 
natural justice in which Swift does not believe. Swift puts 
necessity to the fore, not desirability or idealism. Leviathan 
is power, not right, for it is power that is required. 89 Swift 
would take one look at Rousseau's concluding reductio ad absurdum 
and agree with its sentiments; but Rousseau rejects the concept 
of naked force because it is immoral, where Swift rejects the 
concept of natural right because it is irrelevant and 
nonsensical. 
This becomes a 'tyranny of law', because there are no 
restrictions on what the lawgivers may do, either in religious or 
civil matters. The decrees of the legislature "may be against 
Equity, Truth, Reason, and Religion, but they are not against the 
Law",90 because, of course, law is determined by its collective 
will. This echoes Hobbes almost to the letter, because his 
legislature hands down tablets of stone which all must obey, and 
is no more answerable to men than is God. Hobbes puts it thus: 
"by a good law I mean not a just law: for no law can be 
unj ust", 91 and Swift shows no sign of baulking at such 
absolutism, and seems prepared to accept this authoritarian maxim 
as the final word on natural justice. 
But perhaps, one feels, this is slightly unfair to Swift. 
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He was, as previously noted, a famous defender of the liberties 
of the oppressed, and to lump him unreservedly in the camp of the 
absolutists will seem to many critics to be to ignore a very 
large body of writings which suggests something entirely 
different. Orwell's description of Swift as a 
"Tory-anarchist",92 someone who applied the rules unbendingly 
to everyone but himself, is possibly nearer the mark, and yet 
reveals more about Orwell's interest in politics than about 
Swift's. It 
semi-isolation, 
his religion. 
is not enough to study Swift's politics in 
since t~Cj Q.(e so clearly and closely bound up with 
The real reason why Swift advocated an absolute 
legislature was not simply that he was an authoritarian by 
nature, but that he had a clear interest-group, as it were, which 
he wished to preserve: the Church of England. Having already 
detected the siege-mentality, one must attempt to explain and 
define it. The importance of the concept of 'America' is crucial 
and underlies all else, but it is not in itself enough. One must 
go further into the religious writings to understand the true 
identity of the besieged and the besiegers. 
Again it is the seventeenth century which provides the 
truly vital clues. It was then that the great intellectual 
debate began to be voiced by the forces for and against liberty. 
This debate centred upon the precise relationship between Church 
and state, with the two sides at the opposite poles of orthodoxy 
on the one hand and heterodoxy on the other. By the time Swift 
came to write on the subject, the latter view was in the 
ascendancy, so that he was defending a position which was all but 
overrun. The older, Erastian idea of a Church was being 
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challenged forcefully by the new liberals, who sought to achieve 
religious toleration and a separation of Church and state. Since 
the most prominent among the liberals was Locke, a closer look at 
how Swift's views compare with Locke on this issue will go a long 
way towards establishing the limits of Swift's moderation and 
tolerance. 
The central test for such a discussion comes from the 
"Voyage to Brobdingnag", where the Giant King - who is presented 
as an exemplary leader throughout makes the following 
observation when told by Gulliver about the number of sects in 
religion and politics in his country: 
he knew no Reason, why those who entertain 
Opinions Prejudicial to the Public, should be 
obliged to change, or would not be obliged to 
conceal them. And, as it was Tyranny in any 
Government to require the first, so it was 
Weakness not to enforce the second: For, a Man 
may be allowed to keep Poisons in ij~s closet, but 
not to vend them about as Cordials. 
This, in a nutshell, is precisely what the debate on toleration 
centred upon. Poisons and cordials are terms loaded with 
controversy, for who is to say what religion will save a man? 
And precisely what is prejudicial to the public? What is the 
true relationship between Church and state? 
Swift opts for a state-religion, where Locke argues 
emphatically against any such dangerous alliance: "He jumbles 
heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, 
who mixes these societies",94 says Locke, declaring it of vital 
importance to "settle the just bounds" which exist between Church 
and state. 95 The courts have no jurisdiction over spiritual 
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concerns, nor the Church over temporal, so that the two powers 
are sent to different corners of life, each with its own 
clearly-defined sphere of influence over the lives of men. Swift 
will have none of this. Christianity is our religion, and the 
job of the magistrate is to uphold its precepts and ensure 
adherence to its tenets wherever he can. He quotes the dictum of 
Tiberius Deorum offensa Diis curae twice with obvious 
contempt,96 and invokes the right to punish offences against 
God in the here and 97 now. This is one of Locke's mainstay 
arguments. Let the gods look to their own interests in matters 
where they might be considered slighted. 98 Since they are 
capable of punishing hubris with nemesis, why should we 
interfere, or make ourselves God's judiciary? 
But Swift will not allow this. Let the gods punish as 
they will, we need not consider that the end of the matter, and 
will feel free to punish temporal hubris with temporal nemesis, 
refusing to be hoodwinked into denying the constitution of Church 
and state its full right of retribution against transgressors of 
its laws. Swift argues politics before theology, and considers 
the judgments of earthly courts both valid and important, whether 
or not a more important judgment is to come. He will not allow 
men to slip from a secular noose because a divine one awaits them 
later. 
This is perhaps the most crucial dichotomy between Swift 
and Locke on the question of religious practice. Hobbes scorned 
the differentation between the religious and the secular as a red 
herring: they 
. 99 
sovere1gn. 
are both under the jurisdiction of the 
Despite Swift's acceptance of the toleration 
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contained in the 1688 Settlement, he makes it plain that he 
concedes it grudgingly and, like Martin in the Tale, acknowledges 
it only as a stitch in the coat, impossible to remove without 
further upheaval and disturbance of the precious public peace. 
The Revolution of 1688, he cannot forbear saying, "produced some 
very bad effects, which are likely to stick long enough by 
S ,,100 u • All his remarks about sects regret their existence, 
long for their dissolution, and seek to freeze their development 
as the best that can be done for the time being. 101 
Like Hobbes, Swift"'s perpetual plea is that the public 
peace is what really matters, so that right belongs to the 
existing order. It is the dissenters who threaten this 
peace,102 and Swift accepts that religion as a whole must be 
subject to the law in order to prevent small groups who fall 
within the category of religion from carrying out their 
d ' 103 eSlres. State control of religion may alter the basis of 
his own Church, but this, he says, is better than the 
alternative. It is far better to be fettered by the state than 
torn to shreds by the fanatics. The crucial link for Swift is 
between religious dissent and political disobedience, and he 
assumes without hesitation that these men want not religious 
f d b 1 ,' 1 104 ree om, ut po ltlca power. 
Swift makes the point several times that thoughts are 
actions in the making, a pregnancy of dissent which must result 
in a child of 1 d · b d' 105 actua 1S0 e 1ence. Liberty must be closely 
defined by the government in order to prevent it from becoming 
licence: it must mean "'that which one is allowed to do'" or else 
becomes "'that which one wishes to do.... He thus arrives at a 
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concept of right thinking, not of free-thinking, the latter 
becoming precisely the opposite of real freedom. Surprisingly, 
Swift echoes, almost to the letter, the argument given by 
Bolgolam for executing Gulliver: that, since he has cause to 
believe that Gulliver is a traitor at heart, it is only a matter 
of time before "it appears in Overt Acts".106 And despite the 
fact that he is clearly attacking Bolgolam's brand of cynical 
Realpolitik in the Travels, he offers it straight-faced in the 
religious tracts. He perpetually puts forward the argument that 
people who ask for a little liberty want the whole thing, so that 
every concession today is a bomb through the window tomorrow. 
This surely scuppers the arguments of those who would have Swift 
as an Anglican compromiser. The moderate Martin and the gentle 
Giant King provide a smokescreen for a doctrine that is totally 
incompatible with any idea of compromise, their appearance 
serving to belie their absolute authority. Martin rej ects 
extremes and preaches commonsense and prudence, and the Giant 
King is horrified by the suggestion that he should use gunpowder 
against his subjects. But is this important if their authority 
is unquestionable, their power limitless except over activities 
within men's skulls? Is Leviathan's power diminished any because 
he is a pleasant fellow? 
Locke argues against this adamantine intolerance, but his 
claim that the real danger lies in the suppression of 
dissent 107 gets short shrift from Swift. Swift looks longingly 
back to an age of enforced authority and a static society, Locke 
forward to an age of toleration between men, with conscience, not 
law, the supreme concern. In diversity Locke sees salvation, 
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Swift damnation, but both recognise the importance of the 
relationship between Church and state. Swift says that each 
state must have its own national religion. It is the power, not 
the name, which matters, and thus it is the schismatic who is 
dangerous, not one particular brand of schism. He relates this 
easily enough to human nature, and is unsurprised by dissenters' 
scheming. But because something is natural, that is no excuse, 
in Swift's view, for allowing it to happen. The parable of the 
farmer and the kite excludes any conception of morality. Swift 
does not blame the dissenters for being rampaging kites, but does 
not see this as any reason to hand in the licence on his 
shotgun. lOB It is the 'gun-control' lobby within his own ranks 
those who are "answering Fools in their Folly" - for whom his 
greatest scorn is reserved. His attitude towards toleration 
betrays his deepest sympathies in the Hobbes-Locke controversy, 
because it is clear that he regards it as a curse and not an 
achievement: far better not to have had it, but, notwithstanding 
its legal presence in the Settlement, let us keep it at the 
minimum level the letter of the law will permit. This is surely 
why he sees no difference between a "bare" tolerance and a "full" 
one; because to him they mean the same. 
He is utterly adamant in his refusal to listen to the 
other point of view. Those who uphold the principle of 
toleration have mistaken the nature of dissent, because they have 
misunderstood the nature of man. Dissenters have no arguments; 
they simply want power. They request access to Swift's citadel 
on the grounds of liberty of conscience, while in their hearts 
they seek to blow it sky-high. At best it is perverseness, the 
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desire to be different, sneering at clubs because one has not 
been allowed to join. To Swift, it would be absurd to grant them 
membership, since they would then find some other pretext for 
their "spirit of opposition", and keep on finding them until they 
ran the club itself. 110 He will not hear of amelioration, for 
how can one hope to satisfy those whose very existence on the 
political map depends upon not being satisfied? He defines 
dissent as a malady of the mind, not as an expression of 
political disappointment or of principled opposition. This 
disease requires proselytes in order to spread. Swift refers 
again to human nature, not political justice, and cites Milton as 
the exemplar of the selfish spite at work in dissenters. lll 
Their 'principles' originate in the misfortune of their lives and 
can safely be dismissed as verbal tantrums disguised as rational 
argument. Dissent is the sickness of the born malcontent, and 
the job of the Church is to prevent the orthodox from catching 
it. 
Thus, in the Sermon on the Trinity, he suggests that those 
who oppose the doctrine are enemies of religion. They hate 
Christianity because it d h i 1 d d " 112 impe es t e rusts an eSlres. He 
never gives column-space to their supposed reasons, but comments 
simply that the revival of the Arian heresy has stirred doubts in 
men's minds again, and he is more concerned that men should 
believe than that what they believe should be credible. If the 
doctrine of the Trinity is part of the course prescribed by the 
Church for the cure ,. 1 h"" h 113 of men s sou s, t lS lS enoug • If the 
patient is encouraged to question individual elements of the 
course, he might be stirred to question others, perhaps all, and 
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he may be moved to seek another doctor or, which is worst of all, 
conclude that he is not ill at all: "Why, if it be as you say, I 
may safely whore and drink on, and defy the Parson".114 The 
maintenance of orthodoxy is vital, since orthodoxy is the mortar 
between the bricks of Swift's citadel. 
Locke, on the other hand, scathingly observes that 
orthodoxy is a nonsense, since it is a notoriously indefinable 
term. Since every church is orthodox by its own lights, what 
meaning can the word be said to possess, and, as a consequence, 
what possible usefulness in the debate on toleration?115 This 
reductio ad absurdum would only be acceptable if one accepted 
right as a viable entity, and Swift deals only in power. Whether 
he has a right given by God to call his Church the orthodox one 
is academic; he has the magistrate on his side. He is not 
offering spiritual authority, so that the absurd - to Locke -
notion of orthodoxy is easily settled. The orthodox church is 
that established by law; the unorthodox any church not so 
established. Swift constantly refers to the possibility of any 
religion being instituted as the national form of worship. Again 
it is the thing and not the name which matters. The Mahometan 
religion will 
and he says 
sacrifice to 
do, so long as it is the will of the legislature, 
that he is prepared to offer up his own Church as 
the maintenance of order. 116 In this light we 
read the statement "That all true Believers shall break their 
Eggs at the convenient End" as meaning convenient solely to the 
Magistrate. 117 
The question of salvation gets not a mention in the 
discourse, and the parameters of Swift's concern on the subject 
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do not seem to include anything which could specifically be 
termed religious at all. 118 And l.·t is, f a ter all, the 
specifically religious aspects of the discussion which ought to 
be in dispute. Hence the importance of faith for Locke precedes 
any other consideration, and his assessment of the politics of 
religion necessarily places faith before all else. 119 
Believing in natural right, there is no question of any other 
course of action but toleration, for the conscience of each man 
is uniquely valid, and denial of it not only unthinkable, but 
blasphemous. But Locke assumes an area of concern outside the 
purview of the state, an area which Swift refuses to discuss or 
even acknowledge. If schism is a grey-coloured term no matter: 
the law is admirably black and white, and the law is to be the 
arbiter. 
But what makes the matter so much worse is that the 
origins of dissent are interwoven with the faith itself, and the 
first advocate of such dissent was the founder of the faith 
himself. "Christianity had never been content merely to enforce 
an external performance of public ceremonies", says Chadwick, 
pointing out that a religion which sought to reach men's hearts 
was bound to result in passive resistance,120 which in turn 
must lead inexorably to active resistance. Luther's famous 
statement "Here stand I, I can do no other" so resembled the 
founder of Christianity that "it must in time destroy the ideal 
of conformity to rites or to faith by social pressure or by 
law".121 The church which had met in the catacombs of Rome, 
and which was prepared to assert its beliefs to the point of 
martyrdom, could provide little ammunition for reactionary 
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politicians who, in denying toleration to dissenters, must 
resemble the Romans rather than the early Christians, thus 
exposing themselves to the charge of hypocrisy or heresy. Where 
Swift can invoke the law of the land, Locke can call upon the 
authority of no less a figure than Jesus Christ Himself, the 
founder of the faith, or even Luther, the founder of the Church. 
It is abundantly significant that Swift argues politics where 
Locke argues faith, since Swift, as a clergyman, must surely 
recognise that his weaker suit is Locke's stronger. All Swift's 
aces are secular, while Locke holds the trump-card of the 
example of Christ. 
Locke concludes from this that, faced with one hundred 
religions, we have no option but to allow free choice: "Men 
cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or not. And 
therefore, when all is said and done, they must be left to their 
own consciences.,,122 Swift, on the contrary, concludes that 
the legislature must make a choice by which the people are 
bound. They may believe what they like, but must keep such 
beliefs to 123 themselves. This is his definition of liberty of 
conscience, echoing that of the Giant King, where he denies 
liberals the right to express opinions while majestically 
allowing them to hold them. 124 It is conduct not conscience, 
behaviour not belief, which Swift is concerned to regulate and, 
as a consequence, he ignores the religious arguments in favour of 
the secular, quoting Plato's maxim that "Men ought to worship the 
Gods, according to the 125 Laws of the Country." To Swift, the 
authority of God is forever in dispute and is largely useless in 
this sphere. The magistrate reflects the will of the majority, 
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not of God, and this makes his judgment more, not less, important 
to Swift. It is the relative truth - the locally-agreed truth _ 
which is upheld, and may differ from country to country. Unlike 
Locke, Swift is not wielding a universal truth, so that, when 
Locke asks whether Christians might not be treated abroad as the 
dissenters are at home,126 Swift says "Yes". "We are the 
Majority and we are in Possession", he says,127 proving that 
the law is superior to concepts of truth, because it is tangible 
and incontrovertible. The idea that the individual must weigh 
the matter of obedience to authority in the scales of his 
conscience is precisely the dangerous doctrine against which 
Swift is throwing the full weight of his pen. 
It is this which represents the fundamental 
stumbling-block to anyone who would attempt to link Swift and 
Locke. Locke regards liberty of conscience as something very 
much applicable to behaviour and action; otherwise it is 
meaningless. He uses it to advocate extension of freedom where 
Swift uses it to establish the limits of its application: "The 
Word conscience properly signifies that Knowledge which a Man 
hath within himself of his own thoughts and Actions.,,128 Since 
few men are knowledgeable enough to voice an opinion, conscience 
is dismissed as a faculty incapable of arbitrating between 
standards f b h · 129 o e aVl0ur. This is a direct parallel to 
Swift's tactics when dealing with opponents: attack the man 
first, and dismiss the ideas because they come from such a man. 
As with Tindal, so with . 130 conSClence. Swift says that men 
cannot know whether what they feel is right, because their 
consciences are inadequate indicators. Thus, having dismissed 
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conscience as a generic term, he need not discuss its outpourings 
from the mouths of individual men. With such flawed equipment, 
men have no more ability to judge their behaviour or that of 
others than to use their arms to fly to the moon. Swift seeks to 
encourage people to trust in the established authority rather 
than their own discredited intellects. 
Against this Locke defiantly declares that "No way 
whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my 
conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the 
blessed.,.!31 He puts forth the vital importance of inward 
light, and offers the ultimate heretic's creed, offered before 
him by Christ and Luther: "obedience is due, in the first place, 
to God, and afterwards to the laws.,,132 Spiritual affairs are 
far above temporal, and their care must be attended to before 
earthly affairs. A man's conscience is the most important thing 
to him, and must, where offended by the law, be given priority. 
Such liberty of conscience is, in the eyes of Swift, the most 
disastrous thing imaginable, for, with his seventeenth-century 
approach, this idea of the inner voice is the thing he most 
feared: "every man his own carver"; the political anarchy of 
free-thinking. Toleration, carrying such anarchy in its 
sUl'tcase l'S to SW1'ft the complete surrender of the citadel, 
" , 
the return to d d d Am · 133 a rea e erlca. Conscience is nothing more 
than a private freedom; it is not a public right: "we are 
commanded to obey our Governors, because Disobedience would breed 
Seditions in the State.,,134 In the end, the importance of the 
public peace far outweighs the importance of liberty of 
conscience. 
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The attempt to make of Swift a liberal ultimately breaks 
on the rock of religious freedom. It finds its final expression 
in the Project where Swift openly declares a preference for 
hypocrisy over individual conscience. 135 "A sweet religion, 
indeed, that obliges men to dissemble and tell lies, both to God 
and man, 136 for the salvation of their souls!", scoffs Locke. But, 
Swift claims, hypocrisy is better than open infidelity and 
shameless breaching of the public peace. If people wish to be 
martyrs, Swift is prepared to accommodate them, and those who 
claim that their disobedience emanates from the calling of God 
should take up the matter when they appear in that court of 
courts. Meanwhile, the magistrate is in no way bound by inner 
voices, and would-be martyrs can have no cause for complaint, so 
that when Locke says that "the true disciples of Christ must 
ff t · ,,137 su er persecu lon , Swift responds that he will take his 
chances on the question of truth when the time comes, but makes 
it quite abundantly plain that 'true' is a contemptible word 
which may one day explode in everyone's face: 
You who in different sects have shammed 
And come to see each other damned; 
(So some folks told you, but they kneY38 
No more of Jove's designs than you). 
Moderation, as defined by Swift, bears no resemblance to 
that of Locke, just as his toleration is tyranny, and his freedom 
enslavement, to the liberal philosopher. His claim that "I 
believe, I am no Bigot in Religion; and I am sure, I am none in 
Governrnent" 139 will be upheld only by those who carefully 
select their evidence. His middle-way writings are not to be 
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seen as humble pleas but as the minimum necessary for the 
survival of religion. The existence of a state Church is to be 
defended fiercely in all quarters, not quietly advocated in 
discussion-groups. And one may feel uneasy about the only real 
freedom Swift will allow freedom of thought. Does he hanker 
after even that supposedly untouchable faculty that makes man 
uniquely man? He does not say so much, for without the means to 
achieve such an ambition, it would be impolitic in the extreme to 
express it. But why would the man who is prepared to accept 
hypocrites, and who is so clearly a pragmatist in the politics of 
religion, refuse the means to turn the hypocrites into devout 
Anglicans were he to come into possession of the necessary 
technology? 140 He says at one point: "You may force men by 
interest or punishment, to say or swear they believed, and to act 
as if they believed: you can go no further.,,141 Locke would 
say "ought to" but Swift only says "can": he refers to inability 
alone, not undesirability. After all, when Swift suggests that 
it is bad politics to try to force-feed natives of distant lands 
with too much Christianity, it is the article of Christ's 
divinity he is prepared to jettison. What does this leave the 
1 . . ? 142 re 19lon. 
Those who would have Swift as the greatest compromiser in 
an Age of Compromise have either ignored or distorted the extant 
record of Swift's writings on h . 1 b· t 143 t ese crUCla su Jec s. The 
assumption that Swift had faith and was not a hypocrite in no way 
alters the fact that these considerations do not appear to have 
affected his attitude towards the politics of religion as 
expressed on the printed page. Since it is the page itself with 
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which we have to deal, we have no right to change his statements 
in accordance with preconceptions which we may have about what 
kind of man he must have been. If there is one characteristic 
absent from his writings on the Church, it is faith; and if there 
is one word least applicable to his perception of conscience and 
toleration, it is moderation. 'True' religion is always 
discarded as a useless chimera, and 'inward light' as a 
contemptible excuse for not obeying the law. 144 
But, having gone thus far, one can really go no further. 
The point at which the analogy with Hobbes breaks down is when 
one considers what he did not have in common with him. The very 
idea of Swift as pastor within Leviathan's puppet-church is 
laughable, and one need only imagine the reaction of his 
ecclesiastical masters to this suggestion to realise as much. 
Swift remained always his own man, for his obsession with law did 
not obtain when the Whigs were in power. In any event, the 
crucial difference between the two lies in the nature of their 
writing. Hobbes is the dispassionate critic, dissecting society 
with mathematical precision and a cold eye. Swift is both a 
realist and an angry man, and the roots of his politics lie in 
his own passionate nature. One need only look at the list of 
heroes from Glubbdubdrib to realise the gulf between the two men; 
for they are all tyrannicides, idealists or sceptics who stood up 
against kings or creeds to which they refused to submit. The 
inclusion of both Brutus and More betrays the superficiality of 
his political links with Hobbes's monolith, for it is their very 
outlawry and principled nonconformity which links them most 
closely with Swift, particularly as the author of the Drapier's 
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Letters. 145 
Other, cooler, heads may rationalize, ameliorate, weigh 
the matter in speculative, philosophical scales. But for Swift 
the Royal Society's motto - nullius in verba - is appropriate; he 
wants deeds, not words; action not debate. He is concerned with 
the safety of his precious citadel, and is prepared to provide 
whatever means are necessary to protect the capitol, and 
indifferent as to the consistency or otherwise of his defensive 
materials. Politics and law are his principle weapons of defence, 
but the Anglican Church is the citadel, and this is the only 
consistency to be found in these writings. His devotion to his 
Church is absolute. Because it is his, and because it is the 
established Church, this enables him to put forward arguments of 
an authoritarian nature; indeed, compels him to. Swift knows the 
real danger of the horde without the gates. He is protecting the 
Anglican Church and its possessions against 'progressive', 
'liberal' ideologies designed to break or weaken its hold on the 
people. Believing in the Hobbesian - or rather Augustinian -
state of nature, he becomes like a lion- keeper who knows that 
his beasts are the same as their fellows in the wild and that, if 
allowed to mingle for long enough, they will return to their 
natural ways. This is no argument, in his eyes, for allowing 
this to happen; rather the reverse. For, in recognising the 
similarities, he is simultaneously recognising the 
dissimilarities, and he knows the importance of the cage. Swift 
has in his own mind - every justification for preserving the 
bars against would-be liberators like Locke. 
From our distant historical perspective we may state that 
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Locke was right. Toleration weakened the position of the 
dissenters by denying them the status of oppressed minority, 
thereby removing from their brow the laurel of principled 
sympathy. But this is not to say that Swift and the Giant King 
are foolish, obsessed reactionaries. Reactionaries they may have 
been, but they did not know, any more than did Locke, that this 
would be the case. To say that the town apothecary who sees 
rival apothecaries threatening his monopoly on trade, and refuses 
them the right to sell their cure, while allowing them to concoct 
it, is an absurd figure, would only be acceptable were it to be 
clear in advance that his patent cure would still dominate the 
market. But so long as the threat seems real to the 
market-leader, his paranoia, if far from praiseworthy, is at 
least comprehensible, given his dilemma. Locke may argue that 
Swift's position is both insecure and self-defeating, implicitly 
saying that the other cures are credible; for why else would he 
take such defensive action? Repression is the best form of 
advertisement, and Swift is simply perpetuating the dissenters' 
claims by giving publicity to their existence as an alternative. 
Swift was prepared to risk the charges of Locke, but toleration 
was one risk the Anglican Dean was not prepared to run. 
But perhaps one can offer a final perspective on the 
matter which shows precisely what was at stake. At the end of 
Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration , he categorically refuses 
any rights to atheists, asserting that "the taking away of God, 
though but even . 1 11" 146 in thought, d1sso ves a • Swift's citadel 
may have been more exclusive than Locke's, but Locke is trying 
the same trick with atheists that Swift was with dissenting 
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Protestants. Both were fighting a losing battle, for Locke was 
stirring up troubles for his descendants that he imagined had 
been got rid of once and for all with religious toleration. 
"Natural r1" ght" was the pass 0 d t th " d 1 ' w roe c1ta e , an open-sesame' 
which could be used by anyone, and in providing it to those he 
most favoured, he unwittingly provided it to those he most 
feared. As Chadwick observes: 
Once concede equality to a distinctive group, you 
could not confine it to that group. You could 
not confine it to Protestants; nor, later, to 
Christians; nor, at last, to believers in God. A 
:ree mar~e~ in ~~,e opinions became a free market 
1n all 0p1n10ns. 
It had an unlimited application, and, in trying to limit it, the 
liberals became - as much as Swift had in opposition to them - a 
crowd of yesterday's men defending a citadel they themselves had 
unwittingly betrayed. 
The ultimate problem comes when one tries to weave a 
consistent pattern from the various, variable threads with which 
Swift's works provide us. It must be acknowledged that the most 
disheartening factor for a would-be explicator of Swift is that, 
even when broken down into its component parts, the engine of his 
genius is not laid bare before us, stripped of all mystery and 
apparent contradiction: it still confounds the critic. So with 
Swift on party, politics and religious controversy: he is 
apparently being dishonest at least half the time. At the last, 
he must be understood in terms of paradox. He was an 
authoritarian who rebelled, a liberal who proposed censorship and 
restriction, a polemicist who despised polemic, and a liberator 
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who advocated chains. But if we look for the constant, the one 
invariable factor, it will be found to be devotion to the 
Anglican Church. 148 If we understand this, we still cannot 
remove the disturbing paradoxes deeply embedded in his diverse 
writings, but we can at least make them broadly comprehensible. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UTOPIA vs HISTORY. 
The problem of interpreting Swift's meaning in a clear-cut 
and satisfying way ultimately centres around the Fourth Voyage 
and the crucial debate over the Houyhnhnms. The perennial 
question asked by critics over the last three hundred years has 
been effectively the same. Do the horses represent an ideal or 
are they themselves part of the satiric target, the object of an 
ironic attack upon one or more delusive ideals? Are they, in 
other words, an embodiment of a utopian yearning, or exactly the 
opposite? As we have shown in Chapter One, critics have been 
sharply divided on this issue. l George Sherburn, for example, 
argues that the horses do represent an ideal for Swift, and he is 
far from alone in this interpretation. 2 Yet a majority of 
critics find the Houyhnhnms dislikable, even repulsive. George 
Orwell, to name but one, gives expression to the recurring 
objection of such critics that Houyhnhnm society is static, 
incurious, repressive, coercive, authoritarian and indeed, in 
. . l' . 3 certaln lmportant respects, tota ltarlan. However, even if 
all the above were true, this would simply group Swift's utopia 
with every other utopia. No-one has ever written a description 
of utopia which could persuade more than a handful of like-minded 
dreamers of its desirability. As one critic remarks of the 
failed utopian travel agents: "apparently rational horses cannot 
persuade nor wild horses drag people to live there.,,4 
The origins of the idea of utopia as we know it - as this 
Chapter will demonstrate lie with Plato and the Platonic 
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inheritance of the Renaissance, and its unpopularity with modern 
readers is tied to the authoritarian element introduced by its 
founding father. Hugh Trevor-Roper has written of jus t this 
aspect of Platonism: "in religion, in literature, in art, (it] 
has always been a source of inspiration," but "in politics [it] 
has always been not only communist and totalitarian, but also 
essentially static, unhistorical, indeed anti-historical."S 
The reasons for this centre around the disintegration which Plato 
saw happening around him, in particular the effects of history. 
Plato witnessed the decline of Athens, her military defeat, the 
crumbling of her great ideals, all of which for him was 
symbolised in the judicial murder of his mentor, Socrates. 
According to Trevor-Roper, he consequently looked to Sparta for 
his inspiration, since Sparta was a society which appeared able 
to preserve itself against change, an achievement supposedly due 
to the constitution, given to the Spartans - according to legend 
- by their great law-giver Lycurgus. 6 But this was not enough 
for Plato, for what he wished to achieve was a society which 
stepped outside history, which could free itself from the 
inevitable decline - as he saw it of the historical process and 
exist immune to change. As a resul t, he chose to return to 
"first principles" rather than follow a model, however admirable, 
from the world of reality: 
So his Republic was to be communist, 
caste-bound, wi thout money, ideologically 
protected. If this meant that freedom, 
individualism, poetry - everything which had been 
the glory of Periclean Athens should be 
sacrificed, so be it: first things must come 
first. 
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The totalitarian tendencies of utopian thinking were, therefore, 
inherent in the tradition from its very origins. 
When Trevor-Roper suggests that the Renaissance Platonist, 
Thomas More, inherited, among other things, Plato's hatred of 
history, he brings us straight to the heart of our purpose in 
this present Chapter. More the historian did not regard history 
as constructive. He may have written his history of Richard III 
as a kind of post facto justification of the Tudor succession, 
but the wider implications are clear enough. There will always 
be a tyrant who must be overthrown, but the liberators or their 
successors inevitably became tyrants in their turn, and so an 
eternal historical process, an inexorable cycle of tyranny, 
becomes the centre of all historical insight. As a result, More 
the philosopher came to the conclusion a conclusion made 
inevitable both by his Platonism and his own historical 
researches - that the answers to the problems of life were not to 
be sought anywhere in history. "He did not seek, in past 
history, a means of controlling the future: he looked to 
philosophy for a means to end history: to end it altogether." In 
creating his Utopia, consequently, "he sought a social form which 
would be proof against historical change that is, against 
history itself. ,,8 In considering Gulliver's Travels within the 
utopian tradi tion this is of crucial importance, for More has a 
dual role in our discussion. He is both the first maj or figure 
in the modern utopian tradition - and he gave us the very word 
itself and a strong influence on Swift. There can be no 
question that Swift unequivocally and unreservedly admired 
More. 9 The evidence, as we shall see, is overwhelming and is 
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unsullied by so much as one iota of the famous Swiftian irony. 
With this in mind, an analysis of the utopianism of Swift as it 
finds expression in Gulliver's Travels can begin. 
When Gulliver complains in his prefatory letter to his 
cousin Sympson that certain readers have hinted that "the 
Houyhnhnms and Yahoos have no more Existence than the Inhabitants 
of Utopia,,10 he opens a discussion which places the Travels 
within a broad western tradition, and himself hints in a 
typically Swift ian irony - at a profound relationship between his 
creator and the author of the book which gave the whole tradition 
the name by which it has been known ever since. The connection 
between Swift and More is a commonplace, 11 and the fact that 
Gulliver's Travels belongs to a utopian tradition has never been 
disputed,12 but the question of Swift's precise relationship to 
More and the degree and extent to which the Travels can be 
properly described as utopian (in the context of this tradition) 
still deserve close scrutiny; for, in examining both these 
crucial contexts of the work, we arrive at the very heart of the 
Swiftian irony, and come as close as anyone can ever be confident 
of doing to the motivation and ethos behind the great writer's 
maj or satires. The connection with More is vital, both in 
personal and literary terms, for via More we find the 
intellectual and historical roots of the Swiftian irony, and 
discover not only the extent of his utopian tendencies, but also 
crucially - the limitations upon them. 
For a man so little given to hero-worship of any sort, 
Swift's extraordinarily high opinion of Sir Thomas More is 
remarkable. He described More as "the only Man of true Virtue 
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tha( t) ever Engl(an)d produced" and reiterated the point several 
t · . hi . t' 13 1mes 1n s wr1 1ngs. But the most famous and, for our 
present purpose, the most significant tribute occurs in the 
Travels, when Gulliver, visiting the island of the sorcerers, 
asks to see various historical figures, and is given the 
opportunity to speak to them: 
I had the Honour to have much Conversation with 
Brutus; and was told that his Ancestor Junius, 
Socrates, Epaminandas, Cato the Younger, Sir 
Thomas More and himself, were perpetually 
together: A Sextumvirate to wh\~h all the Ages of 
the World cannot add a Seventh. 
In order to discover why Swift should have held More in such high 
regard, and to establish the extent to which this admiration and 
the reasons for it affected Swift's satires, it will be necessary 
to examine More's own Utopia and its antecedents. In this 
examination we shall find vital clues to the utopian elements in 
Swift's writings, and a certain essential understanding of the 
uses of irony, an understanding which illuminates the text, and 
helps the reader to gain crucial insights into the utopian 
imagination of our greatest satirist. 
The idea of utopia is virtually universal, for as 
anthropologists have discovered over many years, savages allover 
the world have imagined paradisiacal islands or other places 
where the problems of society do not exist, and where every man 
may find the peace that eludes him in his present situation. 
However, while the idea itself is far from exclusive to western 
literary traditions, "the profusion of Western utopias has not 
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been equaled in any other culture." 15 The principal source of 
this in our culture is traditionally considered to be in the 
works of Plato, whose record of the life and wisdom of Socrates 
the philosopher established an intellectual foundation for the 
criticism of society on a moral basis, and also for the 
suggestion of what an ideal society should look like and how it 
should be organised. 16 As a Christian-humanist of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Sir Thomas More shared with 
his fellows an abiding interest in The Hellenic inheritance, and 
was much influenced by Plato and the other classical 
philosophers. 17 This is abundantly plain when one comes to 
read Utopia where the Platonic connection is evident throughout 
the book, both in the fact that the book is itself a sort of 
Platonic dialogue, and in the philosophical jests and 
intellectual in-joking which precede the actual text. Utopia is, 
in a sense, a sequel to the works of Plato, since More claims to 
have advanced the achievement of Plato by providing an actual 
report on life in the ideal state, adding the pictorial element 
to the discursive elements in the Republic. 18 More, then, 
updated the Republic, but not in any spirit of rebellion, since 
his respect for his Greek master is visible (and implicit) 
throughout Utopia. But it is not a simple exercise in 
philosophical reverence, for the exchanges between More and his 
imaginary voyager, Raphael Hythloday, "expressed More .... s 
1'1 
ambivalence toward Father Plato", and it is partly this 
ambivalence which distances More from Plato, and which enables 
him to create his own landmark in the utopian tradition, one 
which Swift follows to an important extent in the creation of his 
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own utopian masterpiece. 
However, before assessing the respective attitudes towards 
utopian values of these two authors, we must first examine the 
utopian ideals and institutions of their fictitious voyages. In 
Gulliver's Travels there are three utopias which are generally 
recognised: prelapsarian Lilliput, Brobdingnag, and, of course, 
Houyhnhnmland. 20 A discussion of the values of More's Utopians 
in relation to these countries' systems should lead to valuable 
insights, not so much into what Swift mayor may not have 
'borrowed' from More, as into the extent of their shared attitude 
towards the faults in society and what, if anything, can be done 
to remedy them. 
The major features of Utopian Society are the rule of 
reason, community of property, religious toleration, the pursuit 
of pleasure, and stability. The rule of reason governs all 
things, and so every feature of the society is shaped by this 
philosophy. This af fects the layout of the fi fty-four ci ties, 
which are identical in every respect, and also such things as 
family life, which is patriarchal, with women and children 
accepting their place in the scheme of things. All property is 
held in common21 and all are assured of work and sufficient to 
eat and drink, since this is regarded as the only way to ensure 
that there is no exploitation and that the management of 
resources is organised for the benefit of the whole society, not 
for any individuals or groups within it. The result of this 
approach is that there is no poverty of any sort in Utopia, and 
beggars are consequently a thing unheard-of. 
But the two most striking features of the society are the 
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idea of pleasure and the attitude towards religion. The 
intricate hierarchy of pleasures includes every enj oyable 
sensation of body and mind, but it is not Epicurean in the 
popular sense of the term. If it can be called Epicurean, then 
the Epicurus we are referring to is the one whom Erasmus had 
rehabili tated, a philosopher "who stood for continent, minimal 
gratification, not maximal indulgence".23 It does not 
represent a surrender to sensuality, since pleasures of the mind 
are always the highest, and those of the body are divided into 
pure and adulterated categories. Pleasure is never hedonism, for 
it must be "under the guidance of nature" and includes only 
"man's natural inclinations. ,,24 The two limitations which they 
place upon their pursuit of pleasure are firstly, that only 
pleasures which are neither painful nor harmful to others are 
permitted, and secondly, that one should not choose a lower 
pleasure in preference to a higher. In true classical style, the 
greatest pleasure arises from the practice of virtue and the 
consciousness of a good life. 
The practice of religious toleration is one of the oldest 
principles of their constitution, for it was instituted by King 
Utopos himself at the establishment of the country itself: "even 
if it should be the case that one single religion is true and all 
the rest are false, he foresaw that, provided the matter was 
handled reasonably and moderately, truth by its own natural force 
would finally emerge sooner or later and stand forth 
cons picuously..',25 There is no proper name for, and there exist 
no images of, God, for he is simply styled Mythras, a general 
term used to designate the Supreme Being, whoever He might be. 
93 
There are many roads to God, they believe, and so who is to say 
which is the 'correct' one? All of this is encapsulated in the 
famous utopian prayer, which establishes beyond question the 
tolerance of religious diversity in the country, and the 
reasonableness of religious practice. The Utopian reasons thus: 
If he errs in these matters or if there is 
anything better and more approved by God than 
that commonwealth or that religion, he prays that 
He will, of His goodness, bring him to the 
knowledge of it, for he is ready to follow in 
whatever path He may lead him. But if this form 
of a commonwealth be the best and his religion 
the truest, he prays that then He may give him 
steadfastness and bring all other mortals to the 
same way of living and the same opinion of God -
unless there be something in this variety of 
reli~~ons which delights His inscrutable 
will. 
There are, significantly, two exceptions to this generous 
toleration atheists and proselytisers. Atheism is illegal 
because it is unreasonable, say the Utopians, to degrade one's 
immortal soul to the level of an animal's body. Proselytising is 
forbidden because it contravenes the principle of changing other 
people's ideas only through rational discourse, and emanates from 
passion and prejudice. The example is given of a Christian 
convert who tried to stir people up, showing "more zeal than 
discretion" and threatening hell-fire for non-believers. His 
punishment was exile (though the charge was civil - disturbance 
of the peace h h 1··) 27 rat er t an re l.gl.OUS • The number of 
Christians in Utopia is small, though growing, for the 
, communism' of the Christian beliefs holds a strong appeal for 
the populace. Even so, many of their practices would seem 
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positively blasphemous to European Christians of the Catholic 
faith. 
priests. 
Priests are allowed to marry, and women to become 
Divorce is accepted, though not common, and euthanasia 
is practised, and sanctioned by the clergy. Officials encourage 
a man "not to foster the pest and plague any longer nor to 
hesitate to die now that life is torture to him but, relying on 
good hope, to free himself from this bitter life as from prison 
and the rack.,,28 The absolute rule of reason thus extends to 
the question of existence itself, although euthanasia is limited 
to those with incurable diseases which involve excruciating pain, 
and is strictly voluntary in any case. However, given that the 
Utopians are imperfect Christians, since they lack revelation, 
More can allow them substantial leeway on such issues without 
himself incurring any taint of blasphemy on his own head. In any 
event their social views in respect of property, money and belief 
in the importance of the afterlife are all perfectly in keeping 
with Christian injunctions and practices. 
More's contribution to the utopian tradition is 
substantial, for he introduces certain key elements which, far 
from being an imitation of his classical mentor, are distinctly 
un-Platonic. 29 The hierarchy of pleasures and the complete 
equality of property are two significant innovations, underlining 
the difference between Platonic thinking and that of the 
Christian - humanist circle to which More belonged. But his 
maj or innovation lies in the rehabilitation of the idea of the 
importance of labour among free men. Utopia has slaves, but 
their importance to the economy is negligible, whilst that of 
free men is absolutely essential. This has been described as "a 
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milestone in the history of utopian thought", one which has been 
subsequently incorporated into all socialist utopian writing, 
from Saint-Simon to Ho Chi Minh. 30 Al though More's society is 
still to some extent imbued with the aristocratic elements found 
in Plato, the elitism of the Platonic attitude to work has been 
overtaken by a kind of equality: "All men are imbued with the 
values of a philosophical spirit that respects learning and leads 
to the practice of virtue.,,31 
In textual terms Swift's debt to More can be seen in many 
places in the Travels: in Lilliput, Brobdingnag, and 
Houyhnhnmland, to differing degrees. Lilliput is not a utopia as 
such, since it contains far too many elements of the Europe which 
is the book's constant standard of corruption - rope-dancers, 
scheming ministers, petty warmongering princes - but it contains 
many utopian features. 32 The law "is more disposed to reward 
than to punish" and observance of the law is consequently 
rewarded with money and honours, just as in Utopia good behaviour 
I d bl " "" 33 ea s to pu 1C recogn1t1on. There is a rational approach to 
family life and education. Children are brought up in "The 
Principles of Honour, Justice, Courage, Modesty, Clemency, 
Religion, and Love of their Country" and no fondness is allowed 
between parents and children (just as in Houyhnhnmland».34 
Females are educated as well as males, since "a Wife should be 
always a reasonable and agreeable Companion, because she cannot 
always be young.,,35 This is a familiar Swiftian idea, 
expressed both in A Letter to a Young Lady on Her Marriage and in 
Houyhnhnmland, where the horses are shocked that the English fail 
to educate women too. 36 The final utopian element in 
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Lilliputian society is the fact that the poor are supported by 
the state, a clear link with More .... s thesis in Utopia, and an 
important concept in presenting a view of society as an organic 
whole. However, the limitations of Lilliput as a model society 
are clear, when Gulliver declares of their laws: "It is only to 
be wished that they were as well executed.,,37 Lilliput is 
utopian historically and theoretically rather than currently, not 
least because, as a comment on English politics, it would be 
ridiculous of Swift to present it as an existing ideal state. 
Brobdingnag is perhaps closest to More .... s Utopia as an 
actual picture of the good state, because the Giant King .... s 
cri tical commentary on European history, poli tics and religion 
ties in closely with both Hythloday .... s own assessment and that of 
Gulliver at the end of the Travels. 38 Indeed his remark on the 
political corruption of our system echoes that of Gulliver on the 
Lilliputian model: "I observe among you some Lines of an 
Institution, which in its Original might have been tolerable; but 
these half-erased, and the rest wholly blurred and blot ted by 
Corruptions.,,39 This, and his famous refusal of the gunpowder 
which would have made him "absolute Master of the Lives, the 
Li berties, and the Fortunes of his People", 40 distance him 
immeasurably from the corruptions satirised in the book. There 
is a strong correlation between his legal code and that of the 
Utopians. In Brobdingnag, laws may not exceed in words the 
number of letters in their alphabet - namely, twenty-two - though 
few are even as long as that, and all are plainly 
intelligible. 41 Compare this with Hythloday .... s description of 
the Utopian code: 
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They have very few laws because very few are 
needed for persons so educated •••• They 
themselves think it most unfair that any group of 
men should be bound by laws which are either too 
numerous to be read through or too obscure to be 
understood by anyone. 42 
The utopians believe that people should be allowed to plead their 
own cases before a judge, rather than have a tricky lawyer wrap 
it up in obscure technical jargon which is more likely to pervert 
the course of justice than to advance it. 43 The Giant King 
wholeheartedly supports such an approach, in government as well 
as law, and expresses his beliefs on this matter to Gulliver: 
He confined the Knowledge of governing within 
very narrow Bounds; to common Sense and Reason, 
t 0 Jus tic e and Len i t y, tot he S414 e e d y 
Determination of Civic and criminal Causes. 
If Brobdingnag is, in a sense, the nearest utopia to that 
of More, it is largely because both are human societies, and the 
positive values they espouse can be directly related to our own 
failure to uphold similar values. In the case of Houyhnhnmland, 
of course, this does not apply quite as directly, since it is a 
society of horses, not men, and represents reason abstracted to a 
1 1 b d b OlO 45 eve eyon our capa 1 lty. But this does not in any way 
make it irrelevant as a satire on us, for as we discovered in 
Chapter One, the Yahoos are there constantly as a clear comment 
on our pretensions, just as in Utopia the history and politics of 
Europe are held constantly up to the mirror of an ideal society, 
indicating plainly how desperately short we fall of the standards 
and values we either claim to admire or, worse still, claim to 
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uphold. The Houyhnhnm system of values resembles quite closely 
that of the Utopians. The whole system of government is based on 
an absolute reason which is understood by all, and is beyond 
debate. Philosophical speculation does not exist, and indeed, as 
his Master says to Gulliver, is inconceivable, since the truth 
strikes everyone at the same time and in the same way. Gulliver 
compares this to Socrates' attitude to reason 46 , thereby 
linking his voyages clearly with the classical utopian tradition 
of which it is, in large part, a conspicuous example. Like the 
Utopians, they meet in council rarely, and then simply to discuss 
distribution of goods amongst the society wherever a particular 
shortage has occurred including a shortage of young 
Houyhnhnms. 47 Their communal approach to life and property 
owes some debt to More's depiction of Utopia, a social expression 
of their completely rational attitude towards all things. 48 
But if, as we have already suggested, neither Swift nor 
More is providing us with a model which we can follow, what is 
the purpose of envisaging these two ideal . . ?49 SOC1.et1.es. The 
answer to this question can be found in the conclusions drawn 
from their utopian experiences by Gulliver and Hythloday and in 
their final perorations on human pride. After describing all the 
Utopian institutions and laws, Hythloday remarks: 
At this point I should like anyone to be so bold 
as to compare this fairness with the so-called 
justice prevalent in other nations, among which, 
upon my soul, I cannot dis~~ver the slightest 
trace of justice and fairness. 
Similarly, Gulliver expresses a wish that the Houyhnhnms 
were in a 
sufficient 
Capacity or 
Number of 
Disposition to send a 
Their Inhabitants for 
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civilizing Europe; by teaching us the first 
Principles of Honour, Justice, Truth, Temperance, 
public Spirit, Fortitude, Chastity, Friendship, 
Benevolence, and Fidelity. The Names of all 
which Virtgfs are still retained among us in most 
Languages. 
In the end both voyagers return to the criticism of Europe, using 
their praise of the perfect societies they have encountered as a 
stick with which to beat the pride of their fellow-countrymen. 
Hythloday attacks the rich for their monopoly of goods and power, 
and for their callous disregard for the poor who suffer by their 
deliberate policies. He describes all modern systems as "a kind 
of conspiracy of the rich, who are aiming at their own interests 
under the name and title of the commonwealth. ,,52 But the root 
of all this corruption and cruelty turns out to be not merely 
greed and lust for power, but pride. Like Gulliver, Hythloday 
delivers a sermon on humanity which strikes at the root of our 
own self-perceptions: 
This serpent from hell entwines itself around the 
hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in 
preventing and hindering them from entering on a 
better way of life. 53 
It is pride in both cases which is isolated as the cause of our 
moral corruption, and hence as the cause of all other miseries, 
and it is this knowledge which causes both travellers to carry 
out their respective retreats from participation in the 
continuing calamity of human history. 
In textual terms, the problem for the reader at this point 
is to establish the extent to which the writer identifies with 
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the utopia itself and the final conclusion offered, and in this 
respect both Swift and More seem well-matched. For what they 
share is a utopian mentality of a strikingly similar cast, one 
which embodies an attitude to life which singles them out as 
belonging distinctively to the tradition of utopian realists as 
opposed to that of utopian dreamers. For utopia is not 
heaven-on-earth, nor ever will be. The contrast between Books 
One and Two of Utopia (and between Houyhnhnmland and our own 
society) - utopian excellence cast opposite European depravity -
has another meaning: 
When compared with the models and institutions of 
contemporary English society, Utopian life was 
indubitably nearer to Christian truth. The 
grea ter the shame of Europea:n,s, who had the 
advantage of Christian teaching. 54 
Using Utopia as an absolute standard by which we are judged and 
found miserably wanting, they present what appears to be a target 
towards which we can work, but which is in fact an attack on our 
own wickedness. The ancient mentality they share obliges them to 
present an absolute, given ideal - not something we can attain, 
for they do not look forward to an age of reform, but at the 
present reality only. As one critic puts it: "the wildest of 
utopian plans could be dramatically thrown on the table to 
attract attention to the ills that needed remedy. ,,55 This is 
why pride is used in the final perorations on our wickedness, for 
it is to be found in us all and, whilst it is not exactly 
susceptible to reform, recognition of it could at least bring 
about the humility which ought to prevent us from participating 
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in the corruptions in which we presently indulge. The key tactic 
is to try to shame us into recognition of our true selves, for 
this is a crucial emotion to the satirist. "I never wonder to 
see Men wicked, but I often wonder to see them not ashamed ,,56 , 
says Swift, and it is to instil this very shame that he 
constructs the argument of Gulliver's Travels, just as More in 
Utopia offers not a programme of action, but an exercise in 
humility. 
If Utopia is not a programme of action, as we have seen, 
its implications are nevertheless clearly not unhostile to 
contemporary England. The trenchant social cri tic ism it 
incorporates is, in large part, an accurate reflection of the 
ideals of its creator. But More's saving grace comes from his 
ability to play the fool, to push genuine principles to a comic 
extreme, creating laughter rather than outrage, and consequently 
avoiding the censure of those who, seeing his book as a programme 
of communism, would destroy him. Furthermore, the absence of 
Christian values is evidence to the knowledgable reader that More 
is not 'serious' in his portrayal of Utopia. The Christian 
virt ues, and the all-important personal salvation, are missing. 
We know, as did his contemporaries, that More did not believe 
that life could or should be like this. As John Travgott says: 
"He simply subj ects European life to the criticism of Platonic 
rationalism, as Swift in his Brobdingnag and Houyhnhnm utopias 
subj ects it to the criticism of his f '1' ,,57 sort 0 ratl0na lsm. 
The whole point of subjecting our society to criticism by 
absolute standards would be lost if Swift or More were foolish 
enough to suggest that such standards were to be found here on 
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earth: "Utopia, to effect its purpose, must be nowhere."S8 
The reason why neither Utopia nor Houyhnhnmland offer 
programmes for us to follow is that they belong to a utopian 
tradition that does not, paradoxically, believe in itself, or 
rather in its own potential realisation. J.B. Bury, in The Idea 
of Progress, explains this when he points to two different 
utopian concepts: the literal and the non-literal. 59 Literal 
utopias look forward to a millenium of sorts where things on 
earth will come right, and towards which we can work. 
Non-literal utopias are based on absolute, unchanging values 
which can never exist on earth, and towards which we cannot 
possibly work, since they represent an ideal which can never be 
attained. Failure to understand this 'ancient' cast of mind has 
led many readers of More to carry off portions of his text in 
triumph and lead them into the camp of the liberal utopians, and 
to inscribe his name in the annals of 'progress' as one of its 
champions. 60 But this is to confound the original utopian 
concept, and to distort the whole point about More's utopian 
imagination. Progress is vital to the literal utopian tradition, 
but has no conceivable part to play in the non-literal 
tradition. The good place is no place; it does not exist: but 
its values are to be admired. 61 This is the limit of the 
utopianism of both Swift and More, but it is not the last word 
they have to say on the subject. 
The comedy and idealism of Swift and More resemble the 
idea behind Erasmus's joke about the wisdom of folly, for this is 
the technique and, at crucial junctures, the substance of their 
utopias. More and Swift provide elaborately realistic settings 
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for fantastic storH~5, narrated by "Nonsense" and a gull. Yet 
this is not the end of the peculiar irony - as some readers like 
to think, thereby 'rescuing' Swift from the truth discovered by 
Gulliver. The irony is that what our two narrators learn is, 
finally, well worth knowing. 62 Hythloday's passion is for a 
state which is properly and reasonably organised - as is More's. 
Gulliver learns a shocking truth about himself (and us) and 
advocates humility and a search for self-knowledge, and surely 
Swift endorses this insight. In both cases the fantastic visions 
are clear measures of European pride. The important lesson for 
us is not to work out how we can get to Utopia (we cannot), but 
to recognise how desperately short of the 'civilisation' we boast 
we actually fall. The fantasy in the end - More and Swift assert 
- is European self-perception, for it is we who are living in 
Cloud-cuckooland, blissfully blinkered, where pride prevents us 
from recognising our own reality. 
Hence the alienation of Hythloday and Gulliver, whose 
denunciations of pride cut deeply between appearance and reality, 
leaving them nowhere to rest. But the irony of both Swift and 
More depends upon an association with the characters at the end. 
Both works are f~etorical, both characters devices, but, at the 
cri tical junctures, both approach the status of tragic 
characters, if only to call to mind a maj or tragic theme: "the 
virtue that destroys. ,,63 This links them - despite the comedy 
- with the great tradition which Swift and More follow, a 
tradition of the alienation or destruction of the right-minded 
philosopher, from the execution of Socrates to the present day. 
The two major links between More and Swift are their 
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classical utopianism and their attitudes towards the Church and 
society. This is one reason why More joins the heroes of 
Glubbdubdrib, the only modern figure so honoured. He shares with 
Swift a cast of mind derived from ancient ideals of stability, 
and a fear and loathing of radical change. The classical utopian 
tradition invariably rejects notions of progress or change. The 
ancients "believed in the ideal of an absolute order in society, 
from which, when it is once established, any deviation must be 
for the worse. ,,64 The notion of progress is characteristic of 
the modern mind, but absolute anathema to the ancient. This is 
why neither the Utopians nor the Houyhnhnms have the remotest 
variety in their existence. Li ving under the rule of absolute 
reason, they cannot even contemplate change, for, having reached 
perfection, there can be nothing better to change to. If modern 
readers see in both societies the seeds of a conformist or even 
totalitarian state, then they misunderstand the origins of such 
utopian ideals. 65 For in the Platonic tradition there is only 
one reason, which is absolute and pure, and therefore, the very 
concept of variety in thinking is impossible and absurd. Those 
who regard such a society as rigid and authoritarian belong to 
the class of freethinkers whom More and Swift both feared and 
detested. In both utopias reason is described as the 
satisfaction of nature. In Utopia the hierarchy of pleasures is 
designed to lead to this end, for, although various pleasures 
from scratching to the pursuit of knowledge are present, it is 
only the highest pleasures which achieve the true satisfaction of 
nature by pointing to the highest goods - namely, beauty, 
symmetry, and truth. This is why so many readers find the 
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societies dull. They are unchangeable because they are absolute 
standards; they have no history, for they have always been like 
this. 
them, 
But their dullness cannot be used as an argument against 
because this is exactly the point that the classical 
utopian is making. Utopia exists only in the mind, free from the 
nasty clutches of history. It has only one purpose - "to measure 
the present by an unchanging ideal.,,66 
But behind the shared classical ideals More and Swift have 
something else in common which governs the nature of their 
respective utopian imaginings. 
This is an attitude towards a myth of 
social integration. The church in Utopia is a representation of 
this myth, since it demonstrates a harmony and unity between 
social and religious practices and ideals. The idea that the 
utopian church could ever become a source of conflict or division 
is impossible to imagine, for the two are so perfectly interwoven 
and so ideally married to one another that no such schism could 
ever come about. This myth is a vital link with Swift, who - as 
we saw in the previous Chapter - entertained an anachronistic 
attachment to a Laudian church which was intimately bound up with 
society. This is why Utopia has no factions, and proselytising 
is so severely punished, for More states in plain terms his 
rejection of the liberal idea of allowing factions into the 
public arena to fight one another to a standstill. There is a 
perfect match between More's attitudes here and Swift's. The 
Giant King cannot understand Gulliver's computation of the number 
of people in England by counting the number of factions, and 
draws a sharp distinction between the right to concoct poisons at 
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home and the right to sell them as cordials on the open 
market. 67 With Swift's approval he discriminates between 
liberty and licence in a manner we are to regard as wisely 
protectionist rather than oppressively authoritarian, for what he 
is protecting is the cohesion of society, and what he is aiming 
to prevent, at all costs, is a fanatical fringe creating cracks 
in the fabric of society and driving the wedge of their 
millenarian madness deep into the crevices they have created. 
Intimately bound up with this concept of the religious 
fabric is the precious idea of the social fabric, and the crucial 
connection here is Henry VIII, both in his historical role - not 
least in relation to More himself - and in the figurative 
incarnation of him in Swift's imagination. The agrarian 
capitalism despised by More, and castigated at length by 
Hythloday in the first Book of Utopia, was equally detested by 
Swift in its manifestation in his day. The appropriation of 
Church lands was Henry's bribe to the rich which guaranteed the 
foundation of his own power. But his political triumph was the 
peasants' social calamity and the Church's effective 
., 
emasculation. More$ vision of a "communist" society attempts to 
prevent h ' , f '1 h l' 68 t e dlvislon 0 soclety a ong any suc lnes. The 
aggressive individualism of Europeans is presented in Utopia as 
the exact opposite of their principles of the common welfare: 
no-one seeks to look after number one because everyone is looked 
after equally well. The image of the golden chamberpot - like 
the Yahoos' ridiculous "shining stones" - encapsulates perfectly 
the absurdity of the search for wealth and the pursuit of selfish 
(and worthless) ends at the expense of the rest of society. The 
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striking similarity between Hythloday's - and, behind him, More's 
- bitter remarks on dispossessed beggars, despoiled monasteries, 
and capitalist appropriation of land, and Swift's pamphlets on 
Irish beggary and the impoverishment of the Church, highlights 
another important link between these two writers, what John 
Traugott calls "a symbolic recasting of history. ,,69 For their 
vision of history is every bit as important as their vision of 
. 70 utop~a. In Gulliver's Travels European history is presented 
throughout as random, senseless, and barbarous. Every utopian 
idea or institution encountered by Gulliver is a direct comment 
on the real history he recounts. This is underlined in 
Glubbdubdrib, where history is paraded before the reader as a 
warped morality play in which only six men stand out from a 
contemptible, disgusting rabble. In the same way Swift's tracts 
stress the incoherence of society, a break in the common social 
bond, and the images of dispossession and beggary echo almost to 
the letter those which More had used two hundred years 
previously.71 Hythloday's picture of sheep - gentle, pastoral 
animals and Christian metaphor - become ravenous man-eaters is 
reborn as The Modest Proposer's vision of Irish mothers turned 
butchers, selling their offspring to feed the cannibalistic 
society which reduces them to the lowest conceivable level of 
h . 72 uman eX1stence. 
To counteract this dehumanisation of society Swift summons 
up the ghost of social cohesion in order to condemn all those who 
destroy the essential fabric of society: factions, freeloaders, 
moneymen, absentee landlords, and all the others who impoverish 
the land and the people in pursuit of selfish ends. He stresses 
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the importance of the public interest, and provides a concept of 
"mutual subj ection" in his religious and secular writings) 
precisely in order to isolate and excoriate the religious 
fanatics) freethinkers, liberals) and capitalists whom he holds 
responsible for present miseries. His philosophy - to the extent 
that it can be regarded as a proper philosophy73 is 
essentially an argument in favour of the common body and against 
individualism, and he finds the historical roots of this 
aggressive profiteering and moral myopia in the actions of his 
most detested historical figure Henry VIII. Swift traces to 
Henry the contempt for the clergy which began with the 
despoliation of the monasteries, and continues in his own day 
with the general despoliation of the whole of Ireland (and large 
areas of England). 74 Henry to Swift was a wicked Pandora, a 
ruthless, selfish individual whose lust for power resulted in a 
quid pro quo which released every evil of selfishness, arrogant 
capitalism and egotistic individualism that eats away at the very 
foundations of Swift's beloved stability and cohesion. 75 Those 
who own the land have no interest in any such notion, choose to 
Ii ve elsewhere, and leave those who do live on the land - who 
have no choice but to do so - in the depths of poverty and 
degradation, priest and peasant alike. This is why Swift calls 
Henry a "Bloody inhuman Hell-hound of a King" , 76 for he 
represents to Swift the founder of that club of arrogant, wilful, 
destructive individualists which includes Walpole, Marlborough 
and Wharton. 77 It is also why More appears in Swift's great 
pantheon of virtue. In Swift's symbolic rendering of history, 
More represents all the good things in man: respect for the 
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social body, belief in a church integral with society - even if 
it was not Swift's own - and a refusal, in the end, to compromise 
these values in the face of death. In beheading More, Henry 
became for Swift the archetypal Modern, an intolerable beast 
whose murderous pursuit of his own selfish ambitions represented 
the perfect symbol of Swift's vision of history: the corrupt 
destructive forces of change forces with no moral basis 
triumphant over the virtuous and harmonious stasis, derived from 
the ancients, which was the great satirist's ideal. 78 
Thi s symbolic approach to hi s tory is pe rhaps best 
encapsulated in Book Three of the Travels, where we encounter a 
brief allegory which precisely sums up Swift's attitude to that 
great modern chimera, progress. In Laputa and Balnibarbi 
Gulliver is bombarded with every conceivable utopian plan which 
the modern mind can imagine. In the Academy of Lagado he meets 
an endless succession of projectors engaged in the wildest 
utopian experiments, from an attempt to extract sunbeams from 
cucumbers to a scheme for turning excrement back into food. 79 
In every case the folly and uselessness of such idiotic 
undertakings is made plain by the fact that every single one of 
them is a complete and utter failure. The price of these 
'scientific' attempts to improve the lot of man, and to lead us 
all to a bright new tomorrow, is witnessed by Gulliver: "I never 
knew a Soil so unhappily cultivated, Houses so ill contrived and 
so ruinous, or a People whose Countenances and Habit expressed so 
much Misery and Want. ,,80 Having seen the results of the modern 
visionaries' dream of making the world anew, Gulliver meets Lord 
Munodi, a man despised by his own society for his lack of vision 
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and his wilful defiance of the laws of progress. In contrast to 
the disastrous dwellings of his fellow-citizens, Munodi's house 
is "built according to the best Rules of ancient 
Architecture.,,8l In defiance of the utopian planners, he is 
"content to go on in the old Forms; to live in the Houses his 
Ancestors had built, and act as they did in every Part of Life 
wi thout Innovation". 82 His life represents continuity and 
stability, a link with an ancient tradition where there is no 
need to change what is working quite well. It may be static, but 
not backward-looking in any derogatory sense, for what is the 
point of altering a way of life which is perfectly stable because 
it is in harmony with the natural order of things?83 In order 
to demonstrate the conflict of forces in his country, Munodi 
tells Gulliver the s tory of the ruined mill. This mill used to 
stand by a large river whose strong current provided the power to 
turn the mill and supply the needs of his own family and many 
others besides. Then one day a team of projectors turned up with 
a plan to move the mill to the side of a mountain, and build a 
canal to carry pipes above the mill so that the running water 
would provide even more power than previously. However, nothing 
ever came of it, since the proj ect - like every other similar 
proj ect f ai led to come to anything, and the proj ectors 
disappeared from the scene, leaving behind a trail of 
dstruction. Nothing remains of the mill but a sad ruin. 84 
This is the paradigmatic example of the Swiftian approach 
to the wild-eyed advocates of progress, for it establishes 
perfectly the dichotomy we have been discussing. On the one hand 
we have stasis backed by tradition and a common bond, whilst on 
111 
the other we have 'progress' which comes from nowhere and is 
going nowhere, which can create nothing, but can destroy 
everything. On the one hand we have Utopia, on the other 
history, and the evidence is overwhelming as to which of these we 
should admire. 
But if it is clear that we are to admire Utopia, it is 
decidedly unclear what we are supposed to do about it. The 
dilemma is placed before us at the end of the two works we have 
been examining. At the conclusion of their respective voyages we 
find both Hythloday and Gulliver back in the Europe which they 
detest, and which has been held up by them for our scorn and 
strongest disapprobation. Given the nature and the vehemence of 
their arguments against our 'civilisation' and in favour of the 
superior morality and integrity of their hosts, we inevitably 
find ourselves asking the obvious question: why are they back in 
our midst? In the case of Hythloday this is arguable, for there 
seems to be no particular obstacle to his remaining among the 
utopians for as long as he desires. He says that he "would never 
have wished to leave except to make known that new world, ,,85 
but would anyone really be prepared to voluntarily forsake Utopia 
in order to return to the corruption of Europe? But if we are 
uncertain - or unconvinced - about Hythloday's return, we have no 
doubts about Gulliver's. Gulliver returns, in textual terms, 
because he is thrown out, because there is no place for a Yahoo -
however superior and intelligent a Yahoo in the rational 
country of the Houyhnhnms. But the real reason why Gulliver must 
come home as the reader knows is that Houyhnhnmland is 
unreal: it simply does not exist. There are no rational horses, 
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there is no island of absolutely perfect creatures, because 
Jonathan Swift did not believe in utopia. We may interpret the 
Fourth Voyage as a holiday from history - a dream for its few 
admirers or a nightmare for its many detractors - but in the end 
the holiday must come to an end, and the place to which we must 
return is the place we left in the first instance. 87 However 
repugnant he may find it, Gulliver must return to England because 
it is his reality, because - from our point of view, as Swift is 
telling us - history, with all its attendant horrors, is the only 
world in which any of us can live. 
The importance of the history/utopia dichotomy goes beyond 
what we have already established, for it leads us towards other 
areas of discussion which are certainly no less important to 
consider, and probably even more so. For the question of the 
behaviour of historical figures and public men inevitably comes 
d h d · f h . t· 88 own to t e vexe 1ssue 0 uman mot1va 10n. One's 
assessment of why events turn out the way they do is inextricably 
tied to the assessment of what people really are. The fact that 
Swift and More present us with utopias which could not exist 
links them not only with the ancients whose tradition they are 
following, but with a particular cast of mind and a particular 
attitude towards life. For they go beyond what we have already 
seen to be the classical utopian approach to suggest not only 
that we can never achieve the good life, but also, and much more 
important, we may fail to prevent things from getting much worse 
than they already are. The battle between utopia and history is 
no real battle, for utopia is a myth, so that we know from 
reading their works that history is all we have. The crucial 
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dilemma the reader is then faced with is this: can we prevent the 
world from becoming unbearably bad? The choice then ceases to be 
one between an ideal and a vicious reality and becomes instead 
one between an already vicious reality and a potentially even 
more disastrous future; not utopia versus history, but history 
versus dystopia. 
For the theme of degeneration runs through Swift's works, 
both fic tional and non-fictional, as a constant reminder of his 
intellectual pessimism. At various times Swift bemoans the decay 
of language, conversation, education, the nobility, political 
institutions, and, worst of all, morals and religion, and behind 
it all is his attitude that he is simply stating a self-evident 
truth. 89 In Lilliput Gulliver describes the positive aspects 
of the society, but adds the dark postscript: 
In relating these and the following Laws, I would 
only be understood to mean the original 
Insti tutions, and not the most scandalous 
Corruptions into which these People are fallen by 
the degenerate Nature of Man. gO 
When he visits the island of the sorcerers later in his travels, 
his unique opportunity to view the unfolding of history merely 
affords him the chance to observe how man has deteriorated not 
only morally but physically: 
It gave me melancholy Reflections to observe how 
much the Race of human Kind was degenerate among 
us, within these Hundred Years past. How the Pox 
under all its Consequences and Denominations had 
altered every Lineament of an English 
Coun tenance; shortened the Size of Bodies, 
unbraced the Nerves, relaxed the Sinews and 
Muscles, introduced a sallow Complexion, and 
rendered the Flesh loose and rancid. 9 
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Even in Brobdingnag the inexorable deterioration has not been 
evaded. For, whilst their moral standards remain one of the 
book's positives, their physical stature is subject to the same 
depressing laws of nature. A moralist author whom Gulliver reads 
observes "that Nature was degenerated in these latter declining 
Ages of the World, and could now produce only small abortive 
Births in Comparison of those in ancient Times. ,,92 The process 
of degeneration is always presented as an inexorable and 
unavoidable march towards an even blacker future: things are not 
only bad, they are getting worse by the day, says Swift, 93 and 
it is this belief which underlies the ferocity and intensity of 
his attacks on the progressivists of his own day in all their 
manifestations. 
In his attacks on the forces of progress in his own day 
in politics, letters, and, most important of all, religion 
Swift faces head-on the challenge from the opposing forces in the 
utopian struggle. We have already discovered that Swift's 
utopianism is of the non-literal variety, which is categorically 
not a plan of action or a blueprint for a New Jerusalem which we 
as readers should try to start constructing as soon as we have 
completed the text. Notwithstanding William Godwin's famous 
interpretation of the Fourth Voyage in just these terms, most 
readers of Swift do not see in the Houyhnhnms a goal for 
humanity.94 For Swift, the Golden Age is gone, it is always 
something in the past, never something in the future. He was 
always much more inclined to place his ideal society or 
institution in the irrecoverable past. One only has to look at 
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the "Argument against Abolishing Christianity" with its central 
irony of a religion long-since degenerated into a nominal belief 
or the "Contests and Dissensions" with its central message of 
history as a record of decline to appreciate this. 95 But if we 
accept - as most readers do - that Swift's utopia is dull, this 
is not merely because utopias on the whole are dull, in contrast 
to history which is exciting but corrupt. It is substantially 
due to the fact that Swift's artistic talents are most 
successfully employed in a different 
direction. 
indeed, opposite 
For Swift is a great negative writer. 96 He is always 
much better at exposing and delivering the lash to manic man than 
presenting positive, temperate, sensible solutions. His 
incomparable gift is the presentation of madness, of bedlam, not 
utopia. When he comes to deal with proponents of the other 
school of utopian thinking in the various shapes and forms in 
which he encounters them, Swift becomes fired with an outrage 
which fuels his imagination and feeds the genius of his saeva 
indignatio of which so much has been written. His assaul ts on 
the millenarian madness of his own age (and the age preceding it) 
are partially present in the Travels, especially in The Third 
Voyage, where the bulbous-eyed boffins and fanatical visionaries 
of a new tomorrow are exposed for the frauds, charlatans, and, 
worse, madmen, they truly are. 97 But it finds its fullest 
expression in A Tale of a Tub, a remarkable and biting satire on 
all the bogus values and pseudo-logic of the modern age which 
Swift so despised, and which he exposes in a compendious 
'tribute' to the advocates of the progress in which he so 
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categorically disbelieves. It is here that the second utopian 
dichotomy - history vs dystopia - is explored at length, with 
conclusions which reach beyond the superficial frivolity to 
become a fundamental 
,. 
expose of the motivation of all 
h . 98 umanlty. 
The division offered by Swift in the 'Apology' is usually 
accepted as a starting-point for discussion of the Tale, for 
there he says that "the numerous and gross Corruptions in 
Religion and Learning might furnish matter for a Satyr, that 
would be useful and diverting.,,99 The form of the Tale 
corroborates this rough division, with religion being kept in 
separate chapters from learning until the end of the book, when 
such divisions disappear dramatically. The actual content of the 
book does not, of course, correspond to this scheme at all, for 
it is a fundamental premise of the Tale that the various victims 
who are brought before us to condemn themselves out of their own 
mouths are all brothers under the skin, or rather the periwig. 
The reason for this is reason, or rather the arrogant assumption 
that we possess it. All the people who are satirised in the Tale 
at various points are connected by this thread: the Moderns, 
fops, the wits who drink at Will's Coffee House, the scientific 
virtuosi of Gresham College, the Grub Street Hacks, the sect that 
worship the image of the tailor, modern philosophers and all the 
rest. lOO They are all characterised by pride in their 
possession of reason, and the constant procession of their 
beliefs, systems and proj ects before our eyes is what gives the 
book its overwhelming exuberance. The "dazzling intellectual 
activity"lOl of the book comes from Swift's astonishing ability 
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to parody a colossal range of characters and writers, both real 
and exaggerated, and the energy which carries the whole mad train 
of thought along is, in truth, this pride as it is given voice on 
each and every page. 
Using as his models those authors whom he most despised, 
Swift offers us "a reductio ad absurdum honouring 
modernity, ,,102 in which all the hallmarks of his chosen victims 
are constantly to the fore. These victims - Le Strange, Wotton, 
Bentley, Dryden and others - are picked out, not simply because 
of personal grievances which Swift may have felt, but because 
they represent in concrete form the kind of writing Swift 
loathed: trite, banal, sugar-coated, endlessly self-important, 
r iddl~(l wi th Types and Fables .103 The apparent fragmentary 
nature of the Tale is not as it seems, for these individual 
assaults in the midst of a more general satiric onslaught, 
highlighting Swift's aversions and dislikes, have, cumulatively, 
a reinforcing effect, not so much because they unify the book, 
but because they add conviction to the satire. 104 They do not 
convey the impression that the persona is consistent, but they do 
add pieces of evidence to the general charges against the 
Moderns, who are dull here, lightweight there, and pompous, 
inept, spleen-ridden elsewhere. 
We can experience some of the flavour of these mul tiple 
charges if we look in detail at several of the recurring themes 
and images of the Tale. There is the theme of fashion, of 
contemporaneity, of profundity, of avowed shallowness, and in 
particular there are several dichotomies which turn up at regular 
intervals, contradicting one another, but never letting the 
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Moderns off the hook. The theme of ephemerality is constantly 
before us, as Swift mocks at length the notion that the 
achievement of up-to-dateness is something of which to be 
inordinately proud. The 'author' declares at the outset that the 
Tale is the work of "a very few leisure Hours" which came about, 
among other things, because of "a tedious fit of rainy 
weather",105 and to prove that he is proud of this fact, he 
later declares that "I am living fast, to see the Time, when a 
Book that misses its Tide, shall be neglected, as the Moon by 
day, or like Mackarel a Week after the Season.,,106 This theme 
is pursued to the point where the 'author' can only defiantly 
claim that "what I am going to say is literally true this Minute 
I am wr i t i ng • " 1 07 Wit, we are told, is equally bound by such 
fashion and locality, for "such a Jest there is, that will not 
pass out of Covent-Garden; and such a one, that is nowhere 
intelligible but at Hide-Park Corner." The crowning comment upon 
this pride in being up-to-the-minute comes in the 'Epistle 
Dedicatory to Prince Posterity', in which the extended joke is 
that Moderns have no dealings with him at all, since none of the 
books lasts. The 'author' refers to several recent works, but 
regrets that they have disappeared without trace, and asks rather 
wistfully: 
Are they sunk in the Abyss of Things? 'Tis 
Certain, That in their own Nature they were light 
enough i8 swim upon the surface for all 
Eternity. 8 
Modern books are so momentary that they resemble mayflies, here 
today, gone tomorrow, and the irony is, of course, that it was 
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precisely this spurious topicality upon which they most prided 
themselves originally. Living for the day, they die with the 
passing of that day. 
The use of lightness above is indicative of another facet 
of Swift's satiric method in the Tale: the use of established 
dichotomies to discredit and undermine the credibility of the 
Moderns. Images of rising and falling, height and depth, 
lightness and weight, inside and outside abound, and often 
contradict one another at the literal level, though this is 
deliberate on Swift's part. The meaning associated with each 
word depends upon the context, for lightness, rising, height and 
the outside are used to denounce speculation, airiness, 
triviality, superficiality when used in conjunction with anything 
Modern. But their opposites - heaviness, falling, depth and the 
inside - are used to suggest leadenness, heavy-handed scholarship 
or plain dullness when they in turn are used for this 
purpose.109 Individually, such images are effective means of 
bringing before the reader a memorable, tangible vision of the 
victim which guarantees that the reader will view the other with 
a contempt no rationaLargument would be likely to instil. This 
approach to his task involves Swift in his favourite literary 
tactic - the reduction of men to symbols or cyphers, and the use 
of the physical to undermine the intellectual and spiritual 
aspirations and pretensions of his satiric victims: what John 
Bullitt calls "vulgarizing caricature".110 
The clearest example of this is to be found in the central 
narrative of the Tale, involving the three brothers, but 
particularly in the present~4nt of Peter who is given the 
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character of a fop, a bombastic tyrant and a manipulator: in 
other words the classic knave. He tries, by the simple force of 
his personality, to oblige others to believe his interpretations 
of words, and to give substance to his wild imaginings and 
hocus-pocus pseudo-religion. He adopts the dual label of 
"Projector and Virtuoso" - two of the most damning titles Swift 
can bestow on his victims - thereby aligning himself with the 
infamous virtuosi of the Academy of Lagado. Swift's tactic here 
is to find a physical equivalent for everyone of Peter's 
innovations and rituals. The confessional is an ass's head, 
papal ceremony is described as "Puppets and Raree-Shows", and 
holy water is called his "famous universal Pickle" III which is 
just the same, needless to say, as any common pickle to be found 
anywhere. Perhaps the best example of Swift's technique here is 
the papal bulls, which Swift characterises as real animals, and 
for a moment the words seem to escape from the meaning they 
should have, and take on a kind of poetic significance of their 
own, giving the passage, and the image, an exuberance all of 
the i r own. 112 Swift is saying here that words are "the 
appearance which may conceal, but can certainly never change, the 
reality they pretend to describe" .113 This is made even 
clearer in the exchange between Peter and his brothers, when he 
tries to pass off bread as mutton, which is Swift's image for 
transubstantiation. When one of the brothers suggests that the 
"mutton" is only bread, Peter says "Pray Sir ••• eat your Vittles 
and Ie ave off your Impertinence." 
objection, one of them saying 
But they continue their 
" By G-, My Lord ••• I can only say that to my Eyes, and Fingers, 
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and Teeth, and Nose, it seems to be nothing but a Crus t of 
Bread." To this objection Peter reacts violently: 
Look ye, Gentlemen ••• to convince you, what a 
couple of blind, positive, ignorant, wilful 
Puppies you are, I will use this plain Argument; 
By G-, it is true, good, natural Mutton as any in 
Leaden-Hall Market; and G-, confound you both 
eternall~, if you offer to believe 
otherwise .11 
Roman Catholicism is a blustering, bombastic bluff, inaccessible 
either to reasonable obj ection or indeed any argument at all. 
Peter is a con-man, a trickster who uses a brazen front to carry 
all the arguments he cannot win by any rational means. 
Perhaps the clearest statement of the intention behind 
this kind of satire comes in the Battle of the Books, when we 
come across the famous exchange between the Spider and the Bee, 
the Modern spirit and the Ancient. The Spider is infested with 
spleen, boasts of his own exploits, and refuses to admit that any 
of his achievements derive from anyone's efforts but his own. 
The Bee is gentle, modest, and makes no great claims on his own 
behalf. The ensuing debate on which is the nobler of the two 
creatures leads to the following conclusion being drawn by Aesop, 
who interprets the discussion, and says to the Spider: 
Erect your Schemes with as much Method and Skill 
as you please; yet, if the materials be nothing 
but Dirt, spun out of your own Entrails (the Guts 
of Modern Brains 1! the Edifice will conclude at 
last in a Cobweb. 5 
This is the point behind a great many of the Tale's satiric 
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thrusts. The Spider is the type and emblem of the Modern, but he 
appears in many guises: Descartes, Wotton, Dryden, the 'author' 
in his many guises, and ultimately Jack and the Aeolists. The 
Ancients-Moderns controversy which prompted the Battle of the 
Books clearly sparked off a fair amount of the comedy of the 
Tale, especially the literary satire. For example, the charge 
laid by Wotton and Fontenelle at the door of the classical 
authors was twofold: they were inferior because of inferior 
knowledge (the world being then so many centuries younger), and 
they possibly never existed at all, in the sense that their 
reputations have grown since they wrote (the argument being that 
giant Ancients are modern creations).116 This produces from 
Swift's pen the "Digression concerning Critics", in which his 
'author' declares that "the noblest Discoveries those Ancients 
ever made, of Art or of Nature, have all been produced by the 
transcending Genius of the present Age."lll The final 
expression is clear illustration of the degree of contempt behind 
the authorial facade, and is the classic satiric jibe O:jQt~!>t all 
Hodern writing as we find it expressed in the Tale. Dryden is 
ridiculed in a passage written in a mockery of his own style, and 
in the same passage the Types and Fables - each more ridiculous 
than the last - demonstrate the 'antiquity' of the Moderns by 
showing an endless list of references to "Asses" to be found in 
Herodotus, Ctesias and others. But in the end the status of all 
such Hacks and bad writers is identical to that of Peter, for 
they have simply hij acked good sense, judgment and taste, and 
used their momentary advantage in a dictatorial fashion. By this 
last, I mean the claim made by the ' author' to "that great and 
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honourable Privilege of being the Last Writer; I claim an 
absolute Authority in Right, as the freshest Modern, which gives 
me a Despotick Power over all Authors before me.,,118 
But what the above examples - and many others one could 
produce to the same effect - have in common finally is that they 
are memorable, when all is said and done, more for their comedy 
than their satire. What we are witnessing is the ability of 
Swift to take a comparatively small stock of common (almost 
standard) caricatures and jokes and expand them into a superb 
comic creation. The attacks themselves live in our memories 
because of the variety and detail of the comic invention of the 
author, not because anyone really cares, or remembers much, about 
h .. I t 119 t e orlglna argumen s. 
This, however, is but part of the Tale's satire, the part 
which is most readily in accord with the original cause and the 
stated purpose: self-seeking, self-important modernity, which 
raises itself by sheer arrogance and imagination to realms of 
power and success in all fields of learning and religion. It is 
only when we come to the most difficult, bedevilling and 
fascinating parts of the Tale, though, that we confront the real 
dilemmas the book throws up, and we move straight to the heart of 
the controversy. For, in the passages involving Jack in his 
development towards madness, the "Digression concerning Madness" 
and the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, we come face to face 
with apparent authorial purpose more serious, more profound, and 
more difficult to assimilate into any pleasing scheme of things 
than we encounter elsewhere in the Tale. Once encountered, these 
sections cast a different light upon all the preceding and 
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succeeding passages, and alter the balance both of the book's 
humour and its ostensible purpose. 
The attacks on the Puritans and the other Moderns are 
related, of course, but there is a marked difference in the 
intensity of feeling whenever Jack is centre-stage instead of 
Peter. The reasons for this are clear enough - as we established 
in the previous Chapter - in political terms, but it is not a 
historical or theoretical argument Swift is carrying on here; 
rather it is an attack that goes to the very roots of spiritual 
experience. Swift is not simply attacking deviations from 
standards or beliefs in the Puritans: these satires represent 
"assaults upon the most fundamental convictions and beliefs,,120 
and, as we shall see, Swift's attempts to limit the scope of his 
assaul ts meet with dubious success. The denial of the Puritan 
claim to spirituality is the constant theme of these works, and 
the identification between spirit and matter, between inspiration 
and wind throughout is significant in the ext reme. Swift has a 
physical counterpart for every would-be spiritual attribute or 
experience, and the purpose of this kind of satire becomes clear 
when we read the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit. The 
definition of "Enthusiasm" which the 'author' gives is that it is 
"A lifting up of the Soul or its Facul ties above Matter", 121 
and it is the brazen effrontery of this claim that Swift is 
attacking in the satire on the enthusiasts, for it is a 
fundamental premise in his work that matter can never be 
transcended. 
The keynote to an understanding of Swift's assault here 
is, again, the Civil War in his interpretation. He shares a 
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reading of the revolution with many modern radical historians, 
notably Christopher Hill, who look back to the 
seventeenth-century upheaval and see the 'other' revolution, the 
one that never quite took place, which was even more extreme in 
its aims and beliefs than the outburst of lawlessness, anarchy 
and brutality, leading to regicide - as Swift would put it -
which actually took place. 122 In this revolution religious 
freedom combined wi th sexual licence, unbridled by law or 
society. What is clear is that Swift is deliberately confusing 
the actual revolution with the one that was stopped by Cromwell 
and, using figures from the underground, illicit rebellion as 
"paradigmatic enemy", 123 he attempts to tar all dissenting 
Protestants with the same antinomian brush. These people are 
mad, but not dishonest: they mean every word they say. But this 
makes them much more dangerous, not less .124 The "Digression 
on Madness" makes this abundantly clear when it declares that 
when a Man's Fancy gets astride on his Reason, 
when Imagination is at Cuffs with the Senses, and 
common Understanding, as well as common Sense, is 
Kickt out of Doors; the first Proselyte he makes, 
is Himself, and when that is once compass'd, the 
difficulty is not so great in bringing over 
others; A strong Delusion always ope{2~ting from 
without, as vigorously as from within. 
The purpose of such an argument in Swift's own day was clearly to 
establish the fraudulence of the dissenting Protestants' cries of 
hysteria about the return of Popery, and a good deal of Jack's 
speech has this behind it. He goes around asking people to 
assault him physically, then returns home, crying: 
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Neighbours mine, this broken Head deserves a 
Plaister; had poor Jack been tender of his 
Noddle, you would have seen the Pope, and the 
French King, long before fhis time of Day, among 
your Wives and Warehouses. 26 
Swift is warning that the danger from the dissenting quarter is 
immeasurably greater than any threat from Rome, and any cries to 
the contrary are simply diversionary tactics to draw Anglican 
eyes away from Presbyterian activities. 
Coupled with this more obvious theme of religious danger 
we have Swift's own abiding interest in madness. 127 Swift 
casts an almost envious - and yet abhorring - eye upon these 
lunatic successes, these madmen bedecked with laurels, instead of 
grovelling in the filth of Bedlam Hospital as one might expect. 
This fascination caused him to view the successful party in the 
Civil War as a kind of mass infection which gripped the whole 
o 01 0 11 dO d 128 natlon, untl lt was eventua y era lcate • This is the 
root of the satire in the Tale, where Swift asks us to see the 
so-called lunatics of Bedlam for what they really are: the 
brilliant men of religion, learning, philosophy and other modern 
arts and sciences who have simply never been given the chance to 
show off their talents: 
Is any student tearing his Straw in piece-meal, 
Swearing and Blaspheming, biting his Grate, 
foaming at the Mouth and emptying his Pispot in 
the Spectator's Faces? ••• give him a Regiment of 
Dragoons, and send him into Flanders among the 
Rest .129 
Politicians, lawyers and doctors of outstanding abilities are 
similarly identified, and always the underlying assault remains 
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the same: a denial of the reasonableness of human conduct. It is 
the prime target of Swift's satire that man has prided himself 
most of all upon the faculty of reason, a faculty which Swift 
demands incessantly to have demonstrated before we may even begin 
to talk of possessing it. But it is not just the fraudulence of 
all the systems of philosophy, religion, metaphysics and history 
that arouses Swift's anger, 
It is the fact that, in their manifest frailty 
and falseness, it is precisely these 
'attainments' which prompt man to assert that he 
has mastered truth, transcended his natural 
state, ordered the universe, and received the 
direct inspiration of God. 130 
It is these assertions which Swift is most anxious to refute, and 
this he does through Crazy Jack and the Aeolists, and the 
mechanical operator, but, as we shall see, in so doing he opens a 
box, like Pandora perhaps, which he is unable to close at the 
point he would wish. 
The fact that the Tale has lasted so well, and is still 
admired and enj oyed today, has little or nothing to do with the 
subj ects of the satire, for they are in themselves dead ducks, 
and were so almost as much then as 131 now. What fires the 
enthusiastic response of the reader is the fact that the mad 
voices we hear have a significance and an applicability which 
stretch well beyond the immediate occasion of the Tale. To 
understand this we must understand Swift's "radical 
imagination". 132 Why, if he was the limited man he so often 
seems to be in terms of his own outlook on life, religion, 
history and politics, did he play such dangerous, fascinating and 
brilliant games which seem to suggest the opposite of the 
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conclusions expres sed in the staid, sensible, dull tracts 
elsewhere in his oeuvre? 
games? What are the 
disparity? 
Why is he so angry if they are just 
origins and implications of such a 
John Traugott suggests that the root of the satire is 
snobbery, particularly class snobbery, and says that Swift 
learned this from Sir William Temple. Temple's position in the 
Ancients-Moderns controversy 
the Battle of the Books 
the one which Swift takes up in 
is utterly preposterous and, 
furthermore, seems to have been obviously so to Temple himself. 
The very fact that the text by which he chose to exalt the 
Ancients was a forgery meant nothing, for the difference between 
between Ancients and Modern was essentially one of taste, of a 
gentleman's taste. But if Swift's irony begins in this way 
asserting class solidarity, as it were - it clearly develops well 
beyond it, until it "ends in tragic irony, separating the 
despairing realist from the desperate illusionist" .133 Swift 
elevates some dull fare into a cornucopia of rich dishes, and the 
threadbare platitudes of Temple become reborn as the radical 
satire of Swift; satire which goes to the heart of man and the 
limits of experience. 
The central text for such an argument is the "Digression 
on Madness", and especially the two paragraphs which expand upon 
the assertion that happiness is "a perpetual Possession of being 
well Deceived" .134 This part of the Tale cannot properly be 
called satiric, since there is no real 0 bj ect under attack, and 
the passage as a whole is much more than anything else in the 
book has attempted or suggested. "Mankind, or a universal 
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disposition of mankind, is the object of Swift's attention here", 
says Edward Rosenheim,135 one of the many critics who have 
attempted to reduce the argument here to something coherent and 
intelligible, and who eschews the tendency to give all the 
dubious verbiage to the persona. The principal difficulty in 
interpreting the passage arises from their tone as much as from 
the words themselves. Swift's position vis-a-vis the voice is 
not at all clear, and this creates an ambiguity which makes 
explication very difficult indeed. 136 But those critics who 
feel that, at this point, the voice we hear is the authentic 
voice of the satirist,137 are cautioned by Rosenheim. It is 
still part of the Tale, the putative author (or persona) is still 
a device, a disguise and, after all that has gone before, we 
cannot accept this argument we are reading as a "literal , 
authentic statement of sober belief", even although we may feel 
in our bones that it is. The whole structure of the Tale forbids 
us to suddenly claim that the masks have been dropped. 138 
The real object under attack is delusion, not simply the 
absence of reason, but irrationality as a force that can create 
overpowering chaos and evil in government, philosophy, letters 
and religion. 139 The happiness mentioned above is shown to be 
delusive, because it avoids reality, and the reason for avoiding 
reality is made plain: 
How fade and insipid do all Objects accost us 
that are not convey'd in the Vehicle of 
Delusion? How shrunk is everything, as it 
appears in the Glass of Nature? So that if it 
were not for the Assistance of Artificial 
Mediums, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish, 
and Tinsel; there would be a mighty l~vel in the 
Felicity and Enjoyments of Mortal Hen. 1 0 
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The appeal of this illusory happiness is solely to the surface, 
because the more one probes into the inner recesses, the more one 
finds that truth "enters into the Depth of Things, and then comes 
gravely back with Informations and Discoveries, that in the 
inside they are good for nothing.,,141 
The truth may be unpleasant, we are (implicitly) told, but 
it is infinitely preferable to the shallow deception of the 
surface which conceals it. The controversial images chosen to 
convey this message - the "flay'd woman" and the dissected beau -
illustrate with graphic brutality the unpleasant, vicious reality 
that underlies all "Varnish and Tinsel". The argument that 
these images are excessive, or that they somehow represent a 
'positive' view of either creature, is debatable. 142 For 
Swift, however, the importance of these examples is that they 
uncover the fraud of happiness, for they res tate a point made 
earlier in the Tale, where the 'author' in his capacity as 
Secretary of the Universe has "dissected the Carcass of Human 
Nature ••• till at last it smelt so strong, I could preserve it 
no longer.,,143 The argument of the "Digression" thus moves to 
its climax, and the epicurean speaking voice draws the obvious 
conclusion from the evidence presented: the truly happy man is 
identified as 
He that can with Epicurus content his ideas with 
the Films and Images that fly off upon his Senses 
from the Superficies of Things; such a Man truly 
wise, creams off Nature, leaving the Sower and 
the Dregs, for Philosophy and Reason to lap up. 
This is the sublime and refined Point of 
Felici ty, called, The Possession of being well 
deceived; the Serene Peaceful State of being a 
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Fool among Knaves. 144 
In the light of our interpretation of the preceeding 
passages, this final sentence would seem to be both logical and 
inevitable. The irrational desire in men is for "security and 
illusion" ,145 and the evil of the Knaves is that they rise to 
power by providing both at the same time. The "Digression" is, 
therefore, a statement of the underlying moral principles of the 
whole satire. The tale of a tub format means that it cannot be a 
bald statement, offered with straight face in the midst of so 
much laughter and tomfoolery. 
satirised objects of the Tale 
Nevertheless, all the other 
modern critics, fanatic 
preachers, glib philosophers, writers of sugar-coated homilies 
and the rest are sufferers from this delusion which the 
"Digression" nails in crystal-clear fashion. Their offerings 
are, above all, anathematical to truth; they are peddlars of 
lies, fake surfaces and nonsense, all passed off as the genuine 
article. This passage demonstrates, once and for all, that the 
bedrock conviction beneath Swift .... s satire is not misanthropy or 
spleen; it is the unbending desire to expose both the systematic 
distortion of truth, and the bland acceptance of this distortion 
- by others - as truth. 
However, acceptance of the above interpretation of the 
bedevilling "Digression" does not, cannot, resolve the central 
dilemma of the Tale and its attendant writings. For this dilemma 
revolves around the feeling among readers that, true as it 
undoubtedly is, the above is not the whole explanation of what we 
find on reading this great satire; and furthermore, there remains 
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an even deeper feeling that this 'something else' not only 
undermines, but ultimately contradicts, the reasonable, moral 
arguments we have carefully drawn from this most difficult text. 
What we have to deal with is the element in Swift's satire that 
goes beyond what he is saying, and seems to offer - or perhaps we 
should simply say suggest conclusions difficult to reconcile 
with the overt argument about religious behaviour and human 
reason.
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The problem, as is so often the case with Swift, is what 
we are to do with the message we are offered, for, as soon as we, 
as it were, pan back from the "Digression on Madness" to the rest 
of the Tale and the Mechanical Operation, we find that it is 
inadequate and difficult to apply to much of what we read. This 
feeling we have at such points is well-nigh universal among 
readers. What we are essentially faced with is a problem we 
cannot solve, for, when we look more closely at what we have 
read, we find that it does not tally with what we thought Swift 
was saying .147 As one critic has put it: "It is not easy to 
learn the lesson from a reading of the Tale of how not to be a 
fool among knaves.,,148 
This is largely because the satire seems to go beyond its 
proper remit at certain . 149 pOl.nts. For example, in the 
concluding passage of the central argument of the "Digression on 
Madness" we come across three points where we might feel this to 
be so. The two examples given by the 'author' to demonstrate his 
point about the surface being preferable to the inside seem to 
substantiate this argument: 
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Last Week I saw a Woman flay .... d, and you will 
hardly believe, how much it altered her Person 
for the worse. Yesterday I ordered the Carcass 
of a Beau to be stript in my Presence; when we 
were all amazed to find so many unsuspected 
Faults under one Suit of Cloaths: Then I laid 
open his Brain, his Heart, and his Spleen; But, I 
plainly perceived at every Operation, that the 
further we proceeded, we found the Defects 
encrease upon us in Number and Bulk. lSO 
The animus is suddenly diverted away from the supposed 
obj ect of the satiric assaul t, and a new dimension is entered. 
Truth versus delusion no longer seems relevant to the point being 
made, and the point being made raises disturbing questions for 
the reader, questions which he can neither answer nor properly 
understand. If Swift had used the beau and the whore as he does 
elsewhere, especially in the poems, where their habits and 
immorality are used to exemplify the surface-depth dichotomy, 
this would be both appropriate and satirically acceptable. But 
the fact that Swift uses them in the way that he does is 
abundantly significant. After all, as Claude Rawson puts it: 
"If a whore .... s body alters for the worse when flayed, or a beau .... s 
innards look unsavoury when laid open, so would anyone else .... s, 
and the fact does not obviously demonstrate anybody .... s 
wickedness."lSl The satire here is directed against the human 
being as flesh, not as moral being. What does one do to reform 
one .... s bowels? What moral code will harden one .... s skin against the 
whiplash?lS2 
The .... photographic development.... process normally used in 
satire - whereby the reader develops the satirist .... s negative 
image into a positive statement is of no value in this 
instance, especially since part of the force of the passage 
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derives from its violation of this developing process. 153 This 
violation is capped by the final opposition, not of good and bad, 
or reason and unreason, we should expect to encounter, but of 
Fool and Knave, one which leaves no room for the reader to 
escape. This is the crux of the problem for the reader, who 
finds himself stranded between two unacceptable options. The 
uncertainty produced in the reader is an integral part of Swift's 
overall tactics, as the use of "Knave" shows; he probably uses it 
to disconcert and knock the reader off balance, and to extend the 
satire by this means to everyone, making self-exculpation 
impossible. The relationship between Swift and/or the 'author' 
and the opposition is unclear, and no line of enquiry seems 
likely to prove fruitful, so that we are left with little more 
than a recognition of the "imprisoning rhetorical effect,,154 of 
the phrase rather than any proper idea of what it actually 
means. The alternative to being a fool - which is, of course, 
what we are all trying to find remains deliberately 
unacceptable. But the most disheartening experience of all for 
the reader is to return to the body of the Tale in the light of 
this fresh evidence to see whether any hope or further 
elucidation - is to be found there. 
For when we do return to the body of the book we find that 
Swift's dual themes of corruption in religion and history - the 
corruptions in learning we have already seen to be more-or-less 
encompassed within the ostensible purpose - seem to go beyond the 
bounds of ordinary satiric practice. Even if this is only 
obvious at certain points, and in odd moments, it is in these 
moments that Swift follows most assiduously to their origins the 
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forces that shape human history. Whatever Swift's own 
predilections and beliefs in life, in art he gives over all the 
Augustan ideals to the demon of his imagination. These ideals of 
d d d "s t d L· h " 155 or er an ecorum, wee ness an 19 t, are nowhere to be 
found in this world, and those who would suggest that they are 
are satirised along with the rest. The satire may begin inside 
the bounds of such ideals and attitudes, but soon broadens its 
scope from lower-class grubs and critics to Courts, the Catholic 
Church, Louis XIV, Descartes, enthusiasm: a Hobbesian world of 
dog-eat-dog presented from the inside, as Swift enters the 
imagination of his chosen victims to look at the world through 
their eyes. 156 But, stranger than this, when these voices 
speak, they speak the truth that the 'saner' passages can only 
suggest: "that the world is a more perfect version of Bedlam 
Hospital.,,157 
This argument is substantiated, as we have seen, by a 
description of the inmates of Bedlam, men clearly fitted for a 
nobler destiny, but for a historical accident, or a misfortune of 
birth. But when the satirist takes us outside the madhouse, the 
point is more clearly and dramatically illustrated. The history 
of Jack, and the passing references to history, amply demonstrate 
the satirist's view that history is a tale told by an idiot: a 
random, senseless catalogue of complete insanity that cannot be 
interpreted in terms of reason or logic. Historical examples 
brought before us to convince us of this include Louis XIV, whose 
brutality and glory in slaughter were a mystery until the 
"Vapour" which caused it formed a tumour in his anus, and was 
immediately detected: "the same Spirits which in their superior 
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progress would conquer a Kingdom, descending upon the Anus, 
conclude in a Fistula.,,158 Swift adapts Lucretius , s atomic 
theory of "films" to his own purpose here, in order to explain 
history. These films deceive men into seeing other obj ects 
(humans) in a false light, and cause mental and physical chaos 
within. Hence a chasm is opened up between reality and 
perception of reality, which causes dire effects when it goes 
undiscovered. The example here is Henry IV of France, who set 
Europe a-tremble, and why? Only when he was stabbed did they 
discover that all this fuss and furore had been caused by "an 
absent Female, Whose Eyes had raised a Protuberancy, and before 
Emission, she was removed into an Enemy's Country.,tl59 The 
semen, being prevented from ejaculating, "ascended to the Brain", 
bringing about the other disastrous effects. 
The impact of such satire derives from the chasm between 
the rational interpretation historians and the rest of us like to 
foist on events, and the irrational, random nature of the 
historical reality. Louis XIV did behave in ways that were 
well-nigh impossible to explain, so why look beyond some blockage 
in his bowels? Henry IV must have been driven by some powerful 
force, so why not the sexual urge? The inclusion of Darius 
further widens the historical span, and adds more evidence to the 
satirist's case that some madness must be responsible for 
history, empire and philosophy. The point is made even clearer 
when introducers of schemes in philosophy "The Empire of 
Reason" - are discussed. Some "Vapour" must be responsible for 
such innovations: 
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For, what Man in the natural State, or Course of 
Thinking, did ever conceive it in his power, to 
reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the 
same16&eng th, and Breadth, and Height of his 
own? 
The seemingly endless line of candidates who are paraded before 
us - and occasionally speak to us - give Swift"'s overwhelming 
answer to this question. Driven by passion and irrationality, 
"the whole of self-deluding, superficial mankind is mad.,,161 
The reductive process by which Swift destroys his victims 
is even clearer in his attack upon the "Enthusiasts" or 
"Fanaticks".162 This attack is made when mad Jack forms his 
own religious sect, called the "Aeolists", whose religion derives 
from the belief that the origin of everything is the "Anima 
Mundi" or wind of the world. Since the source of all is wind, 
they "affirm the Gift of BELCHING, to be the noblest Act of a 
Rational Creature.,,163 But the imagery quickly moves beyond 
the merely humorous, and the association between wind and spirit 
deepens as the Mysteries and Rites are described. Bellows are 
applied to the backsides of preachers in order to provide the 
source of their ... inspiration .... The process is described in 
graphic detail: "a secret Funnel is also convey"'d from his 
Posteriors, or the Bottom of the Barrel ••• whereupon, you behold 
him Swell immediately to the Shape and Size of his Vessel. In 
this posture he disembogues whole Tempests upon his Auditory, as 
the Spirit from beneath gives him utterance.,,164 
The key expression is "Spirit from beneath", because this 
is what Swift is trying to convey: an association in the mind of 
the reader between these religious fanatics and the lower 
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faculties, never the higher faculties from which they themselves 
claim to derive their .... spiri tual.... sustenance. The disreputable 
origins of such inspiration are further displayed when the sexual 
aspect is brought to our attention. Among the "wise Aeolis ts" 
women are sometimes thought to be better orators than men because 
their 
Organs were understood to be better disposed for 
the Admission of those Oracular Gusts, as entring 
and passing up thro.... a Receptacle of greater 
Capacity, and causing also a Pruriency by the 
way, such as with due Management, hath been 
ref in e d fro mac a rna I , in t 0 aSp i r i t ua I 
Exstasie. 165 
Even whilst bearing in mind the object of Swift .... s attack - and it 
is a devastating blow against some of the antinomian excesses of 
the Civil War - it is difficult not to find this kind of thing 
disturbing, not from prudishness or moral disdain, but from a 
normal critical standpoint. What are we to make of such images? 
Are we to ignore them, dismiss them, or denigrate their impact in 
the cause of redeeming Swift from charges of excess and 
blasphemy? The images are excessive, not least because of their 
enveloping insistence that the roots of all spiritual activity 
and feeling lie in foul matter, in wind and sexual 
gratification. 166 
The pursuit of this contention is followed to its logical 
conclusion in the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, where it is 
expressed as a belief that "the seed or Principle, which has ever 
put Men upon Visions in Things Invisible, is of a Corporeal 
Nature.,,167 The hubris of mankind is to believe that the body 
can be transcended and some nirvana of spirituality entered. 
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This is where the attack on Jack sweeps well beyond that on Peter 
(despite Swift's claims to the 168 contrary), because it deals 
not with a crook, a con-man, a tyrant or a mountebank, but a 
proselytising madman, who believes every word of the fantastic 
drivel he delivers to his congregation. Swift traces this 
fanatical self-delusion to its origins, comparing the peroration 
to its bodily counterpart: 
in the Height and Orgasmus of their spiritual 
exercise it has been frequent with them *****; 
immediately after which, they found the spirit to 
relax and flag of a sudden with the Nerv1t,~ and 
they were forced to hasten to a Conclusion. 
The brutal conclusion is that all pretension to rise above matter 
is doomed to failure, for we are too firmly rooted in it .170 
The example of Thales is offered as the paradigm of all such 
self-deluding dreamers. In this he is like Strephon in the 
poems; he must learn the hardest lesson of all, and learn it the 
hardest way of all: 
Nor, wonder how I lost my wits· 
Oh! Celia, Celia, Celia shits!i71 
The lesson Strephon learns, then, is that those who entertain 
preposterous romantic notions about humanity are bound to come to 
grief in the end. Whether philosopher, King, Grub-Street hack or 
Puritan fanatic, the message remains the same: "subtending every 
romantic dream is a bedrock of physiology.,,172 
The final effect of such satire is to dissuade the reader 
from Christianity, for, even if Swift says he attacks only 
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Papists and Dissenters, they are nevertheless the two central 
groups within the Christian tradition. As one critic puts it: 
"His development of the mechanical operation of the spirit leaves 
precious little room for genuine spirituality. ,,173 He includes 
Church history, the history of kings, absurd religious dogma as 
evidence; but man is nowhere to be found behind the various 
costumes, stage machinery and tricks of wind, semen and other 
bodily matter .174 It seems as though, by adopting a parodic 
countenance, Swift is freed to tell us the filthy truth about 
oursel ves, a truth he could never express in propria persona. 
Sexuality and its drives are central to Swift's psychology of 
human public behaviour. In order to express this truth, he must 
don the fool's motley. In this way, he looks at the world for 
evidence of rationality, and finds none. Seeing only hypocrisy, 
egotism and social conditioning, his fool condemns all history, 
all religion, and beneath the Augustan parody we find the madman 
with his terrible truth about the human condition; and Swift can 
always hide behind the masque, the game and deny all knowledge 
that he is saying anything of the sort .175 Needless to say, 
modern critics have been only too anxious to agree with him, and 
pull him back from the nihilistic abyss inhabited by his fool. 
"We share the author's creative liberty, not the supposed 
Author's captivity in chaos", says one. 176 "Swift stands well 
aloof from the drama taking place upon his stage",177 says 
another, and these are but representatives of a wider body of 
critics determined to distance the satirist from his work. 
But, if we are to apply such ideas to the text 
particularly the notion that 'compromise' is intended - we will 
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find that the problems remain. For, whatever the status of 
Martin, religion as a whole must suffer from the implicit denial 
of spirituality and religious rites when one reads the following: 
Who, that sees a little paultry Mortal, droning, 
and dreaming, and drivelling to a Multitude, can 
think it agreeable to common good sense, that 
either Heaven or Hell should be put f9 the 
Trouble of Influence upon what he is about? 8 
Such a sentiment, if accepted, cannot be limi ted in its 
application, and since it underlines the evidence presented on 
nearly every page of the Tale, we must presume that Swift did 
mean it to be accepted. 179 
The truly subversive conclusion offered by the Tale 
appears to be that irrationality is the source of all human 
actions. Swift decries the acceptance of "common forms", 180 
yet curiosity is hardly recommended. To accept surfaces 
"Tinsel and Varnish" - is to be shallow; to delve into the depths 
is pompous, and ultimately heart-breaking, for what do we find? 
The dissection of the beau is the image which conveys this most 
clearly. His vision of the sublime teaches us sublimation, for 
spirituality is human nature in Sunday glad rags; our 'spiritual' 
pastimes are rooted firmly in our animal nature ("ways of 
ejaculating the Soul", as Swift puts it quite bluntly). This is 
all a million miles away from any idea of Augustan decorum that 
Swift may have learned from Sir William Temple, and the farther 
we proceed into the inner recesses of the Tale, the farther we 
travel from the expected ironic responses. The object of the 
satire ceases to be pretended wisdom, inane or misleading 
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philosophy, silly theorising and religious cant, and becomes an 
assault upon the man who assumes that he possesses the rational 
faculties (and sublime faculties) which raise him above the level 
of the victims presented. 181 The metaphors become literal 
truths. Puritans are not like sexual perverts: they are sexual 
perverts. 182 Kings and great men do not occasionally behave in 
ways that appear to make them worthy inmates of a sanatorium: 
they are out of their tiny minds. This is the major strength of 
Swift, the area in which his true genius is most effectively 
employed. For his utopianism and his presentation of rational 
but ultimately insipid ideals are manifestly less successful and 
inspired than his assaults on the enemies of those ideals. The 
argument that the best form of defence is attack is nowhere more 
clearly substantiated than in Swift's satire, where tepid defence 
becomes an exuberant and brilliant attack on loathsome reality 
and the fraudulence of human claims to reason. The attack on the 
"Empire of Reason" produces a conclusion, but not the one we 
might expect. The world at large - the only world there is is 
not an empire of unreason, but the Empire of Bedlam. 183 The 
book places before us "the idea that man and the truth are not 
companions along the same road, but that the choice is between 
the annihilating truth and a delusive hope that alone guarantees 
survival.,,184 What we are faced with at the end is what Swift 
himself - in the guise of his fool - wants us to be left with, 
for this is the real truth that underlies all his major satires: 
the appalling anxiety of being a man. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE HUMANIST HERESY 
When Denis Donoghue suggests in a short but challenging 
article on Gulliver's Travels that it "has become a dauntingly 
'modern' book again in the last 15 or 20 years, because it 
presents as fiction what many of us are troubled by as fact", 1 
he introduces what is perhaps the most striking of the book's 
insinuatingly prophetic themes, and one which, perhaps above all, 
links the great satirist with our own age. Gulliver, on this 
view, is a blank tape upon which each society with which he comes 
into contact may write its own message, its instructions, which 
will be absorbed and obeyed by the hero of the book. 2 
Donoghue's evidence centres upon the readiness with which 
Gulliver accepts his environment in the Fourth Voyage to the 
extent of eradicating - or rather, to his grief, unsuccessfully 
trying to eradicate - the instructions imprinted on the databank 
he calls his brain by his first social surroundings, namely 
eighteenth-century England. The profound effect upon Gulliver of 
such brainwashing (as Donoghue calls it) is, as we have seen, the 
source of most debate surrounding the Travels, since the vital 
knowledge of Swift's approval or disapproval is lacking. 3 
However one may eventually resolve this crucial dilemma, 
Donoghue's argument that Swift is offering us a general truth 
about humanity seems to hold water, since the evidence for the 
view that Swift is saying that the society which surrounds us 
dominates us, and forms the essence of what we are, abounds in 
the Travels. 
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Wherever Gulliver finds himself, he adopts not only the 
language and clothes of his peers, but absorbs their world-view, 
their manners, their customs, and even their prejudices. When he 
saves the palace at Mildendo in Lilliput by means of a torrential 
micturation, he explains that it was possible because he had 
drunk a large quantity of wine, called "glimigrim". In 
parenthesis, he adds that "The Blefuscudians called it flunec, 
but ours is esteemed the better sort", exemplifying the extent to 
which he identifies with his captors. 4 Titles of kings and 
emperors are used with the enthusiasm and awe of a man who has 
lived his whole life among such people, not with the polite 
courtesy of a man who is an accidental, and temporary, guest. 
His unbounded humble respect is given in equal measure to the 
midget king ("Monarch of all Monarchs, taller than the sons of 
men; whose feet press down to the centre, and whose head strikes 
against the sun") 5 and the giant queen ("The Ornament of 
Nature, the Darling of the World, the Delight of her Subj ects, 
the Phoenix of the Creation"). 6 The man beneath, the essential 
Gulliver, is nowhere to be found by the end of the book, for he 
is not even the sum of his experiences. Each successive 
experience erases the one before, replacing old data with new and 
issuing Gulliver with a fresh set of cuI tural assumptions which 
he blithely espouses. 7 The difficulty he has in readjusting on 
each return to England comically underlines the existential 
problems he faces. He acknowledges as much at the end of the 
Second Voyage when, on his return, he behaves as though he were a 
giant, and his fellows pygmies, referring to "the great power of 
habit and prej udice". 8 
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When, at the end of the Travels, Gulliver is presented to 
the reader as a man trying every way he knows how to be a horse, 
discarding every trace of humanity he can manage, and even 
stuffing his nose with tobacco to keep the stench of his 
fellow-men at bay,9 the problem is both hugely comic and 
desperately serious. The extent to which we believe it to be 
either of these things depends upon our reading of the crucial 
Fourth Voyage, for it is only there that the disparate elements 
previously encountered in the Travels are brought into sharp 
focus, and the various lessons which Gulliver learns are 
summarised for us in several passages many readers have found 
hard to take literally, many hard to take seriously, and still 
more, hard to take at all. Nowhere is the contentious nature of 
Swift .... s satire more evident; nowhere the crucial nature of its 
lessons for our own age more crystal-clear. Our attitude towards 
the Yahoos and the Houyhnhnms epitomises our view of the great 
satirist, unless we deliberately focus our attention sharply on 
other works - for instance, the poems - to the exclusion of the 
major item in his oeuvre; it is there that the great and 
contentious issues are raised, and there that we must go to meet 
them. 
The survey of critical response to this part of the 
Travels, offered as the introductory Chapter of this present 
work 10 , indicated clearly that it is a watershed for all 
readers, and stated quite clearly where the present author stands 
on the major issues. In this Chapter, I propose to offer the 
views of one particularly important reader of Swift, and to 
indicate vital ways in which this interpretation affected not 
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only that reader, but, through its more subtle effects as it 
filtered through into his own writing, almost every reader of 
serious fiction today. 11 This author was a man whose own major 
works achieved a fame and notoriety not dissimilar to that of 
Swift, and, as I will argue, for reasons that were also not 
dissimilar. He would surely be counted among the writers 
described by Louis Bredvold as the "tough-minded" along with 
SWift,12 for in his most famous works we encounter problems 
essential, it is surely not too much to say, to be solved if we 
are to continue our existence on this planet beyond the next 
age. He is, of course, George Orwell. 
Comparisons be tween Swift and Orwell have been made many 
times, and, indeed, the link between the satire of Swift and 
Orwell's last two books is now virtually a commonplace of 
1 . . .. 13 lterary crltlclsm. The debt owed by Orwell to Swift is most 
apparent in the style and manner of Animal Farm, a comic 
masterpiece which draws heavily upon the treasure-chest of 
Swift's great comic achievement in the Travels. The use of 
animals and many of the ideas expressed derive quite explicitly 
from the Fourth Voyage and, given Orwell's own testimony on the 
matter when he describes Gulliver's Travels as one of the six 
most important books ever written,14 it is surely not something 
he would have sought to deny. The de bt , I would argue, goes 
beyond this specific instance of literary borrowing, and 
manifests itself in many ways not immediately apparent to the 
casual reader, and ultimately is to be found right at the heart 
of Orwell's own major thesis as it found expression in his last, 
darkest and most important book, Nineteen Eighty-Four .15 It is 
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here, as we shall see, that the vital link becomes most apparent 
and causes the vast differences between the two men, which only a 
fool would attempt to deny exist, to pale into insignificance 
beside a shared insight both profound and fundamental, and 
far-reaching in its impact upon the reader. 16 
Both Swift and Orwell were largely practical writers, the 
overwhelming bulk of their work seeking to convey an essentially 
simple message, namely, the improvement of society through 
commonsense logic and adherence to what appear to both to be 
obvious values. Their most famous works may be satires, but the 
majority of their material is straight, usually campaigning, 
prose. Orwell campaigned for a society based on equality and 
democratic Socialist principles, Swift for a society based on 
tradi tional religious values and enforced respect for authority. 
In their respective writings on language, both display distrust 
of obscure, affected, jargon-ridden speech, and for the same 
reason.
17 If their beliefs are to be put into widespread 
practice, the appeal must be to the common intelligence, not 
simply to cliques of the initiated. After all, since both 
believe that politics ought to be more honest, straightforward 
and consistent with a clearly-defined moral standpoint, and since 
both claim that their views represent common sense, it is, 
self-evidently, neither necessary nor desirable for practical 
writing to be difficult to comprehend. In his piece on 'Polite 
Conversation', Swift at tacks the kind of language which takes 
colourful routes to saying precisely nothing, which hides its 
hollowness in a mist of so-called 'fine' talk. 18 Orwell, for 
his part, bitterly condemns the language of the intellectual, 
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firstly for its unnecessary unintelligibility, and secondly, and 
much more important, for its perniciousness and its ability to 
provide aspiring tyrants with a ready-made tool to trap and later 
imprison the ordinary man. 19 In a letter about a book by 
Sartre, which he is to review, Orwell says "I don't profess to 
understand Existentialism", the implication being - since Orwell 
is neither a fool nor a follower of continental intellectual 
haute couture that Sartre is obscurantist, or at least 
over-difficul t, in his philosophy. 20 And when Orwell concludes 
by saying "I think Sartre is a bag of wind, and I am going to 
give him a good boot", 21 we cannot help but think of the great 
Dean and his attitude towards enthusiastic, mystical windbags. 
The crucial importance of language is as the primary 
communication between men, and for both writers this has a 
practical relevance. Both are, after all, what Swift called 
"Empiricks", because they want what they write to change the way 
men think and act, and therefore for his views to be clearly 
understood is vital to each. The question of influencing public 
opinion leads, however, to the greatest problem for the 
"Empirick". Assuming the meaning, intent and truth of what they 
write to be clear, why do men remain defiantly indifferent? Why, 
faced with such clear-sighted, unambiguous logic do people not 
act upon its truth? Orwell wrote volumes on the Spanish Civil 
War and the more general, and frightening, spread of fascism 
across Europe, arguing all the points, both broad and fine, over 
a substantial number of years, and eventually risked his life for 
what he believed to be justice and freedom; yet, as he bi tterly 
comments, the average man cares far more about Manchester United 
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than the burning political issues of the 22 day. Such 
indifference is the most bitter pill for the "Empirick" to 
swallow. If people argue violently for or against his writings, 
it proves at least that they are alive to its importance, and 
recognise that the subject-matter, if not the argument itself, is 
significant. In ignoring it, they are in effect saying to 
Orwell: "What you write doesn .... t interest us". As a great 
believer in the socialist democracy that is to come - the age of 
the common man - Orwell is rocked back on his heels by the 
realisation that the ordinary everyday man, in whom he places 
such faith, has delivered him the cruellest blow of all. The 
greatest crime of all is not to care, but how can a democrat 
accuse the majority without betraying his elitism? 
This is very close to Swift .... s most bitterly personal 
satire, A Modest Proposal. 23 Swift, the hero of the Irish over 
Wood .... s infamous halfpenny - where he had first of all to tell the 
people why it was such a bad thing - and constant friend to Irish 
liberty, who risked his very life as the Drapier, unleashes a 
multi-faceted assault on political abuses, exploitation and 
colonial maladministration. The underlying thrust of the 
argument, however, is against two satiric objects not immediately 
identifiable on a first reading. The English and their lackeys 
are the obvious targets, brutally exploiting Irish poverty and 
weakness, and the unforgettable, shocking centre-piece of the 
mock- treatise - the contention that if one is going to treat 
people like animals, one might as well go the whole way, and do 
it in an efficient, cos t-effective, profitable fashion, as with 
pigs or cows - is certainly directed across the Irish Sea. But 
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the underlying attack, a time-bomb that detonates only on a 
second, careful reading, is against the Irish people themselves. 
What he appears to be saying is that, since the Irish are such 
unthinking, heedless, defiantly stupid animals, this would be a 
fate that is little more than they deserve. The Engli sh are 
condemned for kicking the Irish into the ditch, but the Irish are 
d d · th' f . 24 con emne 1n e1r turn or not even trY1ng to get out. The 
irony is finally, and bitterly, at the expense of Swift himself: 
can he have been so blind and stupid as to believe that such 
25 people could ever be reformed? 
Both are shocked and indignant that the people to whom 
they have given so much, and for whom they have risked so much, 
appear to be neither interested in, nor capable of, change, even 
when such change is obviously in their own interests. As a 
rebuke to their presumption, they are obliged to don the 
hair-shirt of mass-indifference and reflect upon the folly of 
their ways. When Swift added the "Letter to Sympson" to the 
Travels, it was, at least partly, in this spirit. "I have now 
done with all such visionary Schemes forever" is, among other 
things, the end of trying to be an exception to one's own rules, 
the "Empirick's" confession of futility. 26 The lessons learned 
by each in these cases - Orwell in Spain, Swift in Ireland -
turned out to be profound. Swift discovered in Ireland that the 
Irish were Yahoos, 27 whilst Orwell found out in Spain that the 
battle for the brotherhood of man was capable of turning into a 
brutal internecine bloodbath. 28 More than this, however, Swift 
found looking round Europe, that all men were Yahoos, just as 
Orwell saw that all attempts to bring socialism about could end 
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in just the same river of blood. The result was that, given 
their far-from-abandoned mission to reform man and society, each 
set about constructing a maj or literary enterprise to bring to 
the attention of the world the insights hard-won from the bitter 
soil of Dublin and Barcelona; to give the world one last chance 
to learn a lesson it must learn: the truth about mankind. 
Despi te this shared experience, the discussion of Orwell 
in relation to Swift must begin with a kind of antipathy, for the 
starting-point of this argument is a close look at Orwell's 
direct comments on Gulliver's Travels, as he expressed them in 
his essay, "Politics vs. Literature. ,,29 In his reading of the 
Travels, Orwell goes along with much of Swift's criticism of 
human nature, but rej ects the conclusions about what is to be 
done as a kind of defeatist-escapist solution, whose obvious flaw 
- to Orwell, at least - is its reactionary nature, its defiant 
exclusion of progressive possibilities. Where, says Orwell, are 
the good things on the other side of the coin? The ostensible 
positives of satire centre around the possibility of achieving 
the good by owning up to the bad: crack the vicious shell of 
lies, folly and deceit which surrounds and incapacitates the good 
in man, and thereby free it from its imprisoned state to open up 
future possibilities of better things. But in Gulliver's Travels 
the crucial conclusion leaves the reader with the impression that 
the book offers no such comforting formula for improvement. The 
most positive conclusion that the book seems to offer us is that 
the best we can hope for is to stop being proud of our faults and 
corruptions, since they themselves are "in the Nature of Things" 
and therefore immutable. 30 Orwell is, quite clearly, not 
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prepared to endorse any such world-view and goes so far as to 
call Swift a "diseased writer".31 
What really irritates Orwell is the lack of progress in 
Houyhnhnmland, although he never, significantly, in the light of 
more modern critical suggestions to the contrary, doubts that it 
is meant as an expression of Swift's utopian desires. He attacks 
Swift's anti-scientific stance as narrow-minded, for it is 
important for Swift that the Houyhnhnms have no science, and 
indeed, much to Orwell's disdain, "appear not to have invented 
wheels".32 Orwell clearly disapproves of Swift's dislike of 
theoretical science. The only aspect of the Third Voyage to get 
a tick from him is the implication that state-control through 
spies and informants, involving falsification and fabrication of 
evidence, is an adumbration of the more widespread totalitarian 
practices of our own day.33 The issue that is at stake here is 
progress, viewed from two diametrically-opposed angles. Orwell's 
description of Houyhnhnmland as a "static, incurious society,,34 
is intended as a severe condemnation of Swift's defiance in the 
face of historical progressivism. He believes history to be a 
linear development and opposes Swift's attempt to stop a 
part icular point - and a point in the dis tant, pagan (Orwell's 
word) past35 - and dig himself in. But what, above all else, 
Orwell obj ects to is the "refusal of life" in Houyhnhnmland, 36 
the denial of other aspects of man's nature and civilisation. 
The horses, it is implied, do not have any enj oyment of life; 
worse than this, do not even seek any. Orwell says that "their 
aim is to be as like a corpse as is possible while retaining 
physical life". 37 But Orwell here, at the very heart of his 
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argument, seems to miss the real point of the satire, the core of 
the Fourth Voyage. The fact that the country lacks vitality or 
variety, the achievement of peaceful consensus, the absence of 
hea ted de bate discussion of the Yahoos is a pest-control 
problem, not a moral issue are put forward by Swift as 
positives precisely because they represent reason triumphant over 
progress. What the country lacks for Orwell is life, but for 
Swift such life involves hatred, brutality, lust, killing, greed 
and the other sundry 'benefits' of 'civilisation'. Swift is 
saying, in my view, that you cannot have progress without these 
things - they are the very mainstay of, and also the impetus 
behind, the Empire of Bedlam - and, since the best possible 
society ought to be free of them, it must, following the logic to 
its inevitable conclusion, consequently deny progress. 
The curious relationship between Orwell and Swift is 
abundantly clear from the concluding passage of the essay. 
Orwell says that "the durability of Gulliver's Travels goes to 
show that if the force of belief is behind it, a world-view which 
only just passes the test of sanity is sufficient to produce a 
great work of art. ,,38 From such inauspicious beginnings, it 
may perhaps appear optimistic to draw parallels between these two 
writers, but, obvious differences notwithstanding, a study of 
Orwell's two major works, Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
will, it is hoped, reveal similarities that lie deeper than the 
surface differences already found. 
Orwell's study of the revolution gone wrong in Animal Farm 
is, in certain clear respects, derived from Swift. The use of 
animals instead 39 of men, and the reduction of human ideas to 
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silly animal equivalents, achieve precisely the reduc ti ve tenor 
that characterises so much of Swift's works. 40 The tone of 
detached amusement almost throughout is reminiscent not just of 
the Fourth Voyage, though that is the obvious source of the 
technique, but also of the Lilliput episodes, perhaps even 
sections of the Tale of a Tub. Stalin is wicked, devious, and 
brutal, but somehow never frightening, as Napoleon, perhaps 
because he is, whatever else, a pig, a cartoon animal, and never 
a human being. The comedy depends upon an association in the 
reader's mind never quite taking over: we know who he is meant to 
be, and what his human equivalent in real life did, at the cost 
of millions of lives, yet, even as the drama unfolds, the reader 
is never fully involved in the action, as he is in Nine teen 
Eighty-Four. 41 As with most of Gulliver's Travels, the 
elements that make the book a children's classic predominate, so 
that the reader always feels himself to be above the action, just 
as he does in Lilliput or in parts of the Third Voyage. The 
various committees formed by the animals - The Egg Production 
Committee, The Clean Tails League, The Wild Comrades Re-education 
Commi ttee, The Whiter Wool Movement 42 - bring to mind the zany 
experiments carried out by the professors at the Academy of 
Lagado, where mad scientists bring to men the inestimable benefit 
of their talents, attempting, though never quite succeeding in 
bringing to completion, such worthy tasks as extracting sunbeams 
from cucumbers, breeding naked sheep, sowing chaff, and turning 
excrement back into food. 43 We laugh at what does not frighten 
us, and talking animals do not frighten us, any more than 
six-inch tyrants. 
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If we take Lilliput as equivalent to Animal Farm, and 
gauge our reaction accordingly, it is perhaps permissible to 
extend this to suggest that, in that case, Brobdingnag is like 
Oceania, with an atmosphere of foreboding and a threatening 
environment. Identifying with Gulliver in Lilliput, we laugh at 
the plots and the self-important pride, even when they are 
genuinely malicious and wicked. Identifying with Gulliver in 
Brobdingnag, on the other hand, we feel his vulnerability, 
recognising the dangers inherent in everyday objects and 
activities, and previously harmless beasts. 44 In the space of 
the Second Voyage, Gulliver's life and well-being are endangered 
by a small boy, a baby, rats, a hazel nut, flies, wasps, apples, 
hailstones, a spaniel, a kite, a snail, a frog and, most 
dangerous of all, a monkey. He is nearly drowned in cream, and 
is stuffed 
dwarf. 45 
to the neck inside a marrowbone by a malevolent 
Gulliver is, throughout, at the mercy of every man, 
woman and child in the kingdom, and is never truly safe until he 
'escapes'. Similarly, Winston is at the mercy of everyone he 
meets, for the most innocent-looking gesture a twitch, a 
momentary alteration of facial expression - could end in arrest 
and subsequent evaporation. At every point surveillance is 
maintained: at work, at home, in bed - especially in bed, where 
even unconsciousness can betray - in the lavatory. The terror of 
Oceania is not darkness but an unremitting brightness that 
destroys any notion of privacy, that exposes the slightest hint 
of "ownlife" as deadly. What was funny because small becomes 
frightening when large, and Stalin ceases to be either amusing or 
manageable when he becomes Big Brother instead of Napoleon. 
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Oceania is much more terrifying than Brobdingnag because there 
can be no escape. We are not tempted to laugh at people or 
events in Oceania, as we were in Animal Farm. 
Yet, though the events are often comic, the central 
action, and the intellectual impact of the book, are deadly 
serious. The art of Animal Farm and it is, without much 
serious dissent, accredited as his supreme artistic triumph -
cannot be allowed to blind us to the vital moral issues at stake 
in the fable of the animals .... revolution. It is the his tory of 
the Revolution Gone Wrong, and, furthermore, was writ ten by one 
who, all his adult life, wrote on behalf of, and campaigned for, 
the belief on which that Revolution was originally based. Orwell 
is not some right-wing reactionary pouring scorn on the failure 
of something which was anathema to him anyway. What makes this 
book, and its successor, so fascinating is that their creator at 
no time stopped believing in the good of the belief itself. 
Nowhere in Orwell .... s letters or journalism will democratic 
Socialism take a beating; only this or that individual, or this 
or that system. On his return from Barcelona, Orwell wrote: "I 
have seen wonderful things and at last really believe in 
Socialism which I never did before. ,,46 The upper-case "s" is 
deeply significant, showing that the political belief remains 
sound, whatever hammering its incarnation in the Spanish Civil 
War may have taken. Hounded by his own side, he narrowly escaped 
with his life; yet at the end of his book of wartime experiences, 
it is optimism that rides high. Why should this be? The poem 
with which he concludes Homage to Catalonia provides all the 
explanation that is necessary. He writes of an Italian 
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militiaman whose innocence and honest demeanour inspired him to 
believe that Socialism (upper case) was possible: 
But the thing that I saw in your face 
No power can disinherit: 
No bomb that ever burst 
5hatters the crystal spirit. 47 
The combination of decent, honest, ordinary man and just, 
democratic Socialism should be enough, in the long run, to see 
mankind through. 
A look at the plot of Animal Farm, however, causes the 
reader to pause when considering this. Briefly it goes as 
follows. The animals on the farm bemoan their lot, decide to 
oust their cruel master and establish a farm run by themselves. 
The pigs, as the most intelligent animals, emerge as leaders. 
However, after several dubious rules are instituted about food 
and working hours, which favour the pigs at the expense of the 
other animals, further changes in the Seven Commandments are made 
until the pigs are clearly tyrannical rulers, indistinguishable 
from the previous despots, and the only question the animals have 
to answer is whether they are worse off than before, or only the 
same. The motto "All animals are equal but some animals are more 
equal than others ,,48 remains as the bitter pill for them to 
swallow, and the concluding passage finds them unable to 
49 distinguish, physically, between the new masters and the old. 
Even from such a crude sketch it is evident that some 
difficult questions remain to be answered, if Orwell's status as 
believer in Socialism is still to be credible (to his 
fellow-believers, that is) .50 If Orwell's condemnation of 
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Swift's Houyhnhnmland as negative is to stand, how does one 
explain the pessimism of the twentieth-century man's animal 
fable? We should, according to the previous discussion, be able 
to find two things that redeem Animal Farm: a reliable creed, and 
an honest, good animal. They need not win in the book, but the 
fut ure will be shown to be theirs. Remembering Orwell's 
condemnation of Swift's denial of life, we recall also the 
passage where he writes: "The notions that life here and now is 
worth living, or that it could be made worth living, or that it 
must be sacrificed for some future good, are all absent". 51 
This is an essential item in the revolutionary's kit-bag, no less 
important than the sickle or the hammer, probably more. To work 
hard and sacrifice now for the benefit of others (perhaps 
ourselves, too) tomorrow: this is the very essence of Orwell's 
precious crystal spirit. If Animal Farm does no more than 
demonstrate that this spirit shines under any circumstances, then 
the fact that the revolution fails need not be disastrous, even 
if it must be inconvenient. If this conclusion can be drawn, 
legitimately, from the book, then the distance between Swift and 
Orwell will remain substantial. 
A more de tailed examination of Animal Farm reveals, 
however, that the pessimism runs deep, for in attempting to come 
up with an animal exemplifying the crystal spirit, we are obliged 
to settle on Boxer the horse. Boxer is certainly honest, decent, 
loyal and benign even mourning a farm-boy whom he thinks he has 
killed, much to Snowball's disgust 52 - and a society of Boxers 
would, surely, be enough to see the future all right. Yet the 
combination of his two mottoes illustrates the cruel irony at 
159 
work in the society, one exemplifying his industry, the other his 
loyalty. His first motto is "I will work harder" and his second 
"Napoleon is always right". He is not the instigator of further 
rebellion, but the upholder of inequality, because his 
combination of industry and blind loyalty are the very walls and 
bars of not only his, but every animal's, prison. His lack of 
intelligence condemns not only him, but his fellows too, to a 
life of oppression. His physical strength is thus effectively 
nullified as a threat to the pigs' rule. The animals who do have 
intelligence, such as the cat or Benjamin the donkey, are 
indifferent or selfish, aware of the reality of Animal Farm, but 
preferring cynicism to rebellion - Benj amin says that "hunger, 
hardship, and disappointment" are "the unalterable law of 
life,,53 though their combined forces would be of little 
significance in any event without the physical strength of Boxer. 
This seems to encapsulate the central, rather bitter, 
irony of the fable. Orwell presents us with good and evil but 
the possible success of good is destroyed by the fact that 
intelligence is on the side of evil. The pigs very quickly 
perceive that the other animals are weak and stupid, and it is 
the combination of these two qualities which Squealer, with a 
trick of the tail, is easily able to exploit. The suggestion, 
surprising but inescapable, seems to be that the good animals are 
incapable of possessing power because their powerlessness is 
intrinsically bound up with their goodness. This sounds more 
like Dickens 54 than Orwell, yet is the only conclusion we can 
draw from the evidence presented. There is no hope in Animal 
Farm of the good animals ever achieving power. If Boxer did kick 
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the pigs and their vicious guard-dogs to pieces, he could achieve 
power, but in doing so he would invalidate his claims on our 
sympathy, because his very lack of ruthlessness, power-hunger and 
intelligence is shown to be his most positive asset. He is saved 
from the corruption of power and forced to remain in chains 
because of his stupidity and blind, ignorant loyalty.55 
If we wish to draw a positive conclusion from the book, 
then we must settle simply for this: goodness exists; the crystal 
spirit is intact. But goodness exists at such a level, and in 
such a way, as to ensure perpetual powerlessness and subj ection 
to slavery. If any reader can draw sufficient comfort from such 
a prospect, let him declare the book a qualified positive 
statement. For the rest, we must surely conclude that such a 
description of the crystal spirit, as it exists on Animal Farm, 
is far from optimistic, lacking even a glimpse of comfort for the 
future. It seems to be a restatement of the bitter, and, for the 
reader, infuriating, dichotomy in the "Digression on Madness": an 
update, for modern man and society, of the Fools and Knaves 
di vision we found in Swift. The situation of the reader at the 
end of Animal Farm at least is the same as it was after reading 
the Tale. As one critic has put it: "The available options 
within the text are unacceptable, while the acceptable option is 
not available.,,56 
In the context of Orwell's life and work, the book is 
surprising in one sense, predictable in another. Surprising, in 
that his whole life had been geared towards achieving democratic 
Socialism, and the book appears to suggest that this is not, at 
least under the circumstances presented within the text, 
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achievable, not least because those with the intelligence are 
shown to be a malevolent force. For this 'betrayal' Orwell 
received many harsh rebukes from the Left, being accused of 
handing the Capi talists a stick with which to beat their 
opponents. Yet, the book is predictable in that Orwell was, no 
less than a democratic Socialist, a believer in the intrinsic 
value of objective truth. 57 If the truth happened to be 
inconvenient - too bad. Comparing this life-long love-affair 
wi th the truth with his belief that Socialism, of one sort or 
another, was the future, we find ourselves a good deal less 
surprised at the book's contents and argument. Since Capitalism 
and Fascism were defeated - the first dying, the second dead -
the only question left was: which kind of Socialism will come to 
power, to fill the void ?58 Orwell's consistent denunciations 
of Stalinist excesses and brutalities, and his 
frequently-expressed opinion that it is vital for Socialism that 
they should be exposed and flayed, show, in crystal-clear 
fashion, his anxiety to avoid in the minds of the masses an 
association between Socialism and Soviet - or, indeed, any other 
kind of - Communism. 59 To become toadies to the Politburo was, 
to Orwell, to betray the cause of true Socialism, and to hinder 
its coming to power, not to aid it. Within this overall context 
then, the book appears at least to be quite comfortably 
compatible with its author's stated aims and objectives. 
Yet, to restate a case made in previous Chapters, this 
kind of argument cheats Animal Farm the book. For, to argue from 
external evidence that Orwell meant this or that, or believed 
this or that, is not really a legitimate approach for the 
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Ii i · 60 terary cr t1C. To say this is not to get up on a 
high-horse, or to pronounce one's verdict as though it came from 
the very top of Olympus. It is simply to state a sound 
principle, which becomes even more important when we deal with 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. One cannot import the life into the works, 
and sweep away the uncomfortable fiction with the broom of 
biography. Life and work are not absolutely separate entities, 
but they are, or may be, distinct from one another. Therefore, 
to suggest that the pessimism of Animal Farm goes deeper than a 
simple fable against the Stalinist model of a socialist future, 
seems to me to be legitimate and, given the text, inevitable. A 
follow-up fable to this one is unimaginable, or perhaps one 
should say redundant, since the action would inevitably repeat 
itself. Given this, how can the democratic Socialist society 
Orwell wants come about at all? The eventual, deep-lying, 
pessimism of the book revolves around this question, for if power 
and those who desire it are consistently bad, and if all 
tyrannicides are doomed to turn tyrants themselves, where is the 
light at the end of the tunnel? 
In the end, our reaction to the deep pessimism of Animal 
Farm is probably conditioned by our response to the form it 
takes. The material remains more-or-less manageable, even at its 
most depressing, simply because Animal Farm remains just that: a 
farm full of animals. This is, without question, something that 
Orwell learned from Swift, and, indeed, the book has usually been 
credited with the technique of Swiftian . 61 sat1re. The 
reduction of European history and religion to the ant-like capers 
of Lilliput, where serious and bloody religious strife becomes a 
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debate on which end of the egg should be broken first, and the 
representation of a calamitous revolution involving millions upon 
millions of deaths as "a record of barnyard chicaneries",62 
involve the same technique and achieve the same end. The 
intellect registers every nuance of the satiric thrusts, but the 
emotions remain stable; we understand the horrors, yet do not 
feel horrified. 63 
This is very far from the case when we read Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, Orwell's last and darkest work of fiction. The 
oppressive atmosphere of the book is not something that many 
readers have felt themselves able to surmount, and the rejection 
of the book's message by many critics has often amounted to a 
horrified recoil. Reaction to the book among a twentieth-century 
audience brings to mind the Victorian response to the Fourth 
Voyage of Gulliver's Travels, and the accusations of betrayal 
recall the charges levelled at Swift, for 'blaspheming' against 
human nature. 64 The bleak brutality and naked horror that 
characterise Orwell's novel have often been explained in terms of 
the disease that was killing him as he wrote, just as Swift's 
depiction of men as filthy, disgusting Yahoos was put down to his 
supposed disintegrating mental state. The mentality which 
concluded that only a deranged madman could present man in such a 
depraved, bestial condition, returns to suggest that only a dying 
man could create such a black nightmare of unrelenting gloom as 
Oceania. If the man who wrote Gulliver was, on this view, an 
atheist priest, the man who wrote Nineteen Eighty-Four cannot 
have been a socialist. 65 
It is not, as I will argue, a matter of coincidence that 
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both books should be given the same reception, for the view of 
man that each contains is not one that is ever likely to meet 
with approbation among most men. It is, however, a view of man 
that is almost identical in its conclusion, a fact which may, 
somewhat paradoxically, have surprised Orwell, since, whatever 
conclusions we may draw from his last book, he remained true to 
his own belief in democratic Socialism to the very end. It is 
perhaps hugely ironic, then, that the man who accused Swift of 
being a "diseased writer,,66 has been awarded that title in our 
own day by many critics, and that the verdict of Orwell on 
Gulliver's Travels, that it represented a world-view just this 
side of sanity, has been surpassed by the verdict upon his own 
novel, which has, as often as not, been found to stray on the 
other side of that self-same divide. 67 
Both Nineteen Eighty-Four and Gulliver's Travels set about 
asking the same fundamental question: what is a man? Gulliver 
travels, but his most important voyage of discovery is internal. 
He travels, essentially, to find out the truth about himself; not 
about exotic peoples and places, midgets and giants, flying 
islands, but simply about Lemuel Gulliver. Similarly, Winston 
rebels, as he is eventually taught by O'Brien, not to expose the 
wickedness and corruption of the society that surrounds and 
oppresses him, but in order that he may finally be brought to 
unde rs tand hi s own de pr avi ty • As one critic says, speaking of 
Gulliver, though it clearly applies to both: "he is his own 
greatest, most appalling discovery. ,,68 The shocking discovery 
for the reader is that Swift, who wrote his Travels to reform a 
creature whose belief in his own goodness angered the 
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· . t 69 satlrlS , finds a fellow in Orwell, whose novel seems not 
simply to agree with Swift, but, if anything, to go beyond him in 
its pessimism, not least because the vision of man which is 
exploded as a comforting myth was known to be shared by its 
author. 
The world of Oceania is, in many respects, similar to the 
world of most of Orwell's fiction. The drabness, bleakness and 
oppressive atmosphere that we find there are met, in one form or 
another, in places as diverse as Paris, London, Barcelona and 
Burma, and even the plot, the struggle of one rebellious man to 
understand the world around him and to accept his place in that 
world, is a repetition of earlier works. But, of course, the 
discovery by Winston that this is what he is doing is not the 
superficial plot, and the knowledge strikes both character and 
reader at roughly the same point in the book. The rebellion that 
ends in a surrender is familiar enough terri tory for readers of 
Orwell's fiction, but in the case of Oceania, such surrender 
becomes shocking, for the nature of the society is so brutal and 
powerful that the reader longs for a note of hope, which must be 
provided by Winston, for there is no one else in the book 
remotely capable of providing it. Flawed individual as he is, 
Winston is clearly the defender of the crystal spirit as it 
exists in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and, like the good animals in 
Animal Farm, it is to him that we must look for any positive 
statement in the book. When Gulliver enters Houyhnhnmland, and 
Winston takes up the cudgels against Big Brother and the Party, 
they do so as our representatives, and it is vital to establish 
this before examining their fictional 
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voyages. What is at 
stake is man's good opinion of himself, so that Gulliver and 
Winston represent the humanist version of our nature. What is on 
trial is the vision of man as animal rationale, and the 
representative defendants are Winston Smith and Lemuel Gulliver. 
Having suggested in Animal Farm that the good cannot 
overcome the evil, Orwell seems to turn the question round, and 
asks, can the evil completely eradicate the good? For the world 
of Oceania is indisputably evil, and the evil not only controls 
all life, but is all life. The Party has absolute power over 
every aspect of individual life, and has sucked the life-blood 
from every person in the society, turning each person into a 
single cell of a complete body: a universal social embodiment of 
Fear and Hate writ large. One element of hope alone remains: 
Winston Smith is carrying on a lone struggle to defeat the Party, 
or , given the dimensions of the struggle, at least to defy it. 
To remain human and retain the values in which he believes: this 
is his goal; a goal which would effectively defeat the Party, for 
it is humanity that is the enemy of the Party. Winston's 
positives are vaguely imagined and tenuously grasped because he 
is remote from the society which advanced them, a society which 
no longer exists. He believes in the value of words, and keeps a 
diary in consequence. He believes in the importance of the past, 
and in the absolute truth and unchangeability of facts, of 
history: "There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung 
to the truth even against the whole world, you were not 
mad.,,71 He imagines, and dreams of, the Golden Country, a 
place where life is better than in Oceania, where his humanist 
values govern men's lives. All his efforts are towards a 
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rebellion which will be meaningful, which will advance truth and 
expose the lies of the Party. In addition, his final triumph 
really, he loves Julia. This is his greatest act of rebellion, 
for it is spontaneous, instinctive, human, and, most important of 
all, affirms a shared humanity, a bond between people that must 
be the basis of a decent society. "They can do anything ••• but 
they can't get inside you", 72 says Julia at one point, and this 
belief must be proved true if the rebellion is to succeed. 
The black depths of the society are chillingly revealed in 
an ent ry in Wins ton's diary after he has been to the pictures. 
He sees several war films, and describes both the action and the 
audience reaction: 
Audience much amused by shots of a great huge fat 
man trying to swim away with a helicopter after 
him ••• the sea round him turned pink and he sank 
• •• audience shouting with laughter as he sank 
••• then there was a wonderful shot of a child's 
arm going up up up right up into the air ••• and 
there WI! a lot of applause from the Party 
seats ••• 
This passage strikingly reveals the inhumanity of the people who 
live in Oceania, but also recalls a passage from the Travels, 
where Gulliver is describing European warfare to his Houyhnhnm 
master: 
I gave him a Description of Cannons ••• Pistols, 
Bullets, Bayonets ••• Battles ••• Attacks ••• 
Bombardments, Sea-fights; Ships sunk with a 
Thousand Men, twenty Thousand killed on each 
Side; dying Groans, Limbs flying in the Air ••• 
trampling to Death under Horses' Feet ••• Flight, 
Pursuit, Victory; Fields strewed with Carcases 
••• Ravishing, Burning, and Destroying ••• I had 
seen them blow up a Hundred Enemies at once in a 
Siege ••• and beheld the dead Bodies drop down in 
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Pieces from the CI~ds, to the great Diversion of 
all the Spectators. 
The extraordinary similarity in both the matter and manner 
of the two passages suggests, firstly, that Orwell used the Swift 
passage, and adapted it to his own purpose - his frequent 
readings of the Travels familiarising him with many such 
75 passages and secondly, that the thrust behind the two 
passages is much the same: an attack on the inhumanity of men, 
and their easy assimilation of a callous, brutal attitude towards 
the suffering of others. The chief difference lies in the fact 
that Swift is saying that this is what we are like already, 
whilst Orwell is suggesting that this is what we could become in 
the future. 76 
It is, supposedly, this mentality that Winston is fighting 
against. As custodian and embodiment of the crystal spirit, it 
is up to him to transform such mass inhumanity, and to at least 
suggest the possibility of a restoration to power of the other 
P h P G h d h P f H . 77 h arty, w at eter ay as terme t e arty 0 umanl ty, t e 
tradition of which he is the last follower in Oceania. In the 
course of his struggle it becomes clear that the questions of his 
truth and his sanity can be answered by the Party. It is the 
task of O'Brien to prove to Winston that his truth is a lie and 
his sanity madness. The bitter irony is that he does this by 
exposing Winston's positives as methods of the Party, and shows 
that he is not a rebel at all, simply a muddled school boy who 
must learn to read the lesson of his life aright. When they meet 
at O'Brien's house, Wins ton and Julia tell him what they are 
prepared to do to overthrow the Party. O'Brien asks the 
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questions: 
"You are prepared to give your lives?" 
"Yes." 
"You are prepared to commit murder?" 
"Yes." 
"To commit acts of sabotage which may cause the 
death of hundreds of innocent people?" 
"Yes" 
"If, for 
interests 
face - are 
"Yes.,,78 
example, it would somehow 
to throw sulphuric acid in 
you prepared to do that?" 
serve our 
a child"s 
What they are saying is that, in pursuit of some distant, 
hypothetical better world, they are prepared to break every rule 
of moral and physical conduct which could give that world its 
validity. If they are prepared to "corrupt the minds of 
children" and commit the acts just mentioned, what possible claim 
can they have to goodness?79 
O"Brien has laid the subtlest of traps, by proving that 
they are willing to use the methods of the Party to overthrow the 
Party. This is a logical absurdity. To use fear and hatred and 
brutality to defeat fear and hatred and brutality, and expect to 
produce the Golden Country, is an impossibility. It is, in fact, 
acceptance of the Party, not rejection of the Party, and this is 
the first major lesson that Winston must learn in the Ministry of 
Love. Winston presumes that the vices of the majority can become 
the virtues of the minority. What O"Brien shows Winston is that, 
so long as fear and hatred are the driving force of minority and 
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maj ori ty, they are not on different sides at all. The same 
forces operate upon both powerful and powerless, and moral 
justification is dissolved. Winston is shown up as a 
power-worshipper hiding behind the disguise of a 
freedom-fighter. A more terrible revelation awaits Winston in 
Room 101, but first he must learn that the Party is invincible, 
and why. 
The methods of the Party aim eventuailly to wipe out all 
traces of the kind of dissent that Winston epitomises. The chief 
enemy is the past. When Winston proposes a toast to the past at 
O'Brien's house, instead of the future or the death of Big 
Brother, O'Brien gravely concurs: "The past is more 
important.,,80 During the later interrogation, O'Brien explains 
that Oceania is different from any dictatorship in history, 
because it controls the past as well as the present. No martyrs 
are allowed, because martyrs are witnesses that inspire future 
rebellion: "we do not allow the dead to rise up against us." 
Winston will be "lifted clean out from the stream of 
History".81 This task will be made easier by the use of 
Newspeak and Doublethink, since all thought processes alien to, 
or hostile to, the Party can be checked and obliterated by the 
self at the moment of thought. Inculcated into each person from 
birth, this process will eradicate both the idea of and the word 
'freedom,.82 Doublethink and the constant rewriting of the 
past are crucial. By making present reality the only reality, 
all appeal to historically objective truth is denied. Orwell 
himself, writing about German reports of bomb-raids on London 
which he knew to be untrue, sombrely admits that the truth of his 
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statement depends not so much upon 0 bj ecti ve evidence, but upon 
the ability to offer objective evidence. If the Germans win, it 
is true, he says, because "history is written by winners". 83 
He goes further in saying that "the really frightening thing 
about totalitarianism is not that it commits atrocities" - quite 
a statement for a socialist to make - "but that it attacks the 
concept of objective truth: it claims to control the past as well 
as the future".84 O'Brien admits that, until the scheme is 
perfected, Wins tons - like bugs in a computer program - will 
continue to appear, but, once perfection is achieved, the very 
possibility of revolt, of alien beliefs and ideas even, will be 
utterly eradicated. 
Thus one cornerstone of Winston's rebellion is effectively 
removed. As for facts, the statement by Winston that "Freedom is 
the freedom to say that two plus two makes four. If that is 
granted, all else follows,,85 is shown by O'Brien to be false. 
It only seems to be reality because it is accepted as such. But 
if everyone except Winston believes that two plus two equals 
five, because the Party says so, then how can Winston prove his 
sanity? He cannot; his case relies upon the existence of a court 
which accepts his standards of truth as legitimate. Where in 
Oceania could he find such a court? Nowhere, of course. O'Brien 
shows Winston that truth is a means to an end. If it is useful 
to the Party for two plus two to make four, it will; if not, it 
won't. 86 Without a contrary standard against which to prove 
the fallacy of such a claim, it becomes the truth. This point 
links up directly with the Glubbdubdrib episode in Gulliver's 
Travels, where the problem of obtaining truth from living men is 
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satirised. Gulliver can summon the dead, to whom lying is no 
longer advantageous, and be sure of a truthful answer, but the 
message is clear enough: only dead men will not lie. 87 Orwell 
fears this state of affairs where truth is relative and 
contingent; Swift suggest that it is already the case. 
Having established the ability of the Party to erase all 
other realities, O'Brien lays bare the heart of its reality. 
"The obj ect of power is power. The 0 bj ect of persecution is 
persecution. The obj ect of torture is torture. ,,88 It is 
absolute authority without moral purpose. Its 0 bj ect is 
self-perpetuation through subordination and domination. It 
obliges everyone to obey through indoctrination and force, and in 
this is both its nature and its object. Eventually everyone is 
to be absorbed into the Party, and together they will perpetuate 
the Party through "fear, triumph, rage and self-abasement"; by 
this means the Party's power will extend infinitely into the 
future. "If you want a picture of the future", O'Brien tells 
Winston, "imagine a boot stamping on a human face forever.,,89 
The validity of this - for the reader as much as for 
Winston himself - depends upon the validity of one of the final 
exchanges between Winston and O'Brien, in which the former tries 
to find the words for the thing which will stop the Party before 
it reaches its goal. He says: "I don't know - I don't care. 
Somehow you will fail. Something will defeat you. Life will 
defeat you.,,90 O'Brien replies: 
"We control life, Winston, at all its levels. 
You are imagining that there is something called 
human nature which will be outraged by what we do 
and will turn against us. But we create human 
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nature. Men are infinitely malleable.,,91 
Struggling to counter this thrust, Winston falls back upon the 
phrase that encapsulates the precious crystal spirit of his 
creator. What will defeat the Party is "the spirit of Man". 92 
Without a belief in a transcendent God, Winston and his creed are 
thrown back upon this last bastion of defence. But at this 
precise instant, O'Brien replays a tape of Winston's catalogue of 
deeds he is willing to perform to overthrow Big Brother. He has 
no answer; his depravity is clear beyond question, even to 
himself. O'Brien obliges him to observe his physical decay: "You 
are the last man ••• You are the guardian of the human spirit. 
You shall see yourself as you truly are. ,,93 A long mirror 
reveals the extent to which Winston has physically disintegrated, 
physical decay to match the moral decay just exhibited. O'Brien 
contemptuously sums up both: 
"You are rotting away", he says, "you are falling 
to pieces. What are you? A bag of filth ••• Do 
you see that thing facing you? That is the last 
man. If you are human, t~(t is humani ty. Now 
put your clothes on again." 
Winston is stripped, not only to the skin, but to the self. 
Every defence against the Party has been systematically 
destroyed. But even without the structure of the humanism that 
is his real defence - words, an unchangeable past, a tradition of 
human decency vaguely grasped a retention of his own 
self-esteem, his own sense of worth, dignity and nobility, would 
be enough, if he could sustain it. Even death could not destroy 
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such a victory: "To die hating them, that was freedom".95 
But Room 101 removes even this semblance of victory from 
Winston and his humanist dreams, for it is there that he 
discovers that even his one remaining virtue, his love for Julia, 
is erased, leaving him hollow, according to O'Brien's promise, in 
order that he may be filled by the Party. The sensationalism of 
the rats has often been derided by critics,96 yet it is not the 
specific means of extracting the last iota of self-respect from 
Winston that is really important. Any test would have produced 
the same result, for Winston's cover is already blown. 
Substitute any other method for the rats, and the result would be 
the same. The significance of his screams of "Do it to Julia t 
Do it to Julia! I don't care what you do to her,,97 is that it 
smashes irrevocably, not only the human bond between Winston and 
Julia, but the ability ever to form such a bond again. 98 He 
has plumbed a depth from which there is no return to the 
surface. "There were things, your own acts, from which you could 
never recover. ,,99 It is neither the torture, nor the fear, nor 
the 'confessions', nor the despair of other things or people, 
that finally defeats Winston, but a terrible self-knowledge. The 
crystal spirit, as he saw it in himself, is, like the paperweight 
broken by the Thought Police, smashed into a million smithereens, 
incapable of ever being reconstituted. What he has discovered is 
that he, Winston Smith, is rotten to the core. 
The annihilating self-knowledge achieved by Winston at the 
end of the book mirrors that of Gulliver at the end of his 
travels, and the myth at the heart of Winston's revolt - that 
man, or the spirit of Man, is unconquerable, that man is 
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basically good - is the chief target of the satirist'" s great 
work. Throughout the book, Gulliver, in the various roles which 
Swift obliges him to play, is the scourge of humanity or its 
chief proponent, 100 depending upon the way in which Swift 
chooses to attack the myth at the heart of the humanist heresy. 
Even before setting foot in Houyhnhnmland, Gulliver has amassed a 
dossier of evidence that men are rotten, their institutions 
corrupt, and their moral and intellectual pretensions no more 
than the beau's suit: a few rags that, once removed, reveal the 
stinking carcase of humanity. Gulliver has succeeded throughout 
in failing to add up the sum correctly, and not until his final 
voyage do we see his deluded mind stripped of its infirmities, 
enabling him to perform his final, tragic piece of arithmetic. 
We, the readers, accompany Gulliver, aware all the time that the 
set of cultural assumptions he takes with him are ours too, that 
the belief in civilisation is one that we share. 
At least one critic has noted that Gulliver, on his 
arrival, gets things exactly wrong, and, on his first meetings 
with both Yahoos and Houyhnhnms, makes the blunder that 
eventually must be corrected. 10l Meeting the Yahoos, Gulliver 
feels utterly(~"o\ ted. and declares that "I never beheld in all 
my Travels so disagreeable an Animal, or one against which I 
naturally conceived so strong an Antipathy.,,102 He is 
approached, repulses the impudent Yahoo, and is immediately 
assaul ted by an excremental volley from a "herd" ( Gulliver's 
word) of his fellows. Rescued by a horse , Gulliver discerns in 
its behaviour something approaching the rational, and observes 
that "if the Inhabitants of this Country were endued with a 
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proportionable Degree of Reason, they must needs be the wisest 
People upon Earth" .103 Gulliver's error soon becomes apparent 
to him, and his belief that some human tribe or other must be the 
masters of the country is soon exposed as fallacious. 
For Gulliver, as for the res t of us, the lessons of the 
book appear to be in the horses. If we are to leave 
Houyhnhnmland the wiser, we must, like him, study Houyhnhnm 
customs and morality, and learn to emulate their wisdom, sagacity 
and moral rectitude. If the book is Utopian, if it contains 
Swift's great positives and his vision of an ideal society, the 
message must be in the words of Gulliver's Houyhnhnm master, for 
the only other creature on view is the detestable Yahoo, and 
surely we can learn nothing to our benefit from him? This is 
Gulliver's view, and he sets himself to the task of learning from 
the rational horses immediately. However, the horses' insistence 
that he is a Yahoo constantly irritates him for, beyond a 
physical similarity - which he reluctantly admits - there is the 
rational gulf, the divide that separates man from beast. If the 
Houyhnhnms have upset this dictum somewhat, the gulf is at least 
self-evident between Gulliver and the loathsome, hairy Yahoos. 
But gradually, as the dichotomy between Gulliver's 
protestations of European civilisation - which, of course, come 
out as a catalogue of pride, chicanery and bestiality - and the 
description of Houyhnhnm society becomes clear, even to him, 
doubts begin to creep into Gulliver's mind. The conditioning of 
his earlier life has led him to believe that western civilisation 
is the supreme achievement of man, and that man is the crown of 
creation. The lessons he learns on his final voyage contradict 
177 
this. He is told, and comes to believe, that the word Houyhnhnm 
means "the perfection of nature". Furthermore, he comes to 
believe that the horses' society is the best that he ever has, or 
ever will, come into contact with. Its principal virtues of 
"friendship and benevolence" and the preservati.on of "Decency and 
Civility,,104 in the highest degree are set forth to be admired 
by Gulliver - and us - just as their programme of education for 
the young, stressing "TEMPERANCE, Industry, Exercise and 
Cleanliness" is surely to be approved too .105 Recognising his 
great good fortune in falling among the rational horses)' 
"-/ 
Gulliver lists the many reasons why a life among 
the Houyhnhnms is to be desired: 
I enjoyed perfect Health of Body and Tranquillity 
of Mind; I did not feel the Treachery or 
Incons tancy of a Friend, nor the Inj uries of a 
secret or open Enemy. I had no Occasion of 
bribing, flattering or pimping ••• I wanted no 
Fence against Fraud or Oppression; here was 
neither Physician to destroy my Body, nor Lawyer 
to ruin my Fortune; no Informer to watch my Words 
and Actions: or forge Accusation against me for 
Hire: here were no Gibers ••• Backbiters, 
Pickpockets, Highwaymen ••• Attorneys ••• 
Politicians ••• Murderers ••• Virtuosos ••• no 
Encouragers to Vice ••• no Pride, Vanity, or 
Affectation ••• no Scoundrels, rais1~6 from the 
Dust upon the Merit of their Vices ••• 
This is but a representative sample, but is enough, surely, to 
establish in the reader's mind an association between the Good 
Life - the great human goal, everyman's Utopia - and the life 
lived by Gulliver in Houyhnhnmland. Even if we do not admire the 
horses - and most readers do not - the beneficial effects upon 
Gulliver are there for all to see. 
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So what se ts Gulliver hur tl ing towards his eventual 
cataclysmic discovery, if all the above is true? Recognising his 
intellectual and moral inferiority to the Houyhnhnms, and also 
the fact that he will never achieve their noble status, he 
nevertheless buckles to the task of improving, to whatever 
miniscule extent, his behaviour and knowledge of true morality, 
and sets out the pattern of his future days: to sit at the feet 
of his master, assimilating whatever crumbs of wisdom his small 
intellect can manage. Fated thus, Gulliver is the happiest man 
in the world. But Gulliver is not fated thus. Even although his 
Houyhnhnm master has spoken in his defence, and acknowledges some 
progress in his pupil's education, he is, and must remain, a 
Yahoo in the horses' eyes .107 Consequently, he must leave the 
country, lest his modicum of reason added to his undoubted Yahoo 
vices cause him to lead the vile creatures in a rebellion against 
the Houyhnhnms. 108 
This represents the end of the road for Gulliver, but not 
simply in the obvious literal sense that he must pack up and 
leave. For, running parallel to the narrative of events that 
concentrate on the Houyhnhnms, their virtues and Gulliver's 
humility towards his moral superiors - the obvious Utopian side 
of the voyage - is another, darker series, not of events as such, 
but of pieces slowly coming together, rather like a large jigsaw 
puzzle whose picture is unclear until the last few pieces are 
correctly fitted. Gulliver already knows that he is not animal 
rationale, for he has seen that creature, and even accepts that, 
for him, it is an impossible dream. But his revelatory 
experience comes when he realises that there is another lesson to 
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be learned in Houyhnhnmland, one that shocks him, and reduces his 
status beyond what, even in his newly-enlightened state, he would 
have dreamed. 
The other lesson for Gulliver is in the Yahoos. 
Dissociating himself from them at every turn, he nevertheless 
concedes his "Resemblance in every Part but could not account for 
their degenerate and brutal Nature". 109 Yet as he proceeds in 
his description of European history, of kings, courts and 
ministers, of lawyers and crooks of every conceivable kind, the 
obvious conclusions are drawn by his master. The irrational, 
brutal behaviour of the Yahoos mirrors, almost exactly, the 
description of human behaviour given by Gulliver - not only in 
the final voyage, but throughout the whole book - and indeed, as 
Gulliver admits to himself, the humans usually have the edge when 
it comes to viciousness: 
I EXPECTED every Moment that my Master would 
accuse the Yahoos of those unnatural Appetites in 
both Sexes, so common among us. But Nature it 
seems hath not been so expert a Schoolmistress; 
and these politer Pleasures are entirely the 
Producftsns of Art and Reason, on our Side of the 
Globe. 
Like Europeans, the Yahoos "are cunning, malicious, treacherous 
and revengeful" and the cuI tivated vices of the civilised 
creature are shown to be there, in embryo at least, in the 
Yahoos .111 But the final degradation, and the one that strips 
Gulliver like the beau to his true state moral as well as 
physical - comes when he goes to bathe in a river. A female 
Yahoo standing nearby, catches sight of Gulliver and "embraced me 
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after a most fulsome Manner" .112 Typically of Swift, he 
obliges Gulliver to sit the ultimate test of kinship: the sexual 
examination. He who can father a Yahoo must be a Yahoo himself, 
possessing those specific - in the strict scientific sense of the 
word - characteristics that put the matter beyond dispute .113 
For Gulliver, this is the final revelation, the key to 
self-knowledge he came, unwittingly, to find. 114 
If Winston Smith is the last man in Oceania, Gulliver is 
his counterpart in Houyhnhnmland .115 As our sole 
representatives, they must take us up or pull us down. 1l6 The 
fate of liberal-humanism is in their hands, and if we object that 
they are particularly weak, we beg the question that logically 
follows: are we better than Winston or Gulliver? The conclusion 
offered by Gulliver's Houyhnhnm master is based on the evidence 
of history as presented by its champion: 
'He went through all our Vices and Follies, and 
discovered many which I had never mentioned to 
him, by only supposing what Qualities a Yahoo of 
their Country, with a small Proportion of Reason, 
might be capable of exerting; And concluded, with 
too much Probability, how vil11ls well as 
miserable such a Creature must be. 
In recognising the truth behind this verdict, Gulliver, for the 
first time in the book, adds up his sums and arrives at the right 
answer. The society he comes from, which he has loved, grown up 
in, admired and vocally championed throughout "is a society 
barren of virtue, decency and hope" .118 Having learned to 
value truth above all else, Gulliver cannot escape the force of 
his own verdict upon himself and his fellows: they are worse than 
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Yahoos, and all share in the guilt. 119 If there are 
superficial differences, the underlying kinship is no longer able 
to be denied. Gulliver, on this reading, belongs to History and 
the Yahoos, whilst Utopia and the rational horses are forever out 
of his reach. 
Gulliver has to leave Houyhnhnmland, we as readers 
realise, because there is no such place, there are no rational 
horses, there is only corrupt Europe with its corrupt history. 
The horses are a figment of Swift's imagination, and Gulliver's 
enforced, and bitter, exile makes the point dramatically. But it 
is the classic schoolboy mistake to assume that the Yahoos too 
are fictional, for the evidence of the whole book - not just the 
final few pages gives substance to every word of the 
denunciation of our society. "The fallacy of vous autres ••• is 
to assume that because the Houyhnhnms are an impossible dream, 
the Yahoos must be an equally impossible nightmare: the first is 
true but the second isn't.,,120 The real lessons of the Fourth 
Voyage are - as I argued in Chapter One - to be learned from the 
Yahoos, for, in styling the crucial dichotomy as one between 
Utopia and History, we have found that the Utopia is simply that 
- no place - whilst the History is all too real. The general 
argument throughout the book has been one that we have all been 
prepared to swallow, and the last voyage simply spells out the 
lesson for us. And the lesson is surely for us, for on what 
other pretext would such a book be writ ten? Our journey with 
Gulliver is made so that we - the "gentle readers" - share in the 
experience of self-discovery, and so that we may start a process 
of re-education that must begin with acknowledgment of our own 
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" k" ti 121 stln lng corrup on. 
In Gulliver's case, his response is both right and wrong. 
He is wrong to try to be a Houyhnhnm in the ridiculous literal 
fashion he affects, but right to recognise that the message he 
receives in the land of the horses applies to him. He does not 
attempt to evade the responsibility of his own culpability: he 
simply cannot handle it. In this he is no different from Winston 
Smith, for he too has reached zero-point in terms of 
self-esteem. For both, the truth, eagerly sought but 
devastatingly revealed, is, quite literally, annihilating. "An 
inexpiable guilt, a sense of personal vileness that locks the 
door to any remedial action - this is the worst torment of 
all.,,122 This is the final fate of both Gulliver and Winston, 
for neither has been able to hold on to the myths about 
themselves through the heuristic mill of their self-revelatory 
experiences. For the books' readers, the dilemma is 
identical. 123 We are meant to identify with the two heroes, to 
place ourselves in their shoes, and treat their experiences as 
our own .124 We surely cheat both authors - and retain our own 
myths - if we do otherwise, for what would be the point of 
showing how a deluded madman comes to believe he is a Yahoo, or 
how a second-rate, unconvinced liberal-humanist falls apart under 
th ' h d? 125 The conclusion of both books, as e torturer s expert an. 
drawn by the heroes, is really the same; in Eliot's powerful 
" h f· ?,,126 words: after such knowledge, w at orglveness. 
If reaction to Swift's devastating attack on the pride of 
man tended to be extreme, reaction to Orwell's last novel was, if 
anything, more so. The ad hominem diatribes against the great 
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Dean were rewritten in the context of an attack on Orwell"'s 
failure both as man and socialist. 127 Isaac Deutscher, in a 
famous essay, suggests that Orwell simply expanded upon the great 
Stalinist purges of 1936-8, and calls the book "a cry from the 
b f d ." 128 . f . a yss 0 espa1r, wr1tten rom the despa1r of rationalism 
which caused Orwell to view reality "through the dark glasses of 
a quasi-mystical pessimism" .129 Rejecting Orwell"'s own claim 
that the book was intended as a warning, Deutscher says it goes 
too far to be anything of the sort, and is instead "a piercing 
shriek announcing the advent of the Black Millenium". 130 So 
far from seeing the book as a warning, or even a prophecy, he 
concludes that it is in fact "an item in the programme of Hate 
Week" .131 Others have been less harsh on Orwell the man, but 
share the conclusion that the book represents a final despairing 
cry from a dying man. "The whole world, Orwell felt, is steadily 
moving towards a vast and ruthless tyranny, and there is 
absolutely nothing that can stop the monstrous progress.,,132 
The same critic concludes that "Orwell, in his last years, was a 
man who watched in horror while his entire life work was robbed 
of meaning.,,133 The subtle infiltration of biographical 
assumption is clear, and widespread, for no one seems prepared to 
take the book on its own terms alone. 
Other critics have been prepared to see Orwell'" s design 
for what he claimed it to be. "Part of Orwell"'s contention is 
that conditions could arise under which men are stripped of all 
personality and become emotionally and intellectually 
impo tent" , 134 says one, adding that "it is clear that Orwell 
did not intend Nineteen Eighty-Four as a statement of his 
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rej ection of socialist principles" .135 Bernard Crick, major 
biographer of Orwell, describes it as a "flawed masterpiece", 
stressing that the flaws lay in Orwell's failure to clarify where 
the optimism, which must certainly have been there, was to be 
136 found; consequently, he suggests that "Orwell was at best 
incautious, at worst foolish".137 His mistakes centred upon 
the use of socialism, since this provided an ideological weapon 
to the Right. 
Yet Orwell himself clarified his position on all these 
points. "I do not believe that the kind of society I describe 
necessarily will arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for 
the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it 
could arrive. ,,138 He goes on to stress the reason for using 
England as his chosen country. "The scene of the book is laid in 
Britain in order to emphasize that the English-speaking races are 
not innately better than anyone else and that totalitarianism, if 
not fought against, could triumph anywhere. ,,139 The society of 
Oceania is a "I . b I . h " 140 p aUS1 e n1g tmare that becomes the more 
plausible in proportion as it is rej ected. Those who rej ect it 
as a possibility may even be unwittingly laying the foundations 
of the Ministry of Love. 141 The moral of the book is, surely, 
"Don't let it happen. It depends on you.,,142 
The crucial dilemmas we encounter on reading Orwell and 
Swift have a reI evance to our time that is difficult to 
overstate, and the importance of correctly interpreting their 
essential message is great and urgent. The arguments offered to 
suggest that the world is not really heading in this direction 
must be met head-on, if the ground is to be cleared for a full 
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apprai sal of their importance .143 Since the complacency 
against which both authors consistently campaigned has remained, 
in large measure, intact, a brief survey of literary and 
philosophical trends may be helpful. 
The 'death' of religion in the twentieth century has left 
a gap which is not being filled by any comparable faith. The 
nineteenth-century optimism and confident belief in progress and 
the ascent of man falter in the face of the awesome reality of 
Belsen and the nuclear bomb. The linear vision of history, it 
would appear, tends not towards Utopia, but threatens instead to 
head in the direction of totalitarianism. 144 Orwell himself 
knew only too well the threat of totalitarianism, but not until 
Nineteen Eighty-Four did he come to see, or predict, that it 
could be the end of Progress, the terminus of his to ry. If the 
, death' of religion left a gap in men's lives, the death of 
progress leaves a chasm which is impossible to fill: it leads to 
despair. But, whereas a writer like Swift could afford to 
despair intellectually, because there was a God, another, 
superior, system of values, another frame of reference, 
progressivists cannot afford to despair, because they have burned 
all their bridges. In fairness to Orwell, he was not a 
complacent atheist, always declaring that it was simply a 
question of priori ties: sort out this world, and then we can 
think about man's place in a . t t 145 cosmlC con ex • Nevertheless, 
the implications for an age without religious faith are profound; 
the more profound when we consider the dominant literature of our 
era. 
P .. i 1· th t question the dominant factor in eSSlm1sm s, w ou , 
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most important twentie th-century literature: Heart of Darkness, 
The Waste Land, Waiting for Godot, The Fall, Lord of the Flies, 
Catch-22, Brave New World, and Nineteen Eighty-Four itself. The 
list is all but endless. Whether the central concern is the 
individual or society is immaterial, since despair of the one 
means, in effect, despair of the other. The specific focus of 
individual writers may vary, and the exact nature, and degree, of 
pessimism is not necessarily the same from book to book, but the 
underlying message seems to be the same: namely that something is 
desperately amiss in our world, and unless we face up to it, the 
future will be even blacker. Some books attack malevolent 
societies, whilst others expose the black heart of man, and still 
more predict, or suggest, that future societies could exploit 
either or both of these factors (social or personal) to provide a 
gloomy fate for our species. The message in The Fall and Lord of 
the Flies is that there are dark forces within man that crucially 
undermine society: the closing image of the Lieutenant and the 
cruiser in Golding's book clearly suggests an extension of the 
book's relevance to the adult world beyond the boys' island, a 
relevance underpinned by the world of Oceania, where the same 
forces have taken over the driving-seat of history with the 
disastrous and horrendous results we have already seen. If 
society is rotten, we must look to man for the cause; and if man 
is rotten, what kind of society can we hope to create? Despair 
of one need not mean despair of the other, but optimism, if 
present at all in these books, must be both tentative and 
conditional upon a proper, and thorough, self-knowledge. 
Even our best comedy is tragi-comedy the tramps in 
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Waiting for Godot, Yossarian in Catch-22 
- and its essential 
message, too, is the hopelessness of the human condition. The 
heart of, for example, Catch-22 is tragic: it is the truth which 
Snowden is hiding beneath his flak-j acket. That truth is not -
how could it be? - God, or Progress, or Utopia, or man's goodness 
- potential or actual - but Snowden's guts hanging out of his 
rib-cage and writing their message for modern man in a horrific 
confession over the flight-deck floor. Existence is physical, 
animal even, and society is the herd, the pack, operating under 
the same conditions as hyenas or coyotes (or Yahoos). The 
question 'Why?' is meaningless, painfully so. The Houyhnhnms' 
verdict on man's reason is vindicated, Swift's vision of the 
Yahoo no longer the raving of an embittered madman. The 
meaninglessness and emptiness which Orwell found in the rational 
horses ' lives, and recoiled from, returns as the truth of our 
existence, but without the compensation of a rational 
environment. What Oceania offers is a life based on that of the 
Yahoos. The only difference is in the relative sophistication of 
the future society. Yahoos with that "Tincture of reason" have 
achieved the technological revolution, and have discovered 
one-hundred-and-one new ways of hating, fighting, torturing, and 
killing forever into the future. The image of even the animal 
rationis capax is destroyed, because the instincts of the brute 
have proved to be 146 stronger. The bitter irony for linear 
historians is that the victory of Progress in history becomes the 
victory of forces of totalitarian repression, which repudiate, 
and even eradicate, the optimistic voices which gave them life in 
the first place, replacing a Utopian reverie of harmony with a 
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cacophonous Dystopia, a vision of freedom with a life of bleak 
servi tude, and a dream of perpetual peace with a nightmare of 
relentless war, hatred and brutality. 
The shadow of Swift falls not just over modern literature, 
but even modern philosophy, for the choices he offers us, and the 
anxiety that lies at the heart of his greatest writings, return 
when we examine such a philosophy as existentialism. The 
prophetic note in Swift's display of Gulliver as a man lacking a 
rockbottom self - noted at the beginning of this Chapter - can be 
seen when we look at the terms of existentialism. Man is a blank 
tape, we learn from observation of Gulliver: "Existence precedes 
essence", says Sartre. We are nothing until we, or society, or 
our peer groups, make us something; and then we can only be what 
we are made .147 The awesome responsibility is shown in the 
terminology of existentialism: anguish, abandonment and 
despair .148 The anguish is the responsibility for all our 
choices, and a compulsion to choose. Abandonment means that God 
is dead: we are on our own. 149 We despair because we must act 
without hope, for hope is cheating, since it involves 
propitiation of a God who no longer exists. ISO Existentialism 
is, in a sense, the opposite of that other modern philosophy: 
behaviourism. Behaviourism, at least, is comforting insofar as 
we are not morally responsible for our actions: Pavlovian 
responses are not moral choices. The very title of B.F. 
Skinner's book Beyond Freedom and Dignity, with its crystal-clear 
death-knell for liberal-humanism, reveals the awesome gulf 
between certain ways of looking at ourselves now, and more 
traditional views of the human potential, as Anthony Burgess 
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notes in his own study of Orwell's last book. 151 
Sartre sums up the situation for modern man, without God 
or an axiomatic belief in progress. He says that the optimist 
who thinks that the death of God still allows certain absolute 
values and norms of behaviour to remain, is deluding himself. 
Consequently, far from rejoicing in the death of God - as 
Nietzsche did in the nineteenth century - "the existentialist 
finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for 
there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an 
intelligi ble heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, 
since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think 
it." 152 Quoting Ponge, Sartre says "Man is the future of man", 
and this blank page is offered as the opportunity for man to 
f h " h" d" 153 as lon lS own estlny. 
In speaking of human nature, George Steiner has asserted 
that "the dark places are at the centre. Pass them by and there 
can be no serious discussion of the human potential" .154 Both 
Swift and Orwell applied themselves assiduously to just this 
task, recognising the importance of seeing man as he truly is. 
The essential link between the two writers is to be found in this 
forthright honesty. They deal with the possibility of man as we 
(think we) know him becoming extinct. Yet in their despair is 
our (possible) salvation. Orwell wrote about Oceania in order 
that we may, through remaining vigilant, prevent its coming to 
pass. But we cannot do that by dismissing the book as a bugaboo, 
one man's craven surrender to despair. It is not a surrender but 
a challenge, not a prediction but " 155 a warnlng. Similarly, 
when Swift portrays us as Yahoos with a little bit of reason, he 
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does so, not just to shock us or needle us or exhibit his 
and spleen, but to dare us to pick up the gauntlet. 156 
scorn 
The 
situation for the readers at the end of both books is identical. 
The ball is in our court. If we think we can avoid Oceania , 
prove it; if we think we are better than Yahoos, prove it. 
To grapple with these books is to meet, head-on, the 
central problems of human existence. The solution to such 
problems is clearly beyond the scope of this study or the gifts 
of this writer - perhaps any writer - but it remains essential to 
all of us that the problems be kept in the forefront of our 
minds, and it is not the least achievement of our greatest 
satirist that he achieves this end on nearly every page. The 
problems of being human, the difficult path to self-knowledge, 
the implications for the future of present scientific and moral 
attitudes, but, above all, the vital importance of seeing 
ourselves for what we truly are - not what we would like to be -
are constantly brought before us; and the questions asked require 
to be answe red. We may reject Swift's challenge, but the 
questions he asks will trouble our minds until we either answer 
them or destroy ourselves. If modern man wishes to survive, he 
must meet this challenge. The continuing relevance of Swift is 
that he threw it down nearly three hundred years ago, and it is 
still valid. The constant evasion by critics, readers and the 
world at large, of this challenge is perhaps the major reason for 
the importance of reading his works. We must keep looking into 
the pool, beneath the surface rags, behind the "jabber" we speak, 
until we accept that what we see is ourselves. That is the 
importance of Swift, the reason for this study, and the reason 
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why his epitaph is both fitting and justifiable: he did serve 
human liberty. 
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that it was only contumelious heretics who were burned. 
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46. Works, XI, 268. Even Socrates, however, had to debate 
with his opponents in order to enlighten them. 
47. The practice of eugenics in utopias generally is discussed 
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65. They are, of course, conformist and totalitarian, 
following the tradition of Plato, but, the authors would 
argue, for a very good reason: to escape the chaos of 
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67. 
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